ductive of this, and therefore it cannot save. The first is evident from sundry places of scripture; as in Matth. vii. 21, Not every one that says, Lord, Lord, but he that does the will of my Father shall be blessed; and John xiv. 21, If ye love me, keep my commandments; and Phil. ii. 12, Work out your salvation with fear and trembling; with several other places; which proclaim aloud, that there can be no admission into glory, without the obedience of an holy life.

And the assumption, that a death-bed repentance can produce no such thing, seems no less evident. For is it possible for a man to lead a new life when he is even ceasing to live? Can he work out his salvation when the fatal night of death is seizing upon him, and he cannot work?

Now since this is the condition upon which salvation depends, and since this condition cannot be performed upon a man's death-bed, it follows that all repentance that is acted there must be utterly ineffectual, as to all purposes of salvation. And thus much for the first argument.

2dly, The second is this, which though it may be brought under the former, yet, for the more perspicuity, I shall propose it distinctly and by itself. You may take it thus:

The only thing within the power of a dying penitent is a sincere purpose of a good life, and a resolution to amend; but this is not sufficient to save, and consequently, being the utmost that he can do, it follows that he can do nothing effectual to salvation. For the clearing of this we must observe, that whatsoever is only purposed, is for that very reason as yet not done, but to be done hereafter, and then

the argument proceeds in this manner: Either the leading of a new life, here purposed by the deathbed penitent, is necessary actually to be done, or it

is not necessary.

If it be not necessary to be done,

then neither is there any reason why it should be necessary to be purposed; inasmuch as action is both the cause, the end, and also the measure of purpose but if it be necessary to be done, then it follows, that barely to purpose it cannot be sufficient.

And thus, from these arguments, they infer and conclude the absolute nullity of a death-bed repent

ance.

But, for my part, I cannot be yet convinced that there is an absolute necessity to reprobate all deathbed penitents, and to exclude them from all possibility of being saved. It is an assertion harsh and inhuman, and at the very first sight seems to carry in it a contrariety to the merciful and tender spirit of the gospel; and therefore ought not to be admitted, but upon most clear and unavoidable reasons, and such as yet I see none to enforce it.

For the first general exception; that it naturally undermines the necessity of a good life, and takes away all strictness and holiness of conversation, and so turns the gospel into a doctrine of licentiousness; making it to warrant and patronize a continuance in sin, from the assurance it gives to men, that upon such a repentance they shall be saved at the very last.

To this I answer, first, by concession; that if we state all a man's actions in things spiritual, upon a perfect, entire freedom of will, by which it is in his power to repent when he will, after he has persisted in his sin as long as he pleased; so that he is so

perfect a master of his choice, as to be able to determine it to sin, or to the practice of holiness, at any time whatsoever: I say, upon this principle I confess, that it does in a great measure untie and unravel all obligations to an holy life. And supposing that a man were sure of the time of his life, and that it should not, by any unexpected accident, be snapped off suddenly, the doctrine of the efficacy of a death-bed, or indeed of any future repentance, would in its nature tend to encourage such a man to a presumptuous perseverance in sin. But then, considering that (as I have evinced already) no man has his life leased to him for any set time, nor secured from casual, fatal accidents, but that he may lose it unawares; even this principle itself, of a free, entire power in man to repent when he will, cannot, upon a rational account, warrant any man either in the delay of a pious, or in the pursuit of a virtuous life.

But then I add, that repentance is not to be stated upon the power of man's will, but upon the special grace and power of God, by which it is wrought upon the heart, whereby the will is advanced to exert those acts of repentance which of itself it is utterly unable to do. Now upon this principle I affirm, that to hold that a death-bed repentance may be effectual, neither cuts off the necessity of a good life, nor indeed encourages any one to defer his repentance till that time.

For, as I shall venture to tell any man, that if in the very last period, the last expiring instant of his life, he shall sincerely repent him of all his past sins, he shall assuredly find mercy; so I shall tell him also, that it is entirely in the pleasure and hand of

God, whether he shall be able to repent or no; and that he has no certainty in the world that God will vouchsafe him such a measure of grace at that hour; but much, on the contrary, to make him suspect and doubt that he may deny it him, and revenge the provocations of a wicked life with impenitence and obduration at the time of death.

And thus I think that the exception against the efficacy of a death-bed repentance is clearly removed, by stating the exercise of it upon this principle. For though I say, that a man shall be saved whensoever he repents, yet I deny also, that a man can repent whensoever he pleases.

Having thus made our way through this general objection, we are now to look back upon those two arguments that were brought against this doctrine.

1st, The first was; That no repentance can be saving, but such an one as produces an holy life, and is attended with it; but how can a man upon his death-bed begin an holy life, when he is even ceasing to live?

To this I answer, that the space between the first act of repentance, by which the soul is turned from sin to God, and between a man's death, be it never so short, even to but one minute, it is reckoned in the accounts of the gospel for an holy life; that is, any time that a sanctified person lives, is an holy life.

Now that this is so, I thus evince; for either this is sufficient, or there is required some determinate space of time, under the compass of which no man can be said to have lived holily: if this be asserted, let that fixed, determinate compass of time be assigned.

Either it must be the major part of a man's life, or a just half of it, or some set number of years or days. If the first; then he that repents and is converted in the fifteenth year of his age, and dies in the thirtieth, cannot be said to have lived an holy life, and therefore cannot be saved, inasmuch as the major part of his life does not come under the accounts of repentance. In like manner, he that is converted in the twentieth year of his age, and dies before he reaches his fortieth, must come under the same doom, as not being able to bring the just half of his life under this reckoning.

But this is evidently false and absurd; we must therefore seek for this stinted time in some set number of years or days; and here let any one shew me, whether it be twelve, ten, six, or four, or one year; or, to descend to days, whether it be an hundred, sixty, thirty, ten, or seven days, that a man must have completely spent in the practice of holy duties, before he can be said to have lived an holy life; but I believe it would puzzle any one to make such an assignation, or to find warrant for it, either in scripture or reason.

Wherefore we must reckon that time indeterminately which a man spends in this world after he has sincerely repented, be it long or be it short, for an holy life; and consequently I see not why, in those few days, hours, nay minutes, that a sincere death-bed penitent lives, he may not be as truly said to live holily, as he that dates his holy living from twenty years' continuance; and why the widow's two mites were not as true, though not as great an offering, as his that consisted perhaps of an hundred or two hundred shekels.