not only exacts punishment, but exacts it also in the very utmost degree: so that if God may dispense with one, he may by the same reason dispense with the other.

2. If God could shew the highest act of mercy to the sinner, before any satisfaction was given him, then he might also pardon sin without it. The consequence is clear, because the highest act of mercy (if any thing) is sufficient for the pardon of sin : and that he could do the former is evident from this, that God first found out and provided a satisfaction for the sin of man, than which there could not be an higher instance of his love and mercy. Nay, it is greater goodness, upon his own free motion to provide the sinner with a satisfaction, than to pardon his sins, that satisfaction being made.

3. If God punished sin by a necessary egress of his justice, then he must punish it to the utmost that justice requires, and the utmost that the sin deserves. But this is evidently false; for so every man, upon the commission of his sin, without any delay or respite, must immediately be damned. The reason is, because sin deserves, that immediately, and upon the very first moment after its commission, execution be done upon the sinner.

4. Add to this, in the fourth place, that our sins are debts; but every creditor has absolute and free power, without any payment being made, to remit the debt, and discharge the debtor.

Besides, God being absolute sovereign, has power over his own law, to pardon any breach or violation of it. Neither as a governor is he bound to see the injury done to the community by the sin revenged by the punishment. For though earthly governors

are obliged to this, yet God is not, because he is not, as they are, only a trustee, but also the proprietor of all things under his government; so that there is no right of community distinct from his own. For, as both the schoolmen and civilians most truly affirm, in Deo sunt jura omnia. And then nature asserts this freedom to every one, that he may quit and recede from his own right: for indeed he is sole and absolute lord and owner of it.

And thus I have proved God's natural freedom, either in punishing or forgiving sin; but yet, as to the economy of God's present proceedings, we must know, that God, by his own word and decree, having tied up his liberty, he cannot now forgive sin without a satisfaction. And therefore, according to the various readings of the text, propitiatio must go before condonatio; and there must be atonement before there can be forgiveness.

But now there is a sect of men who peremptorily deny, that Christ satisfied God's justice for the sins of men: and, amongst other arguments, much insist upon this, that God is said freely to have forgave us our sins. And they say, that a free forgiveness of sin, and a satisfaction for sin, are inconsistent, inasmuch as one excludes the other; for no man can be said freely to remit, or pardon a debt, when the debtor, either by himself or his surety, has made him full payment.

In answer to this, it must be confessed, that the reconcilement of these two is not so easy as some may imagine. But all that either is or can be said in this matter amounts to this:

That the forgiveness of our sins is not totally and in every respect a free pardon and remission. But

only in respect of those from whom this satisfaction is not in their own persons exacted: now, inasmuch as they pay nothing to God's justice for their discharge, it is a free remission to them.

If it be replied, that it cannot be called a free remission, since, as to the nature of a payment, it is all one, whether it be made by a man in his own person, or in the person of his surety: to this I answer, that it is so, when a man provides himself of a surety, and by his own means procures the payment. But here, since God freely of himself, and by his own contrivance, provides a surety for man, all that is done or paid by that surety is in respect of man a free remission. In short, when the creditor provides himself of a payment, without the least recourse or trouble to the debtor; it is as to the debtor a free absolution, at least equivalent to it.

And therefore, though God, in the pardon of sin, would so fairly comport with all his attributes, as to do it without injury or detriment to his justice; yet even in the satisfaction of that, he shews forth the glory of his other attribute, his mercy, in these two respects.

First, in the relaxation of the law, which required of every sinner a satisfaction in his own person. It did not only denounce death to sin, but it ran thus: The soul that sinneth shall die, and every man shall bear his own sin. But then God, by the prerogative of his mercy, was pleased to transfer the obligation, and to receive satisfaction from a surety. This was the first great instance of mercy.

The second was, that as he was pleased to be satisfied by a surety, so (as I have already shewn)

And certainly this was a glorious and unspeakable piece of mercy, a thing beseeming an infinite goodness.

For put the case; When man had sinned, and upon that sin stood obnoxious to the sentence of the law, and the fatal stroke of God's vindictive justice ; had God stood forth, and according to the first degree of mercy made this agreement and capitulation with the sinner; and told him, that notwithstanding he had broke the law, affronted his justice, and so became liable to death, the punishment that the law awards to all transgressors, and that in their own persons: yet out of his free goodness he would recede from the rigour of that law, and accept of a satisfaction from the hands of a surety. And therefore, if he should provide such an one, he should be discharged; otherwise he must expect to lie under the execution of that inexorable sentence.

What would man have done in this case? Here was mercy indeed, but infinitely short of his necessity. What should he do, whither should he go for some to bail him, much more to rescue and save him from the curse of the law, and the severity of his judge?

As for any thing that he could do himself, he could never be able to bribe or buy off an infinite justice. Should he come before God with burntofferings, with thousands of rams, or with ten thou→ sands of rivers of oil? Should he give his firstborn for his transgression, the fruit of his body for the sin of his soul? Why yet all this would be as short of satisfaction, as it is of infinity.

He must therefore be forced to look abroad, and

implore aid from some others; but from men he could have none: for as it is in Psalm xlix. 7, None of them can by any means redeem his brother, nor give to God a ransom for him.

No creature had such an overplus of righteousness, as to lay it out for another, lest, as the wise virgins said to the foolish, in Matth. xxv. 9, they have not enough for themselves. For all that they have is required of them; and so being due from themselves, they could not produce it to merit for another.

It would have passed the wisdom of men and angels, to have found out a mediator that might have paid the full debt to God's justice. For could any created invention have ascended up to heaven, and fetched the only begotten Son of God out of his father's bosom?

Could a finite understanding have contrived, much less brought about the incarnation of a Deity? clothed the Almighty with flesh and blood? and abased the King of kings to the form of a servant?

Could we ever have thought of such a mediator, as might be both man, to enable him to suffer for us, and also God, to give an infinite value to his sufferings? as might have an human nature to undergo God's wrath, and also a divine, to keep him from sinking under it. Such an one as might not only by his passive obedience loose the bands of death, and rescue us from hell, but also by his active righteousness entitle us to the joys of heaven.

Assuredly none but God, whose wisdom was as immense as his mercy, could have found out such a miraculous, stupendous means of our redemption.