import of the particle that, in the Greek va; whether it denotes the cause, or only the event and consequence of the thing, as in the 39th verse of this chapter, I came into the world, that seeing they might not see. Where we cannot say, that the hardening of any was the cause or end why Christ came into the world; but an event or consequence, that, through the pravity of their hearts, happened upon his coming. So the manifesting the works of God might not be the cause why this man was born blind, but a thing that occasionally fell out upon his being

So.

cause, to answer This would have

But still, the common reason of discourse does compel us to measure the sense of the answer by the nature of the question. Now the disciples' question was about the cause of this man's blindness, and therefore Christ's answer must be so too; and not, when they asked him about the them about the consequent of it. been to make them ask Christ one thing, and Christ to resolve them in another: which if he had, though what he said might have been a truth, yet it could not have been an answer. I conclude, therefore, that Christ means, that the manifesting of God's power in this miraculous cure, was the final cause moving God to inflict this blindness upon him from his birth.

And thus there is a way cleared through the exposition of the words, which briefly exhibit to us the erroneous curiosity of the disciples in their pragmatical inquiry into the reason of God's judgments, and the state of another man's soul. And on the other hand, they shew both the divine knowledge and excellent strain of charity that shined in

Christ's reply; in which, by a reprehensive shortness, he both clears the man's innocence, and vindicates God's proceedings, and so states them both upon a right foundation.

I shall now draw forth and prosecute the design of the words in these three propositions.

I. That men are prone to charge God's judgments upon false causes.

II. That not always the sin or merit of the person afflicted, but sometimes the will of God, who afflicts, is the sole and sufficient reason of the affliction.

III. Though God's will and power be a sufficient reason of any evil inflicted upon man, yet he never inflicts it, but for the great end of advancing his own glory; and that usually in the way of their good.

In the prosecution of these it will appear, how each of them is deduced from the text.

I. For the first of these, though it be an universal, drawn from a particular instance of the disciples, yet the reason and principles inducing them thus to judge being common to all, I think the case, though particular, may not illogically yield an universal deduction. Besides, it amounts to an argument drawn a fortiore, that if the disciples, who were continually under the nurture and instruction of Christ himself, were yet apt to lash out into such extravagant censures, then certainly other men will be so much more, who have not the advantage of so near an access to his person, nor of such familiar acquaintance with his precepts.

In the handling of this proposition, I shall shew, 1. The false causes to which men are apt to refer God's judgments.

2. The principles inducing them to make such false references.

The causes, in short, are these two.

(1.) Sin on his part that suffers. There is a generation of men who have built their faith upon the ruins of charity, and wholly cried up one, while they sufficiently acted down the other. These, upon the hearing of any judgment or disaster fallen upon any man, immediately second it with these censures; As for this man, we know that he is a sinner: for does not God single him out, and expose him as a spectacle to men and angels? Does he not punish him as he did Cain, so as to mark his sin in his very forehead?

As soon as ever the blow is given, then they fall to judge and guess at the cause: first they kill, and then condemn; first do execution, and then pass sentence. Certainly such a man is rotten at the heart; otherwise do you think that God would have thus thrown him away? He has not the power of godliness; for if he had, would God have seen him stript, plundered, and imprisoned?

And if, perhaps, such an one had been severe to advance discipline and suppress the factious, then, to be sure, they worry him home. Do you not remember how he persecuted such and such a precious man, such a saint, such a gospel-preaching minister? Now, I think, the vengeance of God has overtook him. Thus, when Cicero, the preserver of his country, was banished by a prevailing faction, then the rabble and rascality of Rome cried out, that the gods revenged his cruelty to Catiline and his companions.

And moreover, according to the example in the

text, they will arraign even the dead also, and charge upon a man the sins of his ancestors. Thus the curse must lineally descend from the father to the son, as part of the inheritance: one must be condemned in the other if the son is miserable, the father, no doubt, was very sinful. Does his estate perish and moulder away? Questionless it is because his father got it by bribery, or extortion, or the like.

Thus the name of the dead, which should be sacred and reverenced, but always spared, is unchristianly, inhumanly torn and traduced: the poor father, in the mean time, as it were, suffering in his son, and in a manner being executed in effigie; and the afflicted son having this further load added to his affliction, to hear the defaming of his deceased father.

But then, when they come also to charge a man's miseries upon his personal sins, how many surmises, presumptions, and whispers, shall there be of his supposed guilt! charging him with such and such secret sins; and those indeed oftentimes so secret, that God himself knows not of them. In short, they do the most unjust thing in the world; they argue what a man has done, by what he suffers.

(2.) The second false cause, on which men charge God's judgments, is hatred on God's part. They argue as Gideon to the angel, If God loved them, how could it be thus with them? For can God torment in love? can he kill with kindness? does the noise of his strokes and the sounding of his bowels speak the same thing? Certainly an enemy's behaviour must needs import an enemy's heart; and the violence of his own actions are caused and influenced

But such disputers should know, how remote their argument is from the truth: for God may strike, and yet not be angry; and further, he may be angry, and yet not hate. The hand of a father may do the one, and his heart may entertain the other; but to hate a son consists not with that relation. God may smite his creature, and yet tenderly love him at the same time. The air may be clear and wholesome, and yet very sharp. God may register the same name in the book of his eternal election, which he suffers to be proscribed here in the course of his providence and eternal salvation in another world is very fairly consistent with certain destruction in this. While nothing but storms and tempests encounter a man in these lower regions, there may be a perfect calm and serenity in the mansions above.

But let us sift this argument a little further: we will not from God's outward, earthly favours collect his love, and from the mercies of the left hand argue a title to those of the right. Why then, on the contrary, do we not use the same argument where there is the same reason; and from the severity of God's outward dealings, not conclude the certainty of his hatred? Solomon argues equally on both sides, Ecclesiastes ix. 1; No man knoweth either love or hatred by all that is before him. And he that shall make God's outward, promiscuous providences the marks of his inward affections, will spell that meaning out of them, that neither they signify, nor God intends.

This therefore is the second mistaken cause upon which men are apt to charge the divine judgments; namely, God's hatred of the person whom he so afflicts. If a man is signally brought low, he is pre