The object in view in the administration of oaths is evidently to elicit truth in matters of great importance. By an oath a person is supposed to confirm a given statement by an appeal to the Omniscient. Now, if we consider the thing, it will appear evident that an oath can be of no real value, or positive use, unless it be taken from principle; that is, from the love of truth. He who is lacking in this cannot on any occasion, however important, be said to speak anything from this only true motive. The very thing that will lead a man to assert, knowingly, a positive lie in the presence of his fellows, will lead him to confirm it by an oath. An oath in such a case is merely the repetition of the lie. The reason why he does not hesitate thus to take an oath is because he does not fear to utter a lie; or the reason why he takes a false oath arises from the prior event of asserting an untruth, and this arises from the absence of the love of truth. Nothing but the actual and abiding love of the truth will lead a man habitually to speak the truth. But some will say, "A man will fear to take an oath, though he be guilty of falsehood." This we know is a general opinion concerning oaths; but it is, we think, radically unsound; and is evident if we inquire as to the origin of this fear which is to deter him from the repetition of falsehood. We presume that the fear of God is here alluded to; if so, in what does the fear of God originate? Does it not arise from the very principle which we say must exist within a man in order that he may speak the truth habitually? We can see no meaning in an oath, unless it be taken from the real love of truth, apart from any sinister motive whatever. Neither can we conceive of the fear of God as existing in the mind apart from the love of truth; for it is this principle which leads a man to fear, love, and serve God in sincerity, and this alone. The conclusion to which we naturally come is this, that he in whose mind the love of truth is predominant will habitually speak the truth, and that his word is actual truth, as far as he is knowingly and conscientiously implicated, and that an oath, or ten thousand oaths, cannot take from or add to the real value of his testimony. So, on the other hand, he in whose mind this principle does

II. Does it answer the purpose intended? We have anticipated this inquiry, and shown that it does not. In order to make it more evident, let us refer to an example. We have a remarkable instance illustrating the point in question in the case of Peter, who, we are informed by the four evangelists, denied his Lord three successive times. Why, we would ask, did he thus deny Christ? What was his motive in persisting in this positive lie? It could not have been the love of truth, "for men do not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles." It was a sinister motive which led him thus to act. He feared to be recognised as one of the friends of the despised Nazarene. The fearof man brought a snare, and wary Peter was taken therein. Matthew tells us that on his second denial he confirmed it by an oath. Here we plainly see that the denial in the first place, and the false oath in the second, arose from the same motive-the fear of man. We will suppose the case of a jury. Twelve men are chosen, and required to take the oath, according to custom, that each will, according to his judgment, conscientiously give his candid verdict. Does this oath necessarily imply that each does so? By no means. The probability is, that if there was one in whose mind the love of truth was not a fixed principle, he would be swayed in his opinion by any influence rather than the right, or that his opinions would be given from a sinister motive. The oath no more secures the real conviction of each member of the jury than it gives them power to "judge righteous judgment." Of what use, then, in this case, is the oath? Is it not a mere ceremony? If the administration of oaths be necessary in the case of one class of men in civil purposes, why is it not in all cases? Why am I required to corroborate my statement by an oath, while at the same time my friend's is taken on the same ground without an oath? It would, we presume,

appear a lame apology, and excite even those who had visited the cave of Trophonius to laughter, were our august senate to answer in plain words, "Simply because your friend is a Quaker, and you are not." From this it would appear that, if all men were to become Quakers, this "sacred institution' would cease to be. As far as law and justice is concerned, does not the state admit that the Quaker's statement is just as true and valid without an oath, in civil matters, as another person's is with an oath? For the honour of common sense, to say nothing of respect to society, we would ask, Why is not an Episcopalian's statement, or that of any other member of society, recognised as true and valid without an oath as the Quaker's? The only imaginable case in which an oath can be said to answer the purpose intended is with ignorant and superstitious persons, who, not speaking the truth from the love of it, may be, in some cases, compelled to speak it from fear. Such cases are of rare occurrence, and never happen when there is fear arising from the assurance of present punishment. This is, we think, an unjustifiable course of action, to elicit truth by imposing a meaningless rite upon the ignorant and superstitious-a practice by no means in harmony with the nature and dignity of truth itself.

III. Is it in harmony with scripture and the spirit of Christianity? We have shown that the use of oaths does not answer the purpose intended, and that the state, in some instances, admits that it is not absolutely necessary. This is, we think, a sufficient reason why oaths are not, in civil purposes, right and expedient. A more decisive argument still is, that it is not in harmony with scripture; consequently, with the spirit of Christianity. The language of the Great Teacher, and of one of his disciples, is remarkably clear and decisive on this point. This, we think, is the highest possible evidence, and as such demands our earnest and candid consideration, whatever may have been our preconceived notions on the subject. "But I say unto you, Swear not at all; neither by heaven; for it is God's throne: nor by the earth; for it is his footstool: neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great King. Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your commu

nication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.” Thus does He teach us the simplicity and spirituality of the religion which should so far supersede that in which oaths were recognised as necessary under the Jewish theocracy, that all who became its professors should so love the truth as to observe it in all its bearings in human transactions; that all they say and do is to be the type of that divine life within which originates in the truth of God. "But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." Oaths, when taken, as it is supposed, to confirm truth, is "more than these, and cometh of evil." Infinitely more, then, oaths taken to confirm falsehood. The words of the apostle are an exact repetition of this sentiment.

In conclusion we may inquire, What is the general tendency of such a custom, as it regards the social welfare of the community? Here, we think, arises a great evil, as by it persons much concerned in civil matters are, by the frequent and thoughtless repetition of the act, led to the open violation of the third commandment, and an habitual levity on sacred subjects. "The frequent use of that solemn invocation, 'So help me, Gol!' is calculated to take from the sacredness of the obligation it imposes." It leads the ignorant and superstitious mind to regard the Bible in a light inimical to their recep tion of the glorious truths which it contains. Not long since we met with a distinguished lawyer of some fifty years' practice in the county of Northampton. The only bible, probably, in his possession, was the one used for the purpose of taking oaths in his office. At the expiration of the half century during which it had been used, doubtless, many thousand times, its appearance was that of some of those old family bibles thumbed and worn by constant use. Alas! how wide the difference! This lawyer had no family bible; his bible belonged to the office, and was part of his craft. We have the evidence of his nearest relative, who lived with him during the fifty years, that he was never seen or known to read one verse of it! Not long since he died, from the habitual use of brandy! Reader, beware how you comply with such a custom, which tends in the end to such levity and thoughtlessness on things eternal and divine. E. W. S.

First. We will endeavour to show that the use of oaths for civil purposes is right. We are aware that it will be used as an argument against us that our Saviour has said, "Swear not at all," and that this commandment is obeyed to the very letter by the Quakers, and two or three other sects; but it is a rule too well known and generally acknowledged to need supporting here, that, if we wish properly to read and really understand the doctrines of the Bible, we must do so by explaining one passage by another. God, in the third commandment, impliedly allows the name to be used on all proper occasions, for he only forbids it being used in vain. And may not the commandment of our Saviour be construed in the same manner? Is it not only reasonable to suppose that the commandment was given to prevent the improper use of oaths on every trivial occasion, which was then a far too prevalent practice; for, in the twenty-third chapter of St. Matthew, he rebukes the foolish and absurd oaths of the Pharisees? In Genesis we find Jehovah himself ratifying the fulfilment of his promise to Abraham by an oath; for we read that he said, "By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord;" and there can be no doubt that, in the moral code of laws which God himself delivered to the children of Israel in the wilderness, the use of oaths was not forbidden, but allowed on all proper occasions; and in several instances the punishment of death was ordered to be inflicted upon a false witness. This view of the subject is that which is taken by most bible commentators. Barnes says, "Our Saviour here (Matt. v. 33, 34) evidently had no reference to judicial oaths, or oaths taken in a court of justice. It was merely the foolish and wicked habit of swearing in private conversation-of swearing on every occasion and by everything-that he condemued. This he does condemn in a most unqualified manner. He himself, however, did not refuse to take an oath in a court of law, Matt. xxvi. 63, 64. Paul often called

our argument, then, in the words of the last article of the Church of England:-" The christian religion doth not prohibit, but that a man may swear when the magistrate requireth, in a cause of faith and charity, so it be done according to the prophet's teaching, in justice, judgment, and truth."

Secondly. We think there can be little doubt that the use of oaths for civil purposes is expedient. All nations, both ancient and modern, have, from time immemorial, used them in their courts of justice; and a perjurer has been, and is everywhere, severely and justly punished. In all cases, by the laws of France, upon a just principle of retaliation, perjury, at least upon capital accusations, whereby another's life is, or might be, destroyed, is rendered capital, and the offender suffers death; and there can, indeed, be no moral doubt that, if a wilful perjurer actually causes the death of an innocent person, he is guilty of murder. But, although our ancient laws formerly punished this awful crime with death, or the loss of the tongue as the offending member, corporal and pecuniary punishments, exile, and perpetual infamy, are now inflicted as more suitable to the enlightened spirit of the age. Is there not something solemn in an oath as administered in our courts of justice, where the witness swears to speak the truth, so help him, God? Is there not something calculated to prevent even the most abandoned wretch from committed the perjury he may have been suborned to, in the thought that, besides the civil punishment he may foresee looming in the distance here, there will be an eternal punishment inflicted upon him hereafter by that God whom he has just invoked as a witness to his speaking the truth? That oaths are regarded by such men as sacredly binding upon them is a daily attested fact. Shakspeare illustrates this when he makes one of his characters exclaim"This, in the name of heaven, I promise here; The which, if he be pleased, I shall perform. I do beseech your majesty may salve The long-grown wounds of my intemperance: If not, the end of life cancels all bonds, And I will die a hundred thousand deaths Ere break the smallest parcel of this vow."

We live in an age of progression, and we must all move onwards; but, though the laws of our country are being constantly changed and improved, I trust the day is far distant

when the proper use of oaths for civil purposes will be discontinued, and the laws now in force concerning them abrogated by the legislature. C. E.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar. No. XIV.

Junior Division.

Perform Exercise No. V., Vol. III. p. 239.
Senior Division.

Prepare a form like the one given, and arrange the following verbs, and their inflexions, under their proper heads:

Fall, fast, hold, halt, show, mow, snow, blow, crow, throw, cleave, heave, weave, freeze, steal,

speak, dip, swear, bear, forbear, tear, shear, steer, shake, get, eat, seethe, tread, bid, awake, grave, arise, abide, glide, slide, write, thrive, strive, climb, slit, bite, swim, begin, spin, win, sing, sting, ring, wring, fling, cling, drink, stink, meli, help, bind, grind, choose, feel, sweep, creep, lose, loose, flee, sleep, confess, hush, pluck, bend, send, rend, spend, lend, wend, gird, gild, build, shei, cut, cost, spread, hit, hurt, put, set, burst, knit, cast, leave, have, make, buy, owe, work, think, bring, beseech, reach, teach, seek.

II.-1. A noun is a name; as, John, London, house, box, thought, wisdom, intelligence.

2. An adjective is a word thrown to a nonn, to describe the person or thing, &c., which it represents; as, London is a great city; John is an industrious man; that box is a large box; that thought was a good thought, &c. Here great, indus rious, large, and good, are thrown to the nouns city, man, box, and thought, to describe

friendship

laughter knowledge affection belief hope

intentions

revolution

bloom trammel

affinity

erasure attendance acrimony fallacy ardour

the person, place, and things which those nouns represent; great, industrious, large, and good, are therefore adjectives.

3. A pronoun, or for noun, is the representative of a noun, or name; as, Jobn is here to-day; he (i. e., John) will be on the sea to-morrow. LoDdon was once a small fishing station; if (i.e., London) is now the largest city in the world. The house was large; but it (the house) was not