who in their individual character are required to attest their evidence by an oath, are exempted when united with others, equally liable individually, in the discharge of public duties.

These exemptions show that where, from character or position, witnesses are believed to have another motive for speaking the truth, the oath may be dispensed with; and that it is only insisted upon either where no sufficient objection is felt to induce refusal, or where a superstition as to its effect is entertained.

Fourthly. The evil effect of the habitual use of oaths in courts of justice is, I think, serious, and difficult to remove. The form of the oath requires belief in certain theological opinions to give competency to witnesses, and therefore disqualifies persons who are not unworthy of credence, and at times obstructs the course of justice. Every person who offers himself to give evidence may be interrogated as to his belief in the existence of a God, in a future state of rewards and punishments, and of the punishment of perjury in that state. Those who cannot reply in the affirmative are incompetent to bear testimony. Children, also, who are supposed incapable of comprehending the meaning of them, are excluded. In both of these cases there is a possibility of injustice being inflicted, or of a failure to convict the guilty. This arises from the inadaptability of the oath to judicial purposes. In a state where the civil system is framed professedly to give to every citizen a power to assert rights and a remedy against wrongs, the basis of evidence should be as wide as the stability of society will allow. The principle that is nearest the foundation of society is, that it is incumbent on man to speak truth and do justice in all his communications and dealings with his fellows, and the profession of a belief that he is bound to adhere to it is all that should be required as preliminary to examination. The only essential qualification of a witness is worthiness of belief; and

men who disbelieve the opinions I have mentioned as required to render evidence capable of reception, or vary from the received standard in the mode in which they hold them, and children thought too young to understand them, generally possess it. The evil of this disqualification is not an imaginary one. The rejection of the testimony of children, when doing so defeats the ends of justice, is not unfrequent; and a case has occurred in which a witness expressed doubt only upon the necessary points of faith, and was rejected in consequence, though no aspersion could be cast upon the integrity of his character.

Farther. The practice of judicial swearing weakens the public sense of the duty of veracity when unsworn, and so has a tendency to deprave the morals of the community. It is an inevitable result of giving to an action in one place a greater force than in another, to reduce its effect in ordinary cases. The imprecation of divine anger, from being sanctioned by judicial usage, becomes, on the other hand, a part of common speech to a certain class of society. It is used by them sometimes for deception; oftener, perhaps, in mere prodigality of protestation; and familiarity with it, unaccompanied with the experience of evil resulting from the breach of assertions made ander the sanction of it, deadens the feeling which alone can give it effective strength, and thus weakens its hold upon a witness when he is formally sworn.

I have thus endeavoured to indicate the most prominent considerations that seem to me to afford satisfactory grounds for denying that the use of oaths for civil purposes either right or expedient. Perhaps an op portunity may offer for more fully enforcing my views during the progress of the discussion; and, if that should be the case, I shall gladly avail myself of it; for I think the subject is not one of theory only, but involves practical questions, deserving of the serious attention both of moral and political reformers.

THE taking of an oath-which, rightly regarded, is a purely religious act, and perhaps the most solemn a man can be called to perform having degenerated into mere court business, and lost much of its solemnity and

E. D.

effect from the idle formality with which it is generally administered, we are not surprised that it should have become a question among thinking and serious men, whether this much-abused custom is not prejudicial,

rather than otherwise, to the interests of society, and, consequently, whether it be really a divine institution.

In endeavouring to set this subject in its proper light, we will, first, consider the true nature of an oath; then its consistency with the spirit and precepts of Christianity; and, afterwards, its bearing upon the interests of society.

The familiar definition of an oath namely, the calling upon God to witness the truth of a statement-is, to most, as clear and comprehensive as is ordinarily needed; but on an occasion such as this we had better attempt an analysis. This solemn act, then, implies that the person who performs has religious convictions-that he believes in the existence of a God-in his moral government of the world, and that he is responsible to that God for the truth of his testimony. Those who require him to swear are supposed to give him credit for these convictions, and to believe that he is actuated by them. Yet knowing, by experience and observation, the frailty of human nature, they are prone to distrust his veracity, and believe it safest to hear him speak, in matters involving their own interests, under an acknowledged sense of his moral obligation to God. Accordingly, this acknowledgment takes a solemn form of expression, calculated to satisfy his distrustful antagonist; showing that he is fully conscious of the solemn position in which his testimony places him in relation to his supreme Judge-that so conscious is he of rectitude, that he voluntarily places before his own eyes, in the strongest possible light, the strongest motives to speak the truth, hanging his eternal interests upon his own word, and not fearing to look up in the face of Omniscience with the truth upon his lips. All this is implied in the taking of an oath; and this act is thus shown to be one which a conscientious man only can rightly perform. It is a test of the highest integrity of character. Hence it cannot be derogatory to, but in perfect consistency with, the christian character; and, if so, it must be consistent with that which is the root of christian character, namely, Christianity.

But it has been urged that this practice is opposed to scripture and the spirit of Christianity. Our opponent E. W. S., how ever, admits that "this practice was in harmony with the religion of the Jews;" for no

doubt he has found, in the Old Testament, abundant proof that it was sanctioned by the example, and regulated by the precepts, of the most distinguished servants of God; and, also, that it had a most important influence upon many events in the history of those times. But E. W. S. says, in his next sentence, "Our endeavour will be to show that the use of oaths for civil purposes is not in harmony with scripture, and, consequently, with the spirit of Christianity." Here, of course, he confines himself to New Testament scripture. Accordingly, we find he comes immediately to the well-known passage on oaths in Christ's sermon on the mount. "This," he says, "is the highest possible evidence, and as such demands our earnest and candid consideration." We will, therefore, endeavour to give it an earnest and candid consideration, and view it in all its bearings.

Christ in this unparalleled sermon, after assuring his hearers that he was not come to destroy the law, but to fulfil it, calls particular attention to certain points of the law which had been grossly abused, and shows that in these abuses the law had been either misapplied, or altogether evaded; he therefore first quotes the law, and then points out the kind of abuse to which it has been subjected, showing that this abuse had weakened its influence and made it of no effect.

He takes, first, the law which forbids murder, and shows that, while they flattered themselves that they were guiltless of an open violation of this law, they had been accustomed to cherish all these vindictive feelings towards each other to which this crime owed its existence, and to which the law, in its spirit, was equally opposed.

Taking, next, the law which forbids adultery, he shows that although they flattered themselves upon their purity, yet they had granted themselves the liberty to indulge in all kinds of lasciviousness, only stopping short of the grosser sin, to which they supposed, or wished to believe, the denunciations of the law were confined.

Then, coming to the law which forbids perjury, he shows that their loose and profane manner of trifling with oaths-swearing by heaven, by the earth, by Jerusalem, and by their heads, in cases wherein they need not swear at all-in their ordinary communications with each other, when "yea" or "nay"

was quite sufficient-was fraught with evil, inasmuch as it led them to treat lightly the things pertaining to God. He further designed to show them that-as they had chosen these forms of swearing to avoid the direct profanation of God's sacred name, and, probably, to escape the obligations of an oath these objects (heaven, earth, Jerusalem, and the head) were more nearly related to God than they seemed to be, and hence became more binding than they thought. They were not to swear by heaven, for it was God's throne; nor by the earth, for it was his footstool; neither by Jerusalem, for it was the city of the great King; nor by their heads, for they could not make one hair black nor white; because, as he told them on another occasion (Matt. xxiii. 21, 22), what, it appears, they were not fully aware of, "Whoso shall swear by the temple, sweareth by it, and by him that dwelleth therein. And he that shall swear by heaven, sweareth by the throne of God, and by him that sitteth thereon." Therefore, using these as objects of appeal in familiar conversation, they were as solemnly sworn, and as liable to the guilt of perjury, as if they had used the name of God himself.

Hence we believe it was not Christ's intention, in this passage, to set aside the use of oaths in courts of law; but to deprecate the dangerous practice, into which the Jews had fallen, of swearing in their ordinary intercourse, when it was wholly unnecessary.

Had he intended to forbid the taking of an oath in a court of justice, would he not have been more pointed and explicit? It is not to be supposed that the oaths he here forbids were those used in courts of law. "I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God," was the judicial form of oath which the high priest put to this divine Teacher, when arraigned before him in a court of law, and to which he did not refuse to respond.

Having thus endeavoured to prove that the taking of an oath is not forbidden in scripture, and that it is not inconsistent with the spirit of Christianity, we will now attempt, further, to show its purposes, and its bearings upon the interests of society.

When we reflect upon the degeneracy of society in all ages, the deceit and falsehood which have tarnished the dealings of men,

and the fatal effects of base propensities upon all human interests, we do not wonder that men should have been accustomed to regard each other with suspicion, and that they should have been unwilling to trust their interests into each other's hands, without, at the same time, obtaining for their safe keeping every available security. Accordingly, when the life, reputation, liberty, or substance of one man has been endangered by the testimony of another, it has been natural enough, and by no means unfair on the part of the accused, to demand from his accuser not only a true testimony, but, beyond this, some satisfactory pledge of his veracity. Now, in such a case, what pledge can we suppose him to give? He cannot open his bosom and reveal his thoughts to the eyes of his opponent; he can only appeal to One who can read them, whose eye can search the dark recesses of his soul, and with whom he has a far greater interest at stake, an interest as much affected by the truth of his testimony as that of the accused. This pledge is calculated to answer the twofold purpose intended-a powerful motive to speak the truth, and a satisfactory pledge that he will yield to its influence, because, in case of his giving a false testimony, he has involved himself in a more terrible responsibility than if he had spoken an ordinary lie. An ordinary lie would be a damning sin; but the act of calling God to witness the lie would heighten its heinousness, and consequently deepen his damnation.

Such is the purpose which an oath is intended to serve; and, by serving to secure the ends of justice, it therefore becomes an indispensable element in its administration, and a valuable preservative of the interests of society. It is not, then, an evil, but a good. But, alas! all the good in this disordered world is at the mercy of wicked men. All that is sacred in religion have they abused to further the basest ends. Hence we find there are those who do not scruple to confirm falsehood with an oath. Yet, are we to annihilate that which is good and beneficial to society to prevent its abuse? Is it for us to abolish the practice of religion because hypocrites use it as a cloak for sin? No more are we to abolish oaths because bad men perjure themselves. Perjury, however, we have reason to believe, is not so extensively practised as to weaken materially the