that are between the Ideas themselves. And that these are fuch, our Author himself implies, by faying, as the things fignified do Agree or Difagree with one another. Here then is Agreement and Difagreement antecedently to any joyning or feparating. And I very much wonder that our Author profeffing in the Title of the Chapter to difcourfe of Truth in general, and particularly of that Truth too which has been the Enquiry of fo many Ages, fhould yet confine his Difcourfe to Truth of Words and Truth of Thoughts without the leaft mention of Objective Truth. Which indeed is the Principal kind of Truth.

Pag. 300. Sect. 5. Ithink it is a felf-evident Propofition, that two Bodies cannot be in the fame place. If the Propofition be Self-evident how comes he only to Think 'tis fo? If it were only Evident he must do no more than fo.

Pag. 323. Sect. 14. Eternal Truths are not fo from being written in the minds of Men, Or that they were before the World: But wherefoever we can fuppofe fuch a Creature as Man is, inabled with fuch faculties, we must conclude he must needs when he applies his Thoughts to the confideration of his Ideas, know the Truth of certain Propofitions, &c. This is a true Ariftotelian Account of Eternal Truths. But I demand, Are thefe Eternal Truths in being before the Existence of Man or no? If not, how comes he to understand them when he

does

does exift? What, does he make that to be true, which before was not fo? But if they were in being before the Existence of Man, then their Eternity does not consist in their being understood by Man when ever he shall exift, but in their own fix'd and immutable Relations, whereby they have an antecedent Aptnefs fo to be understood. Which the Author himself seems to imply by faying, He muft needs fo understand them. Why muft needs? But only because they are ligion, p. 76 neceffarily fo and no otherwife intelligible. But of this I have dif

Reafon & Re

courfed elsewhere.

Pag. 344. Sect. 8. He takes notice of one manifeft Miftake in the Rules of Syllogifm, viz. That No Syllogiftical reafoning can be right and Conclufive, but what has at least one general Propofition in it. This our Author thinks to be a Mistake, and a manifest mistake. But perhaps if we rightly understand that Rule of Syllogifm, there is no Miftake at all in it. All the Ground of the Difpute is from the Doubtfulness of what is meant by a general or univerfal Propofition. A Propofition may be faid to be univerfal either when a Note of Univerfality (as All) is prefixed before the Subject. Or when tho that Note be not perfixed, yet the Predicate is faid of the whole Subject according to the full Latitude of its Predication, so as to leave nothing of the Subject

Subject out, whereof the Predicate is not faid. According to the former Senfe of Univerfality it is not neceffary that in every concluding Syllogifm one Propofition be univerfal. But according to the latter Senfe of Univerfality (which indeed is the most proper fenfe of it it is certainly neceffary. And I dare challenge any Man to fhew me one Inftance of a concluding Syllogifm that has not one Propofition univerfal in the latter Sense. For even a fingular Propofition is thus univerfal, fince being Indivifible, it can have nothing faid of it, but what is faid of it wholly and univerfally, aó, as Ariftotle expreffes it. The Author may fee a further Account of this in Dr. Wallis his Thefis de Propofitione fingulari, at the latter end of his Inftitutio Logica.

Thefe, Sir, are the most confiderable Paffages that at once reading I thought liable to Reflection in this Work, which notwithstanding these few Erratas, I think to be a very extraordinary Performance, and worthy of the most publick Honour and Refpect. And tho I do not approve of every particular thing in this Book, yet I muft fay that the Author is juft fuch a kind of Writer as I like, one that has thought much, and well, and who freely Writes what he thinks. I hate your Common-place Men of all the Writers in the World, who tho they happen fometimes R

to

to fay things that are in themselves not only True, but confiderable, yet they never write in any Train or Order of Thinking, which is one of the greatest Beauties of Compofition. But this Gentleman is a Writer of a very different Genius and Complexion of Soul, and whofe Character I cannot eafily give, but muft leave it either to the Defcription of fome finer Pen, or to the filent Admiration of Pofterity. Only one Feature of his Dif pofition I am concern'd to point our, which is, that he feems to be a Perfon of fo great Ingenuity and Candor, and of a Spirit fo truly Philofophical, that I have thence great and fair Inducements to believe that he will not be offended with that Freedom I have used in these Reflections, which were not intended for the leffening his Fame, but folely for the promoting of Truth and right Thinking.

And this will justifie that part of the Reflections, where agreeing with the Author in the Propofition intended to be proved, I lay open the infufficiency of his Proofs. For to fay that a thing is falfe for fuch Realons, when 'tis not falle for fuch Reafons, tho it be abfolutely falfe, is as great an Injury to Truth, as to fay a thing is falfe when 'tis not falfe. A falfe Inference is as much an Untruth, as a falfe Conclufion; and accordingly he that might reflect upon the Conclufion if falfe, may with as much reafon reflect

upon

upon a wrong way of inferring it, tho the Conclufion it felf be true. Which I mention with respect to the former part about Innate Principles, where tho I agree with the Author in the thing denied, yet I think his Reasons are not cogent.

After all, notwithstanding my diffenting from this Author in fo many things, I am perhaps as great an Admirer of him as any of his moft fworn Followers, and would not part with his Book for half a Vatican. But every Writer has his Alloy, and I exempt not any Writings of my own from the like Defects Of which perhaps, Sir, I have been convincing you all this while. But that shall not trouble me, if at the fame time I may be able to convince you of my Readiness to ferve you at any rate, as it highly becomes,

SIR,

Your Obliged and

Humble Servant,

J. N.

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