the marble a new existence created by the form which has been given to the stone. But the materialists have to maintain that, by matter being arranged in a particular way, there is produced both the organized body, and something different from it, and having not any of its properties, neither dimensions, nor weight, nor color, nor form. They have to maintain that the chemist who mixed the aquafortis and potash, produced both nitre and something different from the three, and which began to exist the instant that the nitre crystalized; and that the sculptor who fashioned the Apollo, not only made the marble into a human figure, but called into being something different from the marble, and the statue, and which exists at the same time with both, and without one property of either. If, therefore, their theory be true, it must be admitted to rest on nothing which experience has ever taught us; it supposes operations to be performed, and relations to exist of which we see nothing that bears the least resemblance in any thing we know." *

Experience teaches us that the doctrine of the materialist is utterly false. That the mind exists, and wholly independent of the qualities of matter, we have complete evidence; the evidence of its existence is as strong as the evidence of the existence of matter, and the steps by which we arrive at the conclusion are similar. Why do we believe that matter exists? Because it produces a certain impression upon our senses: it produces a certain effect, and we justly argue that this effect must have a cause. How do we know that mind exists? By our consciousness of what passes within us; the consciousness that we are sentient and thinking beings, implies the existence of the mind which thinks, hence, the propriety of that pithy saying of Descartes "I think, therefore I am." This knowledge does not depend upon matter; we do not obtain it by the exercise of any of the senses, and its object has no resemblance to matter. We know that matter exists, only by the operations of mind; and did we doubt the existcnce of either, it would be fully as reasonable to doubt of the existence of matter, as of mind. The existence and operations of mind, account for all the phenomena which mind is supposed to exhibit; but the existence and action of matter, cannot account for one of the phenomena of mind. When we are dreaming, we believe as firmly in the reality of those phantoms which imagination conjures up, as in our waking hours we believe in the sensible objects around us. But

Brougham's Natural Theology.

no effect of material agency ever produced a spiritual existence, or engendered the belief of such an existence..

That the mind, that which thinks, of whose existence we are continually conscious; that which cannot but exist while we exist; that which can make its own operations, the objects of its own thoughts; that this thing, or being, should have no existence, is an impossibility, or contradiction in terms. Then we have the most clear and irrefragable proof that mind, or spirit, does exist; and the argument to prove that it is altogether different from matter may be presented thus. The mind or spirit in man, is not material on account of the absence of the essential properties which belong to matter; it is not material on account of the possession of those properties, or qualities, which are not found in matter, necessarily, or under all circumstances, and which cannot belong to it accidentally, because in their very nature they are consistent with some of those properties which we know necessarily belong to matter. That there are such things as accidental properties belonging to all bodies, is true. Such are those which relate purely to the mode of being, in contradistinction to the essence of being. But that thought, or volition, cannot be an accidental property of matter, or the result of its mere mode of being, is most clearly demonstrated thus. One of the essential properties of matter is divisibility, and it cannot possibly be the subject of any other property inconsistent with this, any more than a thing can be and not be at the same time. But, that a thought, or volition, is indivisible, all intelligent persons do at once as clearly perceive, as that divisibility is an essential property of matter. The conclusion, therefore, is irresistable, that thought, or volition, cannot be the accidental properties, or result of any modification of matter whatever, because it is inconsistent with divisibility, one of the essential properties of matter. This proposition utterly destroys the doctrine of the materialist, and it places under the advocate of Revelation a platform, strong and durable, from which he may successfully repel the attacks of the materialist, and atheist. For if man possess mind, or spirit, and if there be an all-wise and omnipotent SPIRIT, it is not impossible for that glorious Being to reveal himself, and his will, to man.

*

It is very absurd to object against the existence of spirit, that it cannot be the object of any of the senses; for the same objection lies with equal force against the existence of light. Light cannot be touched, nor tasted, nor smelt, nor heard, nor can it be seen. We arrive at the knowledge of the existence of light, by an examination of certain visible objects and appearances; but, light itself cannot be

We now proceed to take up the second question, which is, Is there a God, an all-wise and all-powerful SPIRIT?

The theory of the Atheist is in opposition to the general belief of mankind, and is held only by a few thinly scattered individuals in civilized nations. In all ages of the world, and in every stage of society, belief in the existence of a God, has obtained. The rude hunter of the wilderness, and the polished inhabitant of the magnificent city, have united in the belief of the existence of God. The great error of mankind on this subject has been, not the denial of one God, but the belief of many. It is true, that men have entertained false notions of the nature of God; but still, they have believed in his existence, and the erroneous conceptions which have accompanied this belief; instead of attaching any discredit to the truth of the assertion that there is a God, tend to confirm its truth. They prove that the existence of God is so plainly engraven on the face of nature, and so consentaneous to the dictates of reason, and to the unperverted feelings of the human mind, that it is readily received, even when accompanied by absurdities.

It has been alleged that some tribes of human beings, such as the aboriginal inhabitants of New Holland, have been found, among whom no traces of belief in the existence of God was discoverable. If the allegation be true, it should be borne in mind, that those tribes are in a state of extreme degradation; and that they are not to be considered as denying the existence of God, but as being so brutal as to have no opinion, or belief on the subject. Belief in the existence of Deity has the general suffrage of the human race; and this is no slight presumption of the truth of the thing believed; for when mankind, in all the different circumstances in which they have been placed, have generally agreed on any great point relating to their common interest, this agreement may fairly be interpreted as the dictate of their nature; and consequently may be considered as having a rational claim to general reception. For this general belief in the existence of God, there must be an adequate cause, and that cause is to be found in the fact that the appearances of the universe indicate a powerful, wise, and good being, the Creator of all things. CRANTZ, the missionary, in his History of Greenland, tells us that a native of that country once addressed him in the following manner:-"It is true we were ignorant heathens, and knew little of the nature of God till you came. But you must not imagine that no Greenlander thinks about these things. A kajak (a Greenland boat) with all its tackle and implements, cannot exist but by the labor of man. But the for

mation of the meanest bird requires more skill than that of the best kajak, and no man can make a bird. There is still more skill required to make a man: by whom then was he made? He proceeded from his parents, and they from their parents. But some must have been the first parents, and whence did they proceed? Common report says, they grew out of the earth. If so, why do not men grow out of the earth still? And whence came the earth, the sun, the moon, and the stars?. Certainly there must have been some Being who made all these things; a Being more wise than the wisest Such was the reasoning of an untutored inhabitant of the frozen coast of Greenland, and in some such way has mankind always reasoned.

man."

To attribute the general belief of mankind in the existence of Deity to tradition, will not account for the fact; because the question immediately occurs, what was the origin of the tradition? Besides, no mere tradition could have been so widely and permanently diffused; nor could it have been preserved among all tribes of men, and amidst all the vicissitudes of the human race. If, then, the general opinion and belief of mankind could place any truth beyond the reach of controversy, the question concerning the being of God would long ere now have been finally determined; for on no other subject has mankind been so generally agreed as on the existence of God. It is acknowledged that this belief has not been universal, for an ancient sage hath said, "The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God." It is conceded that the general belief of mankind is not of itself decisive evidence of the truth of the thing believed. But, even as evidence, it should not hastily be dismissed from the mind, unless the causes of general error can be pointed out in a clear and satisfactory manner. But if mankind have been brought to the conclusion that there is a God, by the appearances of the universe; and if these appearances, when calmly and rationally contemplated, justify the conclusion, then the opinion which it establishes is entitled to a cordial reception by every candid and sincere inquirer after truth.

The theory of the Atheist is unwarrantable, for by it the existence of the world cannot be accounted for. We behold the heavens and

the earth replete with myriads of creatures. If there be no God, then not only matter, but the world, is eternal; that is, all things now are, in the main, as they ever were, without a first cause: or the matter is eternal and of itself, and the beautiful and immense frame of the heavens and the earth was caused by a fortuitous concourse of

That all things now are, in the main, as they ever were, is incredible; for if this hypothesis be correct, the whole system of things as we now see it, must have existed from eternity; either all is eternal, or we have no reason to conclude that any part is so. But how can the human race be eternal? Mr. Fergus, on this subject says, "I exist, but I do not necessarily exist, for once I was not. I did not bring myself into existence. My parents were not their own creators; and although I go back as far as the wing of imagination can bear me, still I am as unable satisfactorily to account for the existence of those whom I then find alive, as I am to account for my own existence, or for the existence of those who have lived at any intermediate period. By going backwards I remove the difficulty from one point to another, but still at any given point that difficulty is just the same as when it first met me. According, however, to the constitution of my nature, I cannot rest satisfied till I come either to a self-created, or to a necessarily existing being. But a self-created being involves a contradiction. It involves existence, and non-existence at the same time; I must, therefore, arrive at a necessarily existing, and consequently eternal being, as the first cause of my own existence. Thus I think, that according to the constitution of my nature, I must either believe in an eternal and intelligent first cause, or in something equally incomprehensible, and also altogether absurd." To talk of an infinite succession of beings, such as man, will not remove the difficulty of our first formation, but is an unphilosophical attempt to push it out of sight. For, according to this hypothesis, however high we ascend, we find no animated being but what has derived its existence from a being of the same kind with itself; and although we still meet with plain marks of design, yet the designing cause we have not discovered.

It has been asserted that all things sprang from necessity. But necessity is not an agent, but the condition of an agent; and if those who use the word in the sense under consideration, attach any conceptions to their language, they must understand by it an agent acting necessarily. An agent acting necessarily is merely an instrument in the hand of another. But we are so constituted, that we cannot rest short of a being operating, not by necessity, but by will and choice. We must find an efficient cause, that had power to give, or not to give existence to every creature. Necessity must result from something antecedent to itself.

Some talk of appetency. What meaning do they attach to it? Is it chemical affinity? If it be so, has chemical affinity ever formed