up, most clearly shows that both classes of predictions refer to the same person and to the same kingdom.

Having, by an appeal to the prophets of the Old Testament, established that great truth, that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, our task is finished, our work is accomplished. We have shown, by sound reasoning and demonstrative proof, that the persons who were the authors of the Old and New Testament dispensations performed miracles, and predicted events, which human sagacity could neither have foreseen, nor conjectured; therefore it has been proved, that the divine attestation was given to them as the servants of the Most High. This being established, it follows as a necessary consequence, that the Bible is a revelation from God, and however different may be the opinions of men concerning the particulars of the system of religion taught in it, there can be but one opinion concerning its divine origin, and the obligations we are under to receive it as a revelation of the will of God concerning us, and to regulate our lives according to its precepts.*

A word to the reader, and we are done. In attempting to vindicate the claims of the Bible as a revelation from God, the argument has been confined to the external evidences by which its claims are supported, and little or no notice has been taken of the internal evidences, which are peculiarly clear and convincing. We have taken nothing for granted, but have reasoned together, from the first line to the last. The subject is one of no ordinary importance, but involving our present happiness and eternal destinies. And as it is the office of reason to distinguish between truth and error, to weigh the evidence which can be adduced on both sides of a question, how important is it that candid, impartial reason should now render an honest verdict! It cannot be said that the writer has taken a one-sided view of the subject, which has been under examination: for although he has not noticed every senseless cavil which Infidels have advanced; yet all the leading objections of the enemies of Revelation have been fairly stated, and in the language of their authors. These objections have been duly weighed, and in every instance answers made. The reader, therefore, has before him both sides of this momentous question: and in the language of the Infidel Hume, “ as a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence," we call upon him to be governed by this rule in coming to a decision. Should he act upon this principle, we

The prophecy that Messiah should be born of a virgin, has not been noticed, because the proof of its fulfillment in the person of Christ, rests upon the establishment of his claim as the true Messiah.

feel confident that the result must be an entire conviction that the attacks of Infidelity upon the impregnable bulwarks of Revelation, only exhibit the enmity, folly, and madness of its votaries. And that the Bible, the more it is attacked, only shines the more brightly, and that the very objections of its enemies are converted into evidences of its truth.

But if the reader have given a different verdict, and he be not settled down into absolute brutish Atheism, we beg leave to present to his consideration, certain difficulties which it is presumed he will find insuperable. If the Bible be not a Revelation from God, he cannot tell, whether there are or are not more than one God; and if for the sake of argument it be admitted that there is but one God, there is no way by which he can attain to any knowledge of his moral perfections; there is no way by which he can learn how God is to be worshiped by him, or whether he will accept of his worship in any way it may be rendered unto him; there is no way by which he can learn that God will pardon his iniquities; and, however sceptical he may be, he cannot conceal from himself that he is a sinner, and at least sometimes he must have forebodings of coming wrath; there is no way by which he can know what is to become of him upon leaving this world, whether he shall be annihilated, or be miserable for ever; there is no way by which he can learn, that God will not punish his every vice, and to its full demerit. The light of reason teaches that God is infinitely wise; (although it cannot bring us to the knowledge of his moral attributes) can it be supposed that he created a race of intelligent agents, and then turned them loose, without giving them the smallest hint on the important subjects just stated?

There are other difficulties in which the Infidel is involved; for instance, can he deny the fact of the universal deluge? If he can, his achievement has to be accomplished in the face of all testimony. If he admit it, he must also admit that a divine revelation has been made. It is the same with the denial or admission of the fulfillment of prophecy. With respect to Christianity, difficulties increase upon him; for certainly he must himself acknowledge that it requires a much more vehement effort of faith to believe that Christ and his apostles were enthusiasts or impostors, than to believe them to be the inspired messengers of God. These, and other difficulties which might be stated, are of such a character that he can never overcome them. Therefore, while in direct opposition to all testimony, and the dictates of reason, he

rejects Revelation as an imposture, let him never more brand the Christian with an easy faith, seeing that he himself is the very portent of credulity.

Is the reader a young man, just entered upon the busy scenes of life, and perhaps destitute of any fixed principles? For such this work has been chiefly prepared, and by one who knows from experience the danger to which they are exposed; having himself, for a time, fallen a victim to the assertions and sophisms of the Infidel. And to such the writer would affectionately say, that owing to a rash confidence in their own capacities, in which the young and inexperienced are prone to indulge, they are exposed to fall an easy prey to the insidious Infidel, against whose insinuations or bold allega tions they may not be on their guard. Therefore, let such remember, that it is much more easy to insinuate and to assert, than to prove that Christianity is not true. This, all the Infidels that have ever lived have not been able to effect, and they never can; for it is now no idle boast to say, that the argument against our holy religion has never been framed, which has not been triumphantly refuted. Therefore, let not such imagine that the Infidel is in the right because they cannot prove him in the wrong, for the answer can be given, though they may not be able to perceive it. But would they be fortified against all the attacks of Infidelity, let them seek that teaching which is from above, by which alone they can be brought to a firm and steady faith in the Son of God, and by which alone they can apprehend the religion of Jesus Christ in a true light, which to him who has been taught by the Spirit is all glorious to behold. To stimulate such to make the prudent choice, let them bear in mind that Scripture prophecy, and the signs of the times, loudly declare, that a fearful conflict of antagonistical principles in this highly favored land is nigh, even at the door, which may issue for a time, in the almost total ejectment of Christianity. Papacy and atheistical Infidelity are at this moment making silent but rapid strides amongst us; and those who read these pages may live to see these great enemies of Christianity form an unnatural coalition for the destruction of all that is lovely and excellent in our civil and religious institutions. With these views, the writer could not close this work, without warning and beseeching the young and inexperienced to be upon their guard against the inroads of scepticism.

APPENDIX.

STARKIE, an author of great eminence in the legal profession, in his « PRACTICAL Treatise on the Law of EVIDENCE," under the head of "Force of Testimony," vol. 1. p. 471, appends the following note, than which nothing can be more conclusive.

"In observing upon the general principles on which the credibility of human testimony rests, it may not be irrelevant to advert to the summary positions on this subject advanced by Mr. Hume. He says in his Essay, vol. 2, sec. 10: A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. As a matter of abstract philosophical consideration, (for in that point of view only can the subject be adverted to in a work like this,) Mr. Hume's reasoning appears to be altogether untenable. In the first place, the very basis of his inference is, that faith in human testimony is founded solely upon experience; this is by no means the fact; the credibility of testimony frequently depends upon the exercise of reason, on the effect of coincidences in testimony, which, if collusion be excluded, cannot be accounted for but upon the supposition that the testimony of concurring witnesses is true; so much so, that their individual character for veracity is frequently but of secondary importance, (supra, 466.) Its credibility also greatly depends upon confirmation by collateral circumstances, and on analogies supplied by the aid of reason as well as of mere experience. But even admitting experience to be the basis, even the sole basis, of such belief, the position built upon it is unwarrantable; and it is fallacious, for, if adopted, it would lead to error. The position is, that human testimony, the force of which rests upon experience, is inadequate to prove a violation of the laws of nature, which are established by firm and unalterable experience. The very essence of the argument is, that the force of human testimony (the efficacy of which in the abstract is admitted) is destroyed by an opposite, conflicting, and superior force, derived also from experience. If this were so, the argument would be invincible; but the question is, whether mere previous inexperience of an event testified is directly opposed to human testimony, so that mere inexperience as strongly proves that the thing is not, as previous experience of the credibility of human testimony proves that it is. Now a miracle, or violation of the laws of nature, can mean nothing more than an event or effect never observed before; and on the other hand, an event or effect in nature never observed before is a violation of the laws of nature; thus, to take Mr. Hume's own example, it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life, because that has never been observed in any age or country;' precisely in the

same sense, the production of a new metal from potash, by means of a powerful and newly-discovered agent in nature, and the first observed descent of meteoric stones were violations of the laws of nature; they were events which had never before been observed, and to the production of which the known laws of nature are inadequate. But none of these events can, with the least propriety, be said to be against or contrary to the laws of nature in any other sense than that they have never before been observed; and that the laws of nature, as far as they were previously known, were inadequate to their production. The proposition of Mr. Hume ought then to be stated thus: Human testimony is founded on experience, and is therefore inadequate to prove that of which there has been no previous experience. Now, whether it be plain and self-evident that the mere negation of experience of a particular fact necessarily destroys all faith in the testimony of those who assert the fact to be true; or whether, on the other hand, this be not to confound the principle of belief with the subject matter to which it is to be applied; and whether it be not plainly contrary to reason to infer the destruction of an active principle of belief from the mere negation of ezperience, which is perfectly consistent with the just operation of that principle; whether, in short, this be not to assume broadly that mere inexperience on the one hand is necessarily superior to positive experience on the other, must be left to every man's understanding to decide. The inferiority of mere negative evidence to that which is direct and positive, is, it will be seen, a consideration daily acted upon in judicial investigations. Negative evidence is, in the abstract, inferior to positive, because the negative is not directly opposed to the positive testimony; both may be true. Must not this consideration also operate where there is mere inexperience, on the one hand, of an event in nature, and positive testimony of the fact on the other? Again, what are the laws of nature, established by firm and unalterable experience? That there may be, and are, general and even unalterable laws of providence and nature may readily be admitted; but, that human knowledge and experience of those laws is unalterable (which alone can be the test of exclusion) is untrue, except in a very limited sense; that is, it may fairly be assumed that a law of nature once known to operate, will always operate in a similar manner, unless its operation be impeded or counteracted by a new and contrary cause. In a larger sense, the laws of nature are continually alterable; as experiments are more frequent, more perfect, and as new phenomena are observed, and new causes or agents are discovered, human experience of the laws of nature becomes more general and more perfect. How much more extended and perfect, for instance, are the laws which regulate chemical attractions and affinities than they were two centuries ago! And it is probable that in future ages experience of the laws of nature will be more perfect than it is at present; it is, in short, impossible to define to what extent such knowledge may be carried, or whether, ultimately, the whole may not be resolvable into principles admitting of no other explanation than that they result immediately from the will of a superior Being. This, at all events, is certain, that the laws of nature, as inferred by the aid of experience, have from time to time, by the aid of experience, been rendered more general and more perfect. Experience, then, so far from pointing out any unalterable laws of nature to the exclusion of events or phenomena which have never before been experienced, and which cannot be accounted for by the laws already observed, shows the very contrary, and proves that such new events or phenomena may be