changed now, when all the floodgates of innovation were opened, when Montrose had become a signal for every borough, great and small, to put forth all its efforts for a change of constitution. In such a violent ferment of reform, the establishment of a second precedent would render it next to impossible to make any further stand; the time was now come, at whatever cost, to mark the determination of government to proceed no further in this course. The individuals who were to decide, could not also fail to remark, that the very first use which Montrose had made of the boon granted to her by ministry, was to search out the most determined opposition member she could possibly find; and, by her casting vote, to secure for him the northern district of burghs. In defence even of the magistrates, it was represented, that the involved state of the city's finances arose, not from any embezzlement or idle extravagance, but from improvements highly important and useful to the place, though undertaken perhaps on too extensive a scale. The pier, in particular, whose repeated demolition involved them in so much expence, was an object of the highest and most indispensable utility. The magis trates themselves, though stunned with the first blow, had now changed their views, and felt themselves perfectly competent to undertake anew the administration of the city's affairs. Ministers seem to have paused considerably on this occasion. On the 9th May, a committee of the Privy Council, among whom were Lord Liverpool, the Lord Chancellor, and Lord Melville, assembled at the Cockpit, and heard counsel on the subject. The result did not transpire for a considerable time. In August, however, the order of the Privy Council was issued, by which it appeared, that the decision had been made entirely on

the side of establishment and authority. Not only the former set was restored unaltered, but the old magistrates were authorized to elect their successors, in the same manner as if there had been no interruption of their existence. This decision excited in the votaries of reform equal emotions of disappointment and indignation. They now saw their error, in expecting that the executive would ever take the lead in promoting a popular reform. Not only were they baffled in the present instance, but it became evident, that even should they succeed in the tedious and expensive processes by which they sought to reduce the sets of the other burghs, the result would only be, as in the present instance, to fix the old magistrates more firmly in their seats. The only hope appeared in endeavouring to set aside, as illegal, this proceeding of the Privy Council. That body, it was alleged, had only power to renew the functions of the burgh, by giving authority for a poll-election, but not to vest this power in a body of men who, as matters stood, had no more concern in the burgh than any other individuals. Unfortunately, however, several instances occurred in the course of the last century, in which this expedient had been used, to restore the broken chain of election. It was observed, indeed, that these instances took place immediately after the rebellions of 1715 and 1745, and without any opposition on the part of the burgesses; but though these considerations might have weight in reason, it seems questionable how far they could obviate the legal precedent. It was, however, urged also, and seemingly with a good deal of reason, that, upon this system, the magistrates of every burgh in the kingdom, by neglecting some of the legal formalities, might throw their constitution into the hands of the crown, which had only to appoint its

own creatures to fill up the new list of magistrates. Indeed, we have already stated our opinion, that any intromis sion of the Privy Council with the sets of burghs, is contrary, if not to the practice, at least to the principles of representative government. A meeting of the burgesses of Edinburgh was held on the 5th November, and resolutions entered into, in which dissatisfaction was strongly expressed; and a determination stated to assist to the utmost their brethren of Aberdeen. At Aberdeen, the old magistrates, according to the authority given to them, hesitated not to elect their successors, whose installation, however, gave rise to some tumult on the part of the populace; and an assembly of the burgesses afterwards held, while they deprecated such conduct in the people, strongly expressed their regret, that a body of men should have acted thus contrary to the judgment of their fellow-citizens, and to their own recorded opinion.

As some compensation for this loss, the friends of reform gained this year one point, not of trifling importance. Among the old and regularly constituted burghs in Scotland, Dundee ranks next to Edinburgh and Aberdeen, in wealth and importance. Its constitution was still closer than that of any of the other Scottish burghs, being such as not to leave a single crevice by which any thing hostile to the reigning party could enter. So strongly, however, had public opinion declared against it, that the council itself, with Provost Riddoch at their head, professed their readiness to concur in some alteration of the set. As the sanguine hopes derived from the Privy Council were now greatly cooled, it was determined to have recourse to the Convention of Burghs, a body peculiar to Scotland, and whose functions were usually confined to mere formalities or matters of trifling im

portance. This year, however, considerable interest was excited by its meeting, and precedents on both sides were carefully sought. It then appeared that the Convention had repeatedly, on the agreement of all parties concerned, made alterations to a certain extent, in the sets of the burghs, which, when disputed, had been sometimes confirmed by the Court of Session, and when not disputed, possessed the authority of law. The demand of Dundee was merely for three open members; two of which were to be the dean and counsellor of Guild, to be elected by the guildbrethren, and a third trades counsellor, to be chosen by the incorporated trades. Petitions were, however, presented from several incorporations, praying that they should each receive power to elect a member, and that otherwise, no alteration should take place. The lead in support of the measure was taken by Mr Gibson, who sat as commissioner from Culross, and Mr Henderson, commissioner from Kirkwall. On the other hand, Mr Kirkman Finlay, .from Glasgow, and Mr Cook, who sat for Inverury, and was understood to speak the sentiments of government, expressed doubts, both as to the powers of the Convention, and the sufficiency of the consent obtained. The former doubts were strongly combated by Mr Gibson, who declared that he knew of no power of any body so strong and clear, as that of the Convention to alter and amend the sets of burghs. It had exercised it for 250 years, and to deny it, would be disclaiming its own privileges, and destroying itself. In regard to consent, it was observed, that the corporations which opposed the measure had no vested right in the magistracy, and that their opposition was therefore of no legal importance. After a great deal of discussion, the force of these arguments

was at length admitted; the demands of Dundee were granted, and the set, amended as proposed, has ever since continued in operation.

The Edinburgh reformers continued during this year in full activity. They appeared, indeed, to have at one time a near prospect of attaining the object of their wishes. A sentence was obtained in the Court of Session, rendering void the last election of the magistrates of Edinburgh. The magistrates, however, by putting in a reclaiming petition, suspended the operation of the sentence; and as the answers could not be answered in the course of this session, the final deci sion was necessarily postponed till next year. This delay was of infinite importance to a fixed and established body, against a popular movement, which became always fainter, the longer it continued without effecting its purpose.

The transactions of the preceding years in Scotland, formed the subject of some warm parliamentary debates. On the 10th February, Lord Archibald Hamilton brought before the Commons, a motion respecting the proceedings in the case of M'Kinley. The present case, he observed, had every ingredient of gravity and importance. The subject related to the highest concern in this country, the purity of justice; the parties were the highest officers of the law as well as officers also of the Crown; the scene of the transaction which he was about to notice, was the highest court of criminal law in Scotland. His Lordship then alluded to the assertions made last session, by the Lord Advocate, respecting the seditious spirit prevailing in Glasgow, and the outrageous oath pretended to be there administered. Although there certainly might be some degree of discontent, no one could now doubt, that these assertions were highly extravagant, if not grossly slanderous. They tended

VOL. XI. PART I.

to inflame the passions of the moment, and to bias the minds of juries, who were to try the offences. He then directly alluded to the trial of M'Kinley, and first to the denial of access to the prisoner Campbell. The Lord Advocate said, that he had refused access to the witness, "to prevent tampering." And yet any man who attended to these proceedings, must acknowledge, that the whole evidence of the witness Campbell exhibited one continued system of gross and palpable tampering on the part of those very law officers of the Crown, who appeared so jealous and fearful of all tampering but their own. How the learned lord could have prevailed upon himself to give that answer, he was at a loss to conjecture, for the learned Lord must have known that the whole of the law officers had continued access to Campbell; and what took place at these interviews, he, for his part, could call by no other name than palpable tampering. His Lordship then went over the declaration of Campbell, respecting what had passed between himself, Mr Drummond, and other law officers of the Crown, (as detailed in McKinley's trial, in our last volume.) Such proceedings were in direct opposition to all that they had been accustomed to venerate in the British constitution. The facts he had disclosed amounted to subornation of perjury. He could find no other term adequately descriptive of the transaction; for had M'Kinley been convicted on the evidence of Campbell, that conviction must have been obtained by perjury on Campbell's part, in swearing that he had received no promise of any reward, nor had any private motive in giving his evidence, and M'Kinley would have had an undoubted right to say, that he had been convicted in consequence of the unfair practices of the law officers of the Crown. Had Campbell, sti

L

mulated as he had been, given false evidence, he should like to know whether the law officers of the Crown would not have been answerable for the crime. He would beg leave to remind the House of an expression which he was very happy to hear on a recent occasion fall from the Attorney-General, namely, that God forbid he, or any one officially connected with him, should have any intercourse with a witness in a case of public justice. He trusted that on the present occasion a sentiment so exalted would not remain in the honourable and learned gentleman's breast, but that he would repeat it in confirmation of his (Lord A. Hamilton's) opinions. It was the duty of the law officers of the Crown to uphold the dignity and interest of the laws; and he would ask whether, in the transaction under discussion, the law officers of the Crown in Scotland did not violate the sanctity and purity of the laws as palpably, and, indeed, more palpably than M'Kinley, in the crime with which he was charged. He concluded with moving for a copy of the records in the Court of Justiciary, relative to the trial.

The Lord Advocate denied that there was any thing overcharged in his former statements, either of the seditious spirit prevailing in Glasgow, or of the oath which had been admi. nistered. There was nothing to prove this, either in the course of events, or in the trial of M'Kinley. The indictment charged the prisoner with having been guilty of administering an unlawful oath to a great many hundreds of persons in Glasgow and its neighbourhood, the names of many of whom were particularized. The issue of his trial was a verdict by the jury of" Not proven." He spoke in the hearing of gentlemen opposite, who were intimately acquainted with the forms of law, and the distinction of verdicts in Scotland. They would

tell the House, whether or not he was incorrect in stating, that the distinction in Scotland between the verdict of "not proven" and the verdict of "not guilty," was this:-that when the jury were satisfied that the corpus delicti charged in the indictment was proved, and that the person charged was implicated in the guilt, although the legal evidence was insufficient to convict him, they returned a verdict of "not proven;" but that, if they were of opinion no corpus delicti had been proved, they then returned a verdict of" not guilty." In the case in question, the verdict of the jury was "not proven." The inference was-and he stated it without fear of contradiction-that the general fact charged in the indictment, of an illegal oath having been administered to several hundreds of persons in Glasgow and its vicinity, had been admitted by that verdict to be well founded. With regard to the Attorney-General's declaration of not communicating with witnesses, whatever might be the practice in England, it was impossible, according to the established laws. of Scotland, that it should prevail in that country. Some communication with the witnesses was indispensable for the furtherance of public justice. The duties of the Attorney-General of England and the Lord Advocate of Scotland were in many respects different. The Lord Advocate was not only the public prosecutor as the Attorney-General was, but he was likewise a police magistrate. This arose from the circumstance of Scotland being a separate government without having a resident administration. He would ask, if any man could doubt, from what even Campbell himself had stated, that he had an interest in disqualifying himself from giving evidence? He had a palpable interest in not giving his evidence. As to the complaint of the counsel for the prisoner, that no ac

cess was allowed them to Campbell, it appeared evident from Mr Jeffrey's statements at the trial, that there had been a communication between him and that witness. He would oppose to the evidence of Campbell, a statement made to him by Mr Drummond. The statement made to him by Mr Drummond was this-that on going to the Castle to visit this person, he had stated to him, that he was in the greatest terror of his life if he gave information; that at that time the only object that Campbell seemed to have in view was, the obtaining a promise from him of some measures to insure his safety after giving his evidence. After this, Mr Drummond did not go to the Castle of his own accord, but was sent for by Campbell, The person who came to him was the gaoler, who said that Campbell was anxious to see Mr Drummond. He went accordingly, when Campbell told him, that as a condition of his giving evidence, he wished to have a passport, and means to go abroad; that in such a case he was not only prepared to give evidence, but information; but that otherwise he could neither give evidence nor information. Mr Drummond then stated, that without consulting him (the Lord Advocate,) and having his authority, he could not take that course. Accordingly, Mr Drummond communicated the proposition of Campbell to him, and after consultation with the other law officers of the Crown, and after considering the question of law in the best manner they were able, they came to this conclusion, that they were not only entitled to make the witness the promise of a passport and the means of conveying him to a foreign country, but that they were even bound to do so-that they were bound to afford him protection in a way which he himself conceived was the only available way. He directed Mr Drummond, therefore, to make a

promise to him, that what he requested should be done. On the same occasion Mr Drummond communicated to him, that the prisoner was under the greatest apprehensions on account of his wife-that he was desirous of having her brought to Edinburgh, to be near a sister, and that he had applied to him for money for that purpose. Mr Drummond said he had told him that he could do nothing on this subject without his (the Lord Advocate's) authority. A letter from Campbell was afterwards brought to him. He stated positively, that as to giving any money to induce him to give evidence, that he could not do, and it ought not to be done; but he trusted that gentlemen on the other side of the House would not think that in the situation in which the witness stood he had done any thing unbecoming and improper in endeavouring to alleviate his case by bringing the woman to Edinburgh. On being informed of this request of Campbell respecting his wife, he gave directions that a place should be taken for her in a public conveyance by the magistrates of Glasgow; although he really did not know whether she ever came to Edinburgh. There was one part of the deposition of Campbell which the noble Lord had read in rather a lower tone of voice than the rest, the concluding part of what he had stated respecting his conversation with Mr Drummond. He had there stated that no attempt was made to instruct him as to what he was to say. The same was stated by Sir William Rae. And from the beginning to the end of the deposition, he never alleged that one question was put to him by Mr Home Drummond, or any other person, as to the practice in which he was engaged. If they had had any sinister purposes in view, would they not have endeavoured to effect it by putting such leading questions to him? But they had acted with