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the Mind of Man. The Motions of Mat- SER M. ter being All necessary, 'tis evident that Matter can in no fenfe poffibly be capable of any action at all. It can neither begin to move itself when at Reft, nor put any Stop to itself when in Motion, nor in any degree alter its own determination, or its prefent State or manner of Existence. But whatever impreffions it receives from the Impulfes of other Matter, or from the Influences of external Agents; by Thefe, and Thefe only, it is always neceffarily and invariably determined. Senfitive and Brute Animals have in themfelves a higher Principle, a Principle of Self-motion ; by which they act and determine themfelves, according to the Influence of certain Appetites and Paffions. But 'tis always according to That Influence and Direction merely. For over the Appetites and Paffions themselves, they have No Government; no moral Judgment or Dif cernment of the Difference of Good and Evil; no fuperiour Light or Direction, by which to fupprefs a hurtful Appetite, or over-rule the Inftincts of Paffion: And therefore they are not at all accountable for any thing they do. This is the pro

per

SER M. per and peculiar Nature of Humane Acti ons; the diftinguishing character by which

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Man, as a rational and moral Agent, is distinguished from the inferiour Creation, He not only has in himself a Power of Acting, which is in common to him with the irrational creatures; but he has moreover a fill higher Principle or Power of directing his Actions, with fome determinate Views, and to fome certain and conftant End. He has a Power of judging beforehand, concerning the Confequences of his Actions, concerning the Reasonableness or Unreasonablenefs of the End he aims at; and he has a Power of recollecting, after the Action done, whether he acted with a good or an evil View. He can either follow the irregular Motions of All his Appetites and Paffions, as do the Beasts that perifh; or he can reftrain and overrule their Sollicitations, by attending to the Guidance of a Supericur Light of Recfon and Religion. Nay, a man cannot indeed but have fome. View and Defign in every thing he does. Even when he abandons himself moft implicitly to the Brutal Guidance of mere. Appetite and Paffion, ftill he does it with fome View:

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and

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and with a Confcioufnefs, which Beafts SER M. have not, that he knowingly and deliberately chufes to aim at fome mean and unworthy End. Hence arifes That Judgment of Reflection which we call Confcience; by which a man either approves or condemns his own past Actions, and apprehends that he fhall accordingly be appros ved or condenmed by Him alfo to whom he muft finally give account of himself. If a man, in the general courfe of his Life, accuftoms himfelf to confider thefe things beforehand, that is, if he will behave himself as a rational Creature; If he accuftoms himself in all his Actions to confider the Reafon and Equity of Things, to confider what is reasonable for Himfelf to do, or for Him to expect fhould be done by Another to confider what is agreeable to the Will of God, and likely to be approved at the Bar of an impartial and All-seeing. Judge: If This (I fay) be his main directing Principle, and the Point which he conftantly keeps in View: his Actions, generally fpeaking, will not fail to be Virtuous and Good. For fuch as is the Root or Cause, fuch will be the Effect: Such as is the Fountain,

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SER M. Fountain, fuch will be the Streams that iffue from it. A Good tree, will not ufually bring forth Bad fruit. A Good man, out of the good treafure of his heart, will naturally bring forth Good things. For out of the abundance of the Heart the Mouth will fpeak, and the Hands will be accordingly directed to act.

ON the contrary; If a man's Principles be loofe and Atheistical; If he has no Senfe of the Reafon and Equity of things, nor Apprehenfion of the righteous Judgment of God; If his Views be other than the fatisfying of his Appetites, the gratification of his Paffions, the pursuing his prefent Interests, and pleafing his own unreasonable Selfwill; it cannot be, but his Actions will be generally immoral and vitious.

FURTHER yet; If a man's Principles be Superftitious, that is, fuch as not only fet him at liberty from the great Ties of Benevolence and Charity, but moreover lay upon him the ftrongest direct and pofitive Obligation to unrighteous Practices; in This cafe, his Conduct will neceffarily be as much worse, than That of a person who has no Principle at all ;

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as

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as One who follows a Falfe Light that SER M. leads directly to Deftruction goes more certainly out of the right way, than he who at all adventures walks in Darkness. Such a one will act wickedly, not only when his Pleasures, his Intereft, or his Paffions prompt him; which is the fartheft a Man of no principles will go; But This Man, in oppofition to all his own natural Inclinations and Paffions, as well as to the Reafon and Truth of things, will, out of Principle, and in order to do God good Service, run zealonfly into the vileft barbarities of unrighteoufhefs. This is a confideration very neceffary to be diftinctly attended to, concerning the Nature and Spring of Human Actions; and what Dependance they have upon the directing Principle, upon the Light or Understanding that is in the Mind of Man.

II. I PROPOSED to fhow what Power Men have over their own Actions, with regard to the Influence of That Light or Understanding, by which they are to be directed. Every Action a Man does, Every Action of any confiderable importance in life, Every Action that is of a Moral or Immoral nature; muft of neceffity be

done