§. I. THE Roman party doth much glory in unity

and certainty of doctrine, as things peculiar to them, and which no other men have any means to attain : yet about divers matters of notable consideration, in what they agree, or of what they are certain, it is hard to descry.

They pretend it very needful that controversies should be decided, and that they have a special knack of doing it: yet do many controversies of great weight and consequence stick on their hands unresolved, many points rest in great doubt and debate among them.

The kúpia doğa of the Roman sect (concerning doctrine, practice, laws and customs of discipline, rites and ceremonies) are of divers sorts, or built on divers grounds. 1. Some established by (pretended) general synods. 2. Some founded on decrees of popes. 3. Some entertained as upon tradition, custom, common agreement. 4. Some which their eminent divines or schoolmen do commonly embrace. 5. Some prevailing by the favour of the Roman court, and its zealous dependents.

Hence it is very difficult to know wherein their religion consisteth: for those grounds divers times seem to clash, and accordingly their divines (some building on these, some on others) disagree.

This being so in many points of importance, is so particularly in this.

For instance, the head of their church (as they call it) is, one would think, a subject about which they should thoroughly consent, and which they, by this time, should have cleared from all disputes; so that (so far as their decisive faculty goeth) we might be assured wherein his authority consisteth, and how far it doth extend; seeing the resolution of that point so nearly toucheth the heart of religion, the faith and practice of all Christians, the good of the church, and peace of the world; seeing that no one question (perhaps not all questions together) hath created so many tragical disturbances in Christendom, as that concerning the bounds of papal authority a

This disagreement of the Roman doctors about the nature and extent of papal authority is a shrewd prejudice against it. If a man should sue for a piece of land, and his advocates (the notablest could be had, and well paid) could not find where it lieth, how it is butted and bounded, from whom it was conveyed to him, one would be very apt to suspect his title. If God had instituted such an office, it is highly probable we might satisfactorily know what the nature and use of it were: the patents and charters for it would declare it.

a

Agitur de summa rei Christianæ. Bell. Præf. de Rom. Pont. Upon this one point the very sum and substance of Christianity depends.

Yet for resolution in this great case we are left to seek; they not having either the will, or the courage, or the power, to determine it. This insuperable problem hath baffled all their infallible methods of deciding controversies; their traditions blundering, their synods clashing, their divines wrangling endlessly about what kind of thing the pope is, and what power he rightly may claim.

b There is (saith a great divine among them) so much controversy about the plenitude of ecclesiastical power, and to what things it may extend itself, that few things in that matter are secure

This is a plain argument of the impotency of the pope's power in judging and deciding controversies, or of his cause in this matter; that he cannot define a point so nearly concerning him, and which he so much desireth an agreement in; that he cannot settle his own claim out of doubt; that all his authority cannot secure itself from contest.

So indeed it is, that no spells can allay some spirits; and where interests are irreconcileable, opinions will be so.

Some points are so tough and so touchy, that nobody dare meddle with them, fearing that their resolution will fail of success and submission. Hence even the anathematizing definers of Trent (the boldest undertakers to decide controversies that ever were) did wave this point; the legates of the pope being enjoined, to advertise, That they should not

b Tanta est inter doctores controversia de plenitudine ecclesiasticæ potestatis, et ad quæ se extendat, ut pauca sint in ea materia secura-. -. Almain. de Auct. Eccl. cap. 3.

c - di avertire, Che non si venga mai per qual causa si sia alla disputa dell autorita di papa. Concil. Trid. lib. ii. p. 159.

for any cause whatever come to dispute about the pope's authority.

It was indeed wisely done of them to decline this question, their authority not being strong enough to bear the weight of a decision in favour of the Roman see, (against which they could do nothing,) according to its pretences; as appeareth by one clear instance. For whereas that council took upon it incidentally to enact, that any prince should be excommunicate, and deprived of the dominion of any city or place, where he should permit a duel to be fought; the prelates of France in the Convention of Orders, anno 1595, did declare against that decree, as infringing their king's authorityd.

It was therefore advisedly done not to meddle with so ticklish a point. But in the mean time their policy seemeth greater than their charity; which might have inclined them not to leave the world in darkness and doubt, and unresolved in a point of so main importance; (as indeed they did in others of no small consequence, disputed among their divines with obstinate heat, viz. the divine right of bishops, the necessity of residence, the immaculate conception, &c.)

The opinions therefore among them concerning the pope's authority, as they have been, so they are, and in likelihood may continue, very different.

§. II. There are among them those who ascribe to the pope an universal, absolute, and boundless

d Hic articulus est contra authoritatem regis, qui non potest privari suo dominio temporali, respectu cujus nullum superiorem recognoscit. Bochel. 1. v. tit. 20. c. 45. This article is against the authority of the king, who cannot be deprived of his temporal dominion, wherein he acknowledges no superior.

empire over all persons indifferently, and in all matters; conferred and settled on him by Divine immutable sanction: so that all men, of whatever degree, are obliged in conscience to believe whatever he doth authoritatively dictate, and to obey whatever he doth prescribe. So that if princes themselves do refuse obedience to his will, he may excommunicate them, cashier them, depose them, extirpate them. If he chargeth us to hold no communion with our prince, to renounce our allegiance to him, to abandon, oppose, and persecute him, even to death, we may without scruple, we must in duty obey. If he doth interdict whole nations from the exercise of God's worship and service, they must comply therein. So that, according to their conceits, he is in effect sovereign lord of all the world; and superior, even in temporal or civil matters, unto all kings and princes.

It is notorious, that many canonists (if not most) and many divines of that party do maintain this doctrine; affirming, that all the power of Christ (the Lord of lords, and King of kings, to whom all power in heaven and earth doth appertain) is imparted to the pope, as to his vicegerent ©.

This is the doctrine which almost 400 years ago Augustinus Triumphus, in his egregious work con

e Prima sententia est, summum pontificem jure divino habere plenissimam potestatem in universum orbem terrarum, tam in rebus ecclesiasticis quam civilibus. Ita docent Aug. Triumphus, Alvarus Pelagius, Panormitanus, Hostiensis, Silvester, et alii non pauci. Bell. v. 1. The first opinion is, that the pope hath a most full power over the whole world, both in ecclesiastical and civil affairs. This is the doctrine of Aug. Triumphus, &c. and of many others.

f Scripsit egregiam summam de potestate ecclesiæ. Bell. de