fufficiency of reafon; or that reason, is a fufficient guide in matters of religion. And the answer in short is this, viz. That reafon (where divine revelation is not) when carefully used and followed, is fufficient to guide men to God's favour, and the happiness of another world: in oppofition, to that abfolute neceffity of a divine revelation, which fuppofes, that it is impoffible, or at least that it is exceeding difficult and next to impoffible, for a man to obtain God's favour, and the happinefs of another world, who has only his reafoning faculty to guide him, and who has not the help of a divine revelation. Whether reafon be fufficient to discover a compleat system of morality, or whether it be fufficient to any other purpose, is not the prefent queftion: if it be fufficient to guide men to God's favour, and the happiness of another world; then, it answers the most valuable purposes to them; and this is all that I am concerned to make good,

That reafon (where divine revelation is not) when carefully ufed and followed, is fufficient to answer the purposes aforefaid, appears plain and evident to me; and that disposes me to endeavour to make it appear plain and evident to others. And, as I do it with a kind intention, and a regard to truth: fo if I fhould fhew great weakness herein, (which I hope I fhall not) I pre

fume

fume my reader's goodness will excufe it. The question before me is, whether reason be a fufficient guide in matters of religion; that is, whether reafon (where divine revelation is not) when carefully used and followed, is fufficient to guide men to God's favour, and the happiness of another world. In the profecution of this enquiry, I fhall fhew what those principles are which I reafon from, and likewife free them from the difficulties which may feem to incumber them: and then I fhall fhew, what are the conclufions, which do naturally and neceffarily follow from those principles; from which I prefume it will appear, that reason is fufficient to answer the purposes aforefaid. The principles I reafon from, are,

First, That there is a natural and effential difference in things. By which I mean, first, that there is not a univerfal fameness in nature; but that things and actions are really diftinct and different from each other. That is to fay, pleasure and pain, two and four, right and wrong, kind and unkind, are not the fame thing: but thofe different terms are used to exprefs, and do conveigh to the mind, ideas which are really distinct and different in nature. Pleasure is not the fame thing as pain; two is not the fame as four; right is not the fame as wrong; kind is not the fame as unkind; and the like. Again, when I fay there is a natural and

an effential difference in things, I mean, Secondly, that there is not an univerfal in difference in nature; but that things and actions. are really one better or preferable to another. That is to fay, pleasure is in nature (when confidered abftractedly from all other confiderations) better than pain; right is better than wrong; kind is better than unkind; and the like. And our difcerning faculties do as naturally and as evidently perceive the difference betwixt thefe, with refpect to their preferablenefs one to the other as thofe faculties do difcern their differing one from another. That is, we do as naturally and as evidently perceive that pleafure is better than pain, as that pleasure is not pain; we do as naturally and evidently perceive that doing right is better or preferable to doing wrong, as we do perceive that right is not the fame thing as wrong; that to do right is commendable and worthy of a rational being, and therefore ought in reafon to determine his choice in its favour; that to do wrong is difreputable and unworthy of a rational being, and therefore his choice ought always in reafon to be determined against it; and the like. And,

Tho', our reasoning faculty is abfolutely neceffary for the difcovering the natural and effential difference in things, or to enable us to perceive it; yet this faculty does not make or conftitute that difference. Things

and

and actions are really diftinct from, and one preferable to another in nature, when confidered abstractedly from, and independent of any power in us; and our difcerning faculty does only enable us to perceive, but does not conftitute that difference. So that the difference in things, does not refult from, nor depend upon any particular conftitution of the mind; but is founded in nature, and therefore will appear the fame to all minds in which a capacity of difcernment refides, fuppofing those minds to be differently constituted. Two and four are really diftinct and different in nature, and this difference must and will appear the fame to every mind, in which a capacity of discernment refides, tho' differently conftituted. Thus, again, pleasure is in nature better and preferable to pain, and this difference muft and will appear the fame to every mind (however conftituted,) which is capable of perceiving what pleasure and pain is. cafe is the fame with refpect to right and wrong, kind and unkind, and the like; thefe are not only different from, but also one preferable to another in nature; and our faculties do not conftitute that difference, but only enable us to perceive it. And, as there is not an univerfal famenefs in nature, but a real difference with refpect to things and actions themselves; and, as there is not an universal indifference in nature, but a real

The

difference with refpect to the valuableness or preferableness of one thing or action to another, when they are brought into a comparison: fo that difference in all fimple (tho' it be otherways in complex) cafes, is the object of fimple perception only, and as fuch those prove themselves; that is, they appear evident to our perceptive faculties, and do not admit of any other kind of proof. If it fhould be asked, how it can be proved that the double of two is four, that the whole is equal to all its parts, that acting right is different from, or preferable to acting wrong; and the like? The answer would be, that these are felf-evident propofitions; that is, they appear evident to our difcerning faculties, and as fuch they prove themfelves, and do not admit of any other kind of proof. Again,

Secondly, as there is a natural and an effential difference in things: fo that difference exhibits, if I may fo fpeak, a reafon or rule of action to every moral agent. That is, as doing right is in nature better and therefore preferable to the doing wrong: fo this difference will always be a reafon (refulting from the nature of the thing) to every moral agent, why he fhould chufe to do right, and it will be a reafon against, or why he fhould not chufe to do wrong. Again, as pleasure is in nature preferable to pain, the one being a natural good, and the other a

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