cerning it or not; and God's judging us, and rewarding or punishing us agreeably to this rule, would have been the fame, whether he had made any declaration concerning it or not. God does not judge the world, because he has declared that he will do it; but because it is reasonable that he fhould and therefore, his declaration cannot be a ground of certainty in the present cafe. If it fhould be afked, how we could be certain that God would judge the world, if he had not declared that he would do it? Then, it may be afked, how we can be certain that God will judge the world, tho' he has declared that he will do it? God's declaration alone is not a ground of certainty, because he may deceive us; and therefore, there must be fomething in nature to be a foundation for credit with refpect to that declaration: and that which is a foundation for credit to that declaration, is a proper ground of certainty, fuppofing no fuch declaration had been made. is, if we give credit to fuch a divine declaration, becaufe we are fure that God always acts agreeably to reafon, and therefore will not deceive us in the prefent cafe: then we are fure that God will judge the world, tho' he had made no declaration concerning it, because it is agreeable to reafon that he should do fo. And,

That

Here

Here I beg my reader to confider that a future judgment is not a trifling affair, it being of the laft importance to all. thofe who are to pass that tryal; and therefore it cannot be a matter of indifferency to God, whether he will judge the world or not. So that a future judgment and retribution, is either a reasonable or an unreasonable action; that is, there is a reafon refulting from the nature of things, either for or against such a judgment. If the reason of the thing requires fuch a procedure, then this affures us that God will judge the world: and this affurance, is prior to any affurance which is grounded upon a divine declaration concerning this matter, because the credibility of all divine declarations is founded upon this very principle, viz. that God will act agreeably to reafon, in all his dealings with his creatures. And therefore, as the moon derives or borrows all her light from the fun; fo all the certainty which, arifes from divine revelation in the prefent cafe, is derived or borrowed from the principles of reafon. If it should be asked, how can reafon affure us of a future judgment, when it cannot affure us of our future existence? I answer, that the certainty of our future existence, and a future judgment, are both founded upon the fame principle; viz. the fitness and reafonablenefs of God's continuing the one, and executing the other. If

it is fit and reasonable that God fhould continue our beings, and that he should call us to an account for our actions; then this affures us of our future exiftence, and of a future judgment; and all the certainty which divine revelation can give us with respect to these points, is derived from, and founded upon this very principle, as I have already obferved. And therefore, if it were a matter of indifferency to God, whether he would continue our beings, or whether he would judge the world or not; then it would be as much a matter of indifferency to him, (fuppofing he has declared that he will do both) whether he should abide by fuch his declarations, and whether he should deceive us or not, in either of those cafes. The reason of things, and the importance of the affair, is as much concerned in the former as in the latter; and therefore, if the former is a matter of indifferency to God, then the latter must be fo likewife; and confequently, if reafon cannot affure us nor give us fatisfaction in these points, then much lefs can we have it from divine revelation. And, this is what I would humbly recommend to the confideration of all thofe, who have made themselves parties in the prefent question.

If it fhould be urged (as I have been told that this or fomething like it, has been urged by fome writer against me), viz.

that

that tho', when things are constituted as they are, our moral obligations will naturally and neceffarily arife out of them: yet, feeing God is the author of nature, and feeing he might have constituted things otherwife than they are if he pleased; from hence it will follow, that as his will is the ground and foundation of the present conftitution of things; fo his will must likewife be the ground and foundation of all obligations which naturally and neceffarily refult from it.

I anfwer, this at first fight may have the appearance of argument; but when examined it appears to be otherwise. And to fhew this, I will give an instance of another kind. The three angles of a rightlined triangle, bear fuch a relation to each other, as that in every inftance, the three angles of a right-lined triangle are equal to two right angles. Now the queftion arifing from hence is, whether this relation naturally and neceffarily arifes from the things themselves, or whether it refults from the will and determination of him who first made and conftituted a right-lined triangle. And the answer is most evident, viz. that this relation naturally and neceffarily arifes from the things themselves; because the cafe is, and muft, and will be the fame, whether he who first made such a triangle, willed or determined any thing

con

concerning it or not. The three angles of a right-lined triangle, always were, and always will be, equal to two right angles : whether ever any fuch thing as a triangular figure exifted or not; it not being within the power, and therefore it cannot depend upon the divine will, to make it fo, or to make it otherwife. The cafe is the fame with refpect to morality. An innocent indigent moral agent in distress, always was, and always will be, the proper object of pity and relief, whether ever any fuch being existed or not; and it is not within the power, and therefore it cannot depend upon the divine will, to make it fo, or to make it otherwife. And tho', it depends upon the will of God, whether indigent moral agents fhall exift, under this or that or the other circumftances; yet, when they do exift under thofe circumftances, then it does not depend upon his will, whether the moral obligations which do naturally and neceffarily refult therefrom, fhall take place or not, because the cafe is, and muft, and will be the fame, with refpect to thofe obligations, whether God willed or determined any thing concerning them or not. From what I have obferved, I think it appears, that pleasure and pain, or happiness and mifery, that right and wrong, and the like, and the preferablencfs of these one to another; or in other words, that the na

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