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tural and moral difference in things, and all moral obligations refulting from that difference, are founded in nature, and are what they are antecedent to, and independent of the divine will, or any divine determinations concerning them. Again,

Thirdly, As there is a natural and an ef fential difference in things, and as there is a reafon or rule of action refulting from that difference, which is equally obliging to every moral agent; fo Almighty God makes that rule, viz. the reafon of things, the measure of his actions; and this he does, in all inftances and cafes in which it is capable of being a rule to him. And, it is his chufing to act agreeably to this rule, which constitutes his moral character, and denominates him to be a wife, a just, and a good being. And, it is his acting at all times, and in all cafes, uniformly and univerfally agreeably to the reafon of things, which conftitutes his moral perfections; that is, which denominates him to be a perfectly wife, a perfectly juft, and a perfectly good being. And, that this is a true principle, and a proper foundation for argument, I prove thus. Almighty God is present to, and in, and with all things; and thereby, has the most perfect knowledge of them. And, as he moft clearly difcerns the natural and effential difference in things, and the reafon or rule of action refulting from it,

in every cafe; and as this is, and ought to be as much a rule of action to God, as to any other moral agent; and as he is far above and thereby is perfectly free from all temptations, which might mislead him and draw him into a wrong choice; so this affords a moral certainty, that he will always chuse to act right, or agreeably to that rule of action which is founded in the reason of things, as aforefaid. For tho', we have different, and fometimes oppofite interests in view, and are furrounded with many temptations of various kinds, which invite us to a wrong choice, and which too often is the ground and reafon of our foolishly and wickedly acting contrary to that rule of action, which is founded in the reason of things: yet, this is by no means the cafe with refpect to God; and therefore, it cannot be a ground or reafon to him, to chufe to act wrong in any cafe whatever. God has not different and oppofite interests in view, he has no wrong affections within to mislead, no temptations from without to entice and allure him, no pleafing profpect to invite, nor any fuperiour power to threaten and awe him: in fine, nature does not afford

motive to invite him to a wrong choice; and therefore, we are fure that he never will act fo; but on the contrary, he always will make the reafon of things, the rule and measure of his actions. Thus, I think, I

have fhewn, that the principle I have now under confideration, is a true principle: and thereby, it is a juft and proper foundation for argument.

Thefe are the principles I reafon from, which if they are not well-grounded, (as I think I have fhewn they are;) then I acknowledge, that all I have offered on the fubject is of no weight. That is, if there be no real difference in things, but all things and actions are alike indifferent in nature, are neither good nor evil, till they are made and conftituted to be either of these, by the arbitrary will and determination of fome agent; or if there be not a reafon or rule of action refulting from that difference, which ought in reason to determine the will of every being endowed with a capacity of difcerning that difference, either for or against the performance of this or that action; or if Almighty God approves or disapproves, not from any natural and intrinfick approvablenefs, or difapprovableness in the objects themselves, but from capricious humour and arbitrary pleasure; or if he arbitrarily conftitutes what fhall be right or wrong, good or evil, without any regard to what is fo in it felf: then, all my reafoning upon the point, is to be fet afide; becaufe, it is founded upon the oppofite principles.

But here, I must beg leave to make a digreffion, by obferving, that if this were H

the

;

the cafe, then the most abfolute fcepticism in matters of religion would unavoidably follow upon it because then, we could not come to any certainty in any point with refpect to it. For in fuch a cafe there would be no principle in nature to reason from and confequently, there could not be any foundation for argument. God having no principle to act from, nor any rule to govern his actions by, but what he arbitrarily adopted to himself, and which he might at any time as arbitrarily discard: he would act either fairly or foully, uprightly or deceitfully with his creatures, at any time, or in any inftance as he pleased; and confequently, he could not be the proper object of our confidence, in any cafe whatever. Then Abraham's queftion, and what preceded it, Genefis xviii. 25. That be far from thee, to do after this manner, to lay the righteous with the wicked, or that the righteous fhould be as the wicked; that be far from thee! Shall not the judge of all the earth do right? this question would be exceedingly vain and trifling, because whatever God does must be right, (upon the prefent fuppofition,) if he pleases to determine that it fhall be fo. Whether God destroys the righteous with the wicked, or whether he destroys the righte ous only, or the wicked only, and fpares either of thefe from that deftruction; whether he deals fairly and equally, or unequally and

deceit

deceitfully with his creatures, all is right that God does; because upon this fuppofition, it is his determination alone which conftitutes right and wrong, good and evil in every cafe; and because there is no real difference in things, nor any principle in nature to make it otherwife. And then, St. Paul alfo must have been very much mistaken, when he declared, that the oath and promife of God were two immutable things, in which it was impoffible that God Should lie, Heb. vi. 18. Here I beg leave to afk, wherein lies this impoffibility, upon the prefent fuppofition. For, if there is no real difference in things, and if swearing at one time, and for-fwearing at another; if promifing at one time, and falfifying that promife at another, be alike indifferent in nature; then, what should hinder or restrain God, from fwearing and for-fwearing, from promifing and falfifying his promise as often, and in what cafes foever he pleases? nothing furely. And therefore, St. Paul must have been very much mistaken in this point. And,

This is what I would humbly recommend to the confideration of fome of the learned doctors and writers of the age; who under the fhew and appearance of defending divine revelation, and revealed religion, are laying the ax to the root of all religion, by denying the natural and the effential difH 2 ference

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