ference in things, which moft certainly is the ground and foundation of all religion; and by founding all moral obligations, on the arbitrary will and determination of God. Which if it were the cafe, then we could not poffibly come to any certainty what his will is, or what his determinations are with refpect to us, in any cafe whatever; because, as I have obferved above, we have no principle to reafon from, and confequently, have no foundation for argument in the prefent cafe. Befides, if we could come to a certainty what the divine will is in any instance, this is not to be trusted to, nor relyed upon, feeing God may fhift and change his determinations at pleafure, and we know nothing of it, there not being any principle in nature, which can dispose him to acquaint us with it: fo that upon this fuppofition, religion must be the most uncertain and precarious thing in the world. But to re

turn.

I have fhewn above what those principles are which I reafon from, viz. first, that there is a natural and an effential difference in things; fecondly, that this difference exhibits a reafon or rule of action, which is equally obliging to every moral agent; thirdly, that Almighty God makes this rule, viz. the reafon of things, the measure of his actions in his dealings with his creatures, in all inftances and cafes in

which it can be a rule to him. Now, admitting those principles are well-grounded, then I argue thus.

First, If there be a natural and effential difference in things, and if that difference exhibits a rule of action to all moral agents, and if God will govern his actions by this rule: then, God will deal with every accountable creature, according to the abilities he has, the circumftances he is in, and the advantages or difadvantages he is under; and then, God will most certainly and accept approve and fuch creature, who exercises his reafoning faculty as well, or to answer the best purposes that he can, or that may reasonably be expected from him. in his circumftances, and who directs and governs his affections and actions accordingly.

of

every

But, there is a natural and an effential difference in things, and that difference exhibits a reafon or rule of action, &c.

Therefore, God will deal with every accountable creature, according to the abilities he has, the circumftances he is in, &c.

The major propofition in this argument, is proved above: the minor is proved thus. To deal with all accountable creatures, according to the abilities they have, the circumstances they are in, and the advantages or disadvantages they are under, and to approve and accept of fuch of them, who

exercise their reafoning faculties as well, or to answer the beft purposes they can, or that may reasonably be expected from them in their circumftances, and who direct and govern their affections and actions accordingly, is to act fairly and equally by fuch creatures; and to deal otherwife, is to act unfairly and unequally by them. And, as the acting fairly and equally in the present cafe, is in the nature of the thing better, and therefore preferable to the acting unfairly and unequally: fo this difference, exhibits a reason to every moral agent, and therefore, it must be a reason to God, to do the former; and it likewife exhibits a reafon to every moral agent, and therefore, to God, against doing the latter. The major and minor propofitions being proved, the conclufion naturally and neceflarily follows; viz. that God will most certainly deal with every accountable creature, according to the abilities he has, the circumftances he is in, and the advantages or difadvantages he is under; and that he will approve and accept of every fuch creature, who exer cifes his reafoning faculty as well, or to anfwer the best purposes that he can, or that may reasonably be expected from him in his circumstances, and who directs and governs his affections and actions accordingly. Again, I argue,

Secondly,

Secondly, if God will deal with every accountable creature, according to the abilities he has, the circumftances he is in, and the advantages or difadvantages he is under; and if God will approve and accept of every fuch creature, who exercises his reafoning faculty as well, or to answer the best purposes that he can, or that may reafonably be expected from him in his circumftances, and who directs and governs his affection and actions accordingly: then reafon is, and muft, and will be to every man, if he be not wanting to himself, to every individual of our fpecies, who is answerable to God for his actions, under any or all the most disadvantageous circumstances he can poffibly fall into, whether he refides in China or at the Cape of Good Hope, a fufficient guide in matters of religion.

But, God will deal with every accountable creature, according to the abilities he has, the circumftances he is in, &c.

Therefore, reafon is to every man, who is not wanting to himself, &c.

The major propofition in this argument is proved above: the minor I prove thus. It is in the power, and it is left to the election or choice of every individual of our fpecies (who is anfwerable to God for his actions) to exercise his reasoning faculty as well, or to answer the beft purposes that he can, or that may reasonably be expected

from

from him in his circumftances. I say, that this must be the cafe of every individual of our fpecies, wherever he refides, or whatever disadvantageous circumstances he may be under; because, this is no more than doing what he can do, which furely must be in every man's power to do, and to fuppose the contrary, that is, to fuppofe that any man in any circumftances cannot do what he can do, is a manifeft contradiction. Again, it is in the power, and it is left to the choice of every individual of our fpecies, who is anfwerable to God for his actions, to direct and govern his affections and actions by, or according to his understanding and judgment, fo far as his duty is concerned. I fay, fo far as his duty is con-cerned, because if there are any inftances or cafes, in which the affections of the mind, or the motions of the body are uncontroulable by us, then in all those inftances and cafes, our duty is not concerned; that is, it is not our duty to controul them; and confequently, in every fuch inftance and cafe, we are not accountable. But, in all other cafes in which our duty is concerned, and for which we are accountable, it must be in the power of every individual (wherever he refides, or whatever difadvantageous circumftances he may be under) to direct and govern his affections and actions by, or according to his understanding

and