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ference in things, which most certainly is the ground and foundation of all religion; and by founding all moral obligations, on the arbitrary will and determination of God. Which if it were the case, then we could not possibly come to any certainty what his will is, or what his determinations are with respect to us, in any case whatever ; because, as I have observed above, we have no principle to reason from, and consequently, have no foundation for argument in the present case. Besides, if we could come to a certainty what the divine will is in any instance, this is not to be trusted to, nor relyed upon, seeing God may shift and change his determinations at pleasure, and we know nothing of it, there not being any principle in nature, which can dispose him to acquaint us with it: so that upon this supposition, religion must be the most uncertain and precarious thing in the world. But to return.

I have shewn above what those principles are which I reason from,“ viz. first, chat there is a natural and an essential difference in things; secondly, that this difference exhibits a' reason or rule of action, which is equally obliging to every moral agent; thirdly, that Almighty God makes this rule, viz. the reason of things, the measure of his actions in his dealings with his creatures, in all instances and cases in

which it can be a rule to him. Now, admitting those principles are well-grounded, then I argue thus.

First, If there be a natural and effential difference in things, and if that difference exhibits a rule of action to all moral agents, and if God will govern his actions by this rule: then, God will deal with every accountable creature, according to the abilities he has, the circumstances he is in, and the advantages or disadvantages he is under ; and then, God will most certainly approve and accept of every such creature, who exercises his reasoning faculty as well, or to answer the best purposes that he can, or that may reasonably be expected from him in his circumstances, and who directs and governs his affections and actions accordingly.

But, there is a natural and an essential difference in things, and that difference exhibits a reason or rule of action, &c.

Therefore, God will deal with every accountable creature, according to the abilitjes he has, the circumstances he is in, &c.

The major proposition in this argument, is proved above: the minor is proved thus. To deal with all accountable creatures, according to the abilities they have, the circumstances they are in, and the advantages or disadvantages they are under, and to approve and accept of such of them, who exercise their reasoning faculties as well, or to answer the best purposes they can, or that may reasonably be expected from them in their circumstances, and who direct and govern their affections and actions accordingly, is to act fairly and equally by such creatures; and to deal otherwise, is to act unfairly and unequally by them. And, as the acting fairly and equally in the present case, is in the nature of the thing better, and therefore preferable to the acting unfairly and unequally: so this difference, exhibits a reason to every moral agent, and therefore, it must be a reason to God, to do the former; and it likewise exhibits a reason to every moral agent, and therefore, to God, against doing the latter. The major and minor propositions being proved, the conclusion daturally and necessarily follows ; viz, that God will most certainly deal with every accountable creature, according to che abilities he has, the circumstances he is in, and the advantages or disadvantages he is under; and that he will approve and accept of every such creature, who exercises his reasoning faculty as well, or to answer the best purposes that he can, or that may reasonably be expected from him in his circumstances, and who directs and governs his affections and actions accordingly. Again, I argue,

Secondly, Secondly, if God will deal with every accountable creature, according to the abilities he has, the circumstances he is in, and the advantages or disadvantages he is under ; and if God will approve and accept of every such creature, who exercises his reasoning faculty as well, or to answer the best purposes that he can, or that may reasonably be expected from him in his circumftances, and who directs and governs his affection and actions accordingly : then reason is, and must, and will be to every man, if he be not wanting to himself, to every individual of our species, who is answerable to God for his actions, under any or all the most disadvantageous circumstances he can possibly fall into, whether he resides in China or at the Cape of Good Hope, a fufficient guide in matters of religion. · But, God will deal with every accountable creature, according to the abilities he has, the circumstances he is in, &c.

Therefore, reason is to every man, who is not wanting to himself, &c.'

The major proposition in this argument is proved above: the minor I prove thus. It is in the power, and it is left to the election or choice of every individual of our fpecies (who is answerable to God for his actions) to exercise his reasoning faculty as well, or to answer the best purposes that he can, or that may reasonably be expected

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from him in his circumstances. I say, that this must be the case of every individual of our species, wherever he resides, or whatever disadvantageous circumstances he may be under ; because, this is no more than doing what he can do, which surely must be in every man's power to do, and to suppose the contrary, that is, to suppose that any man in any circumstances cannot do what he can do, is a manifest concradiction. Again, it is in the power, and it is left to the choice of every individual of our species, who is answerable to God for his actions, to direct and govern his affections and actions by, or according to his understanding and judgment, so far as his duty is concerned. I say, so far as his duty is concerned, because if there are any instances or cases, in which the affections of the mind, or the motions of the body are uncontroulable by us, then in all those instances and cases, our duty is not concerned; that is, it is not our duty to controul them; and consequently, in every such instance and case, we are not accountable. But, in all other cases in which our duty is concerned, and for which we are accountable, it must be in the power of every individual (wherever he resides, or whatever disadvantageous circumstances he may be under) to direct and govern his affections and actions by, or according to his understanding

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