pre

render them the proper objects of God's fa vour or displeasure; nor to discover those motives to right behaviour, which are an equal balance to all the temptations that the sent constitution of things unavoidably leads them into: I fay, if fuch a conduct be repugnant to reason, and contrary to our na→ tural notions of the Deity; then this is a good argument to prove, that it is not the truth of the cafe. But farther,

on.

I think, my Lord Bishop of London allows, that reafon is a judge in matters of revelatiThat is, (if I understand the cafe right, and if hereby the purposes of fuch a judge are answered to mankind, which furely his Lordship muft intend) reafon is a judge in matters of revelation, in these four relpects. First, of the internal characters of a revelation, whether they are worthy of God. And, fecondly, of the external evidence which attends a revelation, whether it fufficiently proves that it came from God. And in this cafe, I would urge as above, viz. that either reafon is, or else that it ought to be, a proper judge in thefe matters; because otherwife man has nothing to guard and fecure him against delufion and impofition. Thirdly, Realon is, or ought to be, a proper judge of the fenfe and meaning of divine revelation; becaufe otherwife divine revelation may become very burtful to us. Thus, in the chri fian revelation, we are required to be careful for nothing; to take no thought for the morrow;

D

not

not to refift evil; and the like: which precepts, if not under the direction and guidance of reason, may be very prejudicial and hurtful to mankind. And which by the way fhews, that reafon, or the reafon of things, is a rule of action prior to that of revelation. Again, fourthly and laftly, Reafon is, or ought to be, a proper judge of every part of that revelation, of which it is faid that it is di vine; becaufe divinely infpired men may pretend to be fo, when that is not the case; and therefore they are not abfolutely to be relied upon. An inftance of this, we have in the old prophet mentioned 1 Kings xiii. 18. He faid unto him, I am a prophet alfo as thou art, and an angel spake unto me by the word of the Lord, faying, Bring him back with thee into thine houfe, that he may eat bread, and drink water; but he lied unto him. And that this impoftor was divinely inspired, or had immediate communications with the Deity at some other times, and that too after he had been guilty of this vile impofition, is manifeft from verle 20, where it is faid, And it came to pafs as they fat at the table, that the word of the Lord came unto the prophet that brought him back, &c. Here we fee, not only that the poor credulous prophet loft his life by his credulity; but also, that divinely inspired men are not abfolutely to be depended upon, in all that they may put upon us as the word of God. Credulous I call the forementioned prophet, because, I think, that is all the fault

T

which in reafon he could be charged with. For as to his obedience to God's commands, it is plain he intended it thro' the whole, tho' the other prophet wickedly deceived him, and thereby betrayed him into a tranfgreffion, if it may be fo called. And feeing divinely inspired men may deceive us, by pretending to have informations and inftructions from the Deity, when that is not the cafe, as is manifeft in the inftance above: therefore, I fay, that reafon is, or else that it ought to be, a proper judge, not only of every revelation, of which it is faid that it is divine, but al fo of all the parts of every revelation, which comes forth under that character. What F would obferve is, that if we may juftly conclude, that reason is a proper judge in matters of revelation, becaufe, in reafon and equity, it ought to be fo, (and which, I think, muft be the foundation of my Lord Bishop of London's argument in the prefent cafe, fuppofing he were put upon the proof of this point ;) then, I fay, that we may as fairly conclude, that reafon is a fufficient guide in matters of religion; becaufe, in juftice and equity, that ought to be the cafe. To this I may add, that if reafon be a proper judge in matters of revelation (which, I think, is an allowed cafe); then, furely, no reafon can be given, why it fhould not be a fufficient guide in matters of religion, feeing one feems to be as much within the province of reafon as the other; and what is a proper qualification for the for

D 2

mer,

mer, feems equally to be a proper qualification for the latter. Befides, if reafon is at all a guide in matters of religion (which, I think, will not be denied); then, furely, it may be a fufficient guide; because one part of our duty is as agreeable to reason, and (for any thing that appears to the contrary) is as eafy to be discovered by it as another. However, this is not the point I undertook to maintain; that being only to fhew (which, I think, I have done) that either reason is, or else that it ought to be, a fufficient guide in matters of religion.

Before I leave the fubject, I think it proper to observe, that whether I have made good what I proposed or not, (which must be fubmitted to the judgment of my readers) yet this I know, that I have not intended to injure divine revelation, or to ferve the cause of infidelity hereby. Neither do I perceive, that what I have here offered, can any way ferve fuch purposes. All divine revelation must be agreeable to reafon; for otherwise no external evidence can poffibly prove it to be divine. And if all divine revelation be agree able to reafon; then, furely, the fhewing, or endeavouring to fhew, that reafon either is, or that it ought to be, a fufficient guide in matters of religion, cannot be injurious to divine revelation. Befides, thofe men who think reason to be a fufficient guide in matters of religion, and who think themselves obliged to act agreeable to reafon; fuch men, I fay,

can reap no advantage by difcarding divine revelation; because reason does as much oblige them to their duty, as any divine revelation can do; and because all obligations, arifing from revelation, are originally founded in reafon. And as for thofe men whom reason will not oblige nor reftrain, revelation is not likely to have any great influence upon them. The outcry, therefore, that is made upon the exalting of reafon, (as it is called,) and the pretence that this is done to run down divine revelation, and to ferve the cause of infidelity, is, I think, a mere invention; which ferves only to render thofe perfons contemptible, who are for a reasonable religion: that is, for a religion which is fit and proper for fuch a rational creature as man is; and fuch furely, the chriftian religion must be allowed to be. If religion and divine revelation are in any danger of fuffering from this quarter, the danger muft árife, not from the exalting, but from the depreffing of reafon. For if thole, to whom the inftruction of mankind in matters of religion and divine revelation, is committed, are difpofed to captivate the underftandings and confciences of the people and thereby make themfelves mafters of thofe whom they are appointed to ferve, (which sometimes hath been the cafe, and therefore ought carefully to be guarded againft;) then they reprefent religion, and divine revelation in a dark and a mysterious dress, thereby to make the greater advantage upon the

weakness