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the natural and effential differences in things arifes a rule of action, which all intelligent beings, or moral agents, ought, in reaton, to direct and govern their behaviour by.

Befides, admitting the fuppofition, that wifdom and folly, right and wrong, good and evil, just and unjuft, &c. are not founded in nature, but depend upon the will of God to conftitute what fhall be each of thefe: then, I fay, that God might, if he had pleased, have reversed these; that is, he might have conftituted what is wrong to have been right, what is unjust to have been juft, what is evil to have been good, and the like. If it should be faid, that God could not have done this, because then he would not have been God; I answer, if by his not being God be meant he would not have been wife, juft, good, &c. which is the moral character of that being whom we characterize by the term God: then, I fay, that God would have been God in that cafe equally as much as now. That is, he would then have been equally juft, wife, and good, if he had conformed his actions to what he had then arbitrarily conftituted to be justice, wisdom, and goodnefs, as he now is juft, wife, and good, by his now conforming his actions to what he has now arbitrarily conftituted to be each of thefe. But if by God's not being God, be meant his being deftitute of that wildom, juftice, and goodnefs, which is in itself inE 2 trinfically

trinfically fuch, and which is, in reality, the true and proper moral character of the Deity, and which renders him the most lovely and amiable of all beings; then this plainly fuppofes, that all thefe are founded in nature, and are what they are, viz. wifdom, justice, goodness, &c. antecedent to, and independent of any divine determination concerning them. And,

Here I beg leave to obferve, what a defperate game fome men are difpofed to play in order to gain a dominion over the understandings and confciences of the people: (which tyranny we of this nation are happily delivered from, and from which may we always be preserved) namely, they will venture to render morality, and all religion, uncertain and precarious, by giving up and difowning the principle upon which all argument and reasoning, with refpect to thefe, is founded, and fo rifque the whole rather than lofe their point. For if right and wrong, juft and unjuft, wisdom and folly, good and evil, have no foundation in nature, and if it depends upon the will of God what fhall or shall not conftitute each of thefe; then it muft furely be allowed, that all thefe ftand upon a very precarious bottom; because God may be conftantly altering his will, and his determinations, with refpect to them: that is, what God conftitutes to be wife and good to day, he may conftitute to be foolish and evil to morrow, for any thing we know,

or

or for any grounds we have, from which we may juftly conclude the contrary; so that we can never come to any certainty what is right and what is wrong, what is pleasing and what is difpleafing to God, and the like; because we have no certain principle to reafon from, with respect to them, and confequently the foundation of morality, and all religion, must be destroyed.

If it fhould be faid, that as it depends upon the will of God to conftitute what shall be good or evil, juft or unjuft, right or wrong, &c. to his creatures; fo he will always declare what his determinations are with refpect to them; which declaration we are to rely upon, and reafon from, at all times, and in all cafes and if at any time he should alter or change fuch his determinations, with respect to these, then he will declare or make known his will, with refpect to fuch alteration. I anfwer, that God will thus reveal his will, as aforefaid, is prefumed without the leaft ground: for, as upon the prefent fuppofition, there is no principle in nature to difpofe him to it; fo there is no external power which can force him, and confequently we can have no certainty that he will make any fuch declaration. Befides, we cannot, upon the present fuppofition, form any judgment, with refpect to a revelation, whether it be divine or not; because we cannot poffibly have any previous principle to reafon from, with regard to it.

If it fhould be faid, that every intelligent being (the fupreme being only excepted) has a particular felf-intereft of its own, diftinct and different from the particular felf-interest of every other intelligent being, and that the particular felf-intereft of every intelligent being is the ground and foundation, and the rule and measure of wisdom and folly, of juft and unjuft, of right and wrong, of good and evil, to every fuch being; and confequently he is truly juft, wife, and good, who ftrictly and inviolably pursues his own particular felf-intereft, in diftinction from, and in oppofition to the particular intereft of any, or the united intereft of all other intelligent beings and he is truly foolish, unjuft, and evil, who prefers the particular intereft of any, or the united intereft of all intelligent beings to his own in any cafe: and therefore it would be foolish, unjuft, and evil, for a man to deny himfelf any enjoyment, or to fuffer the leaft pain or evil of any kind, for the fake of another, or for the fake of the publick, except he were fure that his prefent lofs would be fufficiently recompenced to him hereafter.

Before I return an answer to what is here urged, I fhall make one or two previous obfervations, viz. first, that selfishness is not an appetite or paflion, (which are immediate excitements to action) but it is a principle which men are to reafon from and to govern their prefent and future behaviour by. Second

ly,

ly, that tho' selfishness be a proper principle of action to intelligent beings, yet it is not, nor ought not to be, the fole principle of action in them; because there is another principle, viz. benevolence, which is equally as natural, and as reafonable. And as both these principles are founded in reason; so, when either of them is carried to an extream, it becomes unreafonable. And confequently there may be cafes in which acting from either of thefe principles may be reafonable, and that the contrary to either of them may be unreasonable. And,

on.

Here I will confider this world as our all, and exclude futurity out of the queftiAnd in this view of the cafe, I think, it will appear that benevolence is a proper foundation or principle of action to intelligent beings; and that benevolent actions, when they come in competition with felfishnefs, are in fome inftances worthy of rational creatures, tho' in other inftances the cafe may be otherwife. That benevolence is a proper foundation, or principle of action, to intelligent beings, is abundantly evident from what I have already obferved, viz. that the communicating of happiness is preferable to the communicating of mifery; and that the communicating of happiness is an action which in itself is kind and good, it is commendable and praifeworthy; and therefore it is fit and reafonable to be performed, and confequently be

nevolence

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