nevolence is a proper principle of action to man, as well as to all other intelligent beings, fuppofing this world were his all. And,

That benevolent actions, when they come in competition with felfishness, are, in fome inftances, worthy of rational creatures, will be evident, by giving a cafe or two in which they plainly appear to be fo, and in which the contrary plainly appears to be otherwife. As thus; fuppofing one man denies himfelf the enjoyment of a low degree of pleasure, or chufes to undergo a low degree of pain, for a very fhort space of time, thereby to remove from another a violent fit of the gout, or ftone, or the like, without any view of pleasure or advantage to himself, either in this world, or the world to come; in this cafe, I think, it would be not only a kind and generous, but also a reasonable action; because, it appears to me, that the end is worthy of the means by which it is obtained. And as generofity, in this inftance, would be fit and reasonable; fo felfishness, if it were made the governing principle of action, would, in this cafe, be carried to an extream, and would be unfit and unreafonable. Again; fuppofe a man, in order to procure to himfelf a low degree of fhort-lived pleasure, or to avoid a low degree of momentary pain, fhould bring upon many others the most intense and durable pain and mifery; in this cafe felfishnefs would be carried to an extream,

and

and would be thereby unreasonable; and its contrary, viz. benevolence, would be fit and reasonable; that is, it would be fit and reafonable for a man to prefer the much greater good of many, to fo trifling a good to him felf, when these come in competition; and this would be the cafe, fuppofing this world were his all. And.

If any farther enquiry fhould be made, wherein the reasonablenefs or unreasonablenefs of fuch actions lie; the answer is, that the actions befpeak or thew themselves to be fo; and that, in the nature of the thing, they do not admit of being fhewn to be lo any other way. And if, in the inftances above, thofe actions are either reasonable or unreasonable, as aforefaid, fuppofing futurity be excluded out of the queftion; then there may be other cafes in which the chufing to undergo greater felfdenial, or greater, or more durable pain, in order to promote the good of others, without any view of pleasure or advantage to one's felf, either prefent or future, may be fit and reasonable alfo. Tho' I grant that benevolence may be carried to an extream, and thereby become unreasonable, as when a man chufes to undergo great and durable pains himtelf, merely to procure a low degree of short-lived pleature to another; in this cafe benevolence would be carried to an extream, and would be unfit and unreafonable. I do not here take upon me to point out the bounds of reafonable or unreafonable

selfishness, or benevolence; but all that I obferve is, that both selfishness and benevolence are founded in reason ; and are, therefore, proper principles of action to man, fuppofing this world were his all; and that there are cafes in which either of thefe may be carried to an extream, and thereby become unreafonable; and confequently there may be cafès in which selfishness ought, in reafon, to give place to benevolence; and that there may be other cafes in which benevolence ought, in reafon, to give place to felfishness. So that neither felfifhnefs, nor benevolence, are the ground and foundation, and the rule and measure of wisdom and folly, of right and wrong, of good and evil, &c. to intelligent beings; but it is that principle of reafon which refults from the natural and effential differences in things that is the ground and foundation of all, and by which both felfishness and benevolence are to be directed and governed.

Having thus fhewn how the cafe would ftand, fuppofing this world were our all; I now proceed to confider how it will be, fuppofing a future ftate, in which God will reward or punish us, according to our behaviour here. And here I obfèrve, that the profpect and certainty of a future ftate of rewards and punishments, does not naturally and neceffarily exhibit to us another law, or rule of action, different and oppofite to what would have been a rule of action to us, fup

pofing this world to have been our all; but, on the contrary, what is fit and reasonable, and therefore our duty, upon one fuppofition, is and must be equally the fame upon the other. And the reafon is evident, because a rule of action is, in order of nature, before the fanctions which are annexed to enforce it, the unreasonable of which rule is, or ought to be, the ground and foundation of thofe fanctions. That is, a law, or rule, of action, does not become reasonable, by having great and valuable things promised to thole who keep it, and severe and terrible thingsthreatned to those who break it; but it is because the law is fit and reasonable in itself, that thofe fanctions are annexed, to excite and lead men on to a ready compliance with it. This, I fay, is, or ought to be the cafe; and it is fo with refpect to all wife and just administrations. And,

As felfifhnefs and benevolence are each of them proper principles of action in man, each of which is reasonable when kept within due bounds, and each of which is unreasonable when carried to an extream; fo the reafonablenefs, or unreafonablenefs of either of thefe, does not arise from any natural relation they ftand in to futurity, but from the particular circumstances of each cafe. And therefore each of these will be reasonable, or unreafonable, whether we take a future ftate of rewards and punishments into the question, or not. Thus,as in the inftances mentioned above, fuppofing one man denies himfelf the enjoyF 2

ment

ment of a low degree of pleafure, or chufes to undergo a low degree of pain for a very fhort space of time, thereby to remove from another a violent fit of the gout, or ftone, or the like, fuch an action is reafonable; and it is equally fo, whether we take futurity into the queftion, or not. Again, suppose a man, in order to procure to himself a low degree of short-lived pleasure, or to avoid a Jow degree of momentary pain, fhould bring upon many others the most intenfe and durable pain and mifery; in this café felfishness would be carried to an extream, and fuch an action would be very unreasonable; and it would be equally fo, whether we take a future ftate of rewards and punishments into the queftion, or not. And,

As the reasonablenefs, or unreasonablenefs of our present behaviour, arifes from our acting fuitable or unfuitably to the prefent relations and circumftances we are under, and not from what we may enjoy or fuffer hereafter; fo God, confidered as the governor of the moral world, if he will be God (to ufe the language of a late writer;) that is, if he will act the part of a wife, juft, and good Being, then he muft and will encourage, and promote, by his promises, a reafonable behaviour, and no other; and he will difcourage, by his threatnings, an unreafonable behaviour, and that only, in his creatures; that is, he will command, encourage, and promote fuch felfishnefs, and fuch only,