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as is under the direction and government of reafon, when confidered abftractedly from his interpofition; and he will forbid, discourage, and condemn fuch felfishness, and fuch only, as is unreasonable, when confidered abstractedly, as aforefaid. And the fame with refpect to benevolence. So that if God, in the government of the moral world, acts the part of a juft, wife, and good Being (which moft certain he does) then he does not intend, by his threatnings and promifes, to exhibit to us another law, or rule of action, different and opposite to what would have been a rule of action to us, and our duty, fuppofing this world to have been our all; but on the contrary, he intends, by his threatnings and promiles, to excite and lead us on to a reasonable fervice; and which would have been equally reasonable, and our duty, whether he interpofed and gave any threatnings and promifes, or not.

Having made the precedent obfervations, which, I think, are very material to the main point which I have now under confideration; I return to the objection, which supposes that felfishness is the ground and foundation, and the rule and measure of wisdom and folly, of right and wrong, &c. to all intelligent beings, who have a particular felf-intereft of their own, and which is plainly the cafe of man; and consequently, that felfishness is, and ought to be, the fole principle of action to him. Now, tho' these principles are ma

nifeftly

nifeftly falfe, as I have fhewn above, and therefore no reasoning from them can be conclufive; yet, for argument fake, I will admit them, and fee how the cafe will ftand upon that fuppofition. And accordingly,

I obferve, that if felfishnefs is the ground and foundation, and the rule and meature of right and wrong, of wisdom and folly, of good and evil, &c. to all intelligent beings, and confequently is the fole principle of action in man; then it is fo, either in the nature of the thing, or else it becomes fo by the will and appointment of God.

And

whether it be the one or the other, (feeing our prefent behaviour has no necessary connection with another world,) therefore, if God acts confonant to the nature of things, or to his own determinations, with respect to them; then he that is the most selfish, with regard to this world, as he is the most vertuous, fo he will, of courfe, be the most pleafing and acceptable to his Maker, and will deferve to be moft amply rewarded by him. And he that is the moft generous (that is, has the greateft regard for the good of others) as he becomes hereby the most foolish, unjuft, and evil; fo, of course, he muft and will render himself most unacceptable and displeasing to God, and will deferve the feverest punishment from him. I fay, that this will unavoidably be the cafe, whether we confider selfishnets to be, in the nature of the thing, the ground and foundati

on,

on, and the rule and measure of wisdom and folly, of right and wrong, &c. to all intelligent beings; or whether it becomes fo by the will and appointment of God: because, in either cafe, if God acts fuitable to his character, as God, by conforming his affections and actions, either to the nature of things, or to his own determinations concerning them; then he will, moft certainly, pay the greatest regard by amply rewarding, in another world, those who act the most selfish part in this world, feeing our present behaviour has no neceffary connection with futurity, as I obferved above. And he will fhew the greatest diflike, by feverely punishing, in another world, those who act the most generous part as to this. Selfifhnefs, with regard to this world, upon the prefent fuppofition, ought to have the greatest encouragement from God; and it would be manifeftly wrong in him to offer any thing, whether it regards this life or another, which might check or reftrain it. And,

As to publick good, we can have no reafon to fuppofe that God would pay fuch regard to it, as to require any of his creatures to deny themselves on its account; because, in fo doing he must act contrary either to the nature of things, or to his own determinations with refpect to them. Publick good, when it ftands oppofed to private good (upon the prefent fuppofition) has nothing valuable in it to recommend it to the choice,

2

either of God or man, but the contrary. And therefore, to fuppofe that God would thus work upon the hopes and fears of his creatures, by promising them the greatest rewards, and by threatning them with the fevereft punishments in another world, in order to induce and engage them to act a part here, which is either unnatural and wrong in itfelf, or else is become fo by a divine deter mination, and that too in the pursuit of an end, viz. publick good, which is not worthy of the choice of either, this fuppofition fure ly is monftrously abfurd. And how favour able foever this doctrine may be to Hobbism; yet, furely, it is very injurious to the chriftian religion; for, upon the prefent fuppofition, the christian revelation could not poffibly have come from God, because it promifes the greatest rewards to the generous (that is, to the most vicious perfons) and to the most felfish as to this world, (that is, to the most vertuous perfons) it threatens the fevereft punishments; which, upon the prefent fup pofition, is manifeftly running crofs to nature, or to that order of things which God hath conftituted; and therefore fuch a reve lation cannot poffibly be divine.

If it should be faid that tho' the promises of the Gofpel are annexed to fuch actions as are fubfervient to the good of others, or of the publick; yet thefe actions are not confidered as the produce of generofity, but of felfifhnels, and that a man becomes entitled

to

to those promifes only when he performs thofe actions, on condition, and in expectation of being fufficiently rewarded for them: and therefore if he performs thole actions without any view to fuch a reward, then he is fo far from being entitled to thofe promises, that, on the contrary, he delerves to be feverely chaftized for his folly :

I anfwer; this is a very fad, as well as a very falfe reprefentation of the chriftian revelation; wherein the promiies, which are made to perions who purfue the good of others, and who deny themselves for the fake of the publick, are made to them only, as those actions are the produce of love, that is, of good will to mankind; and thofe promifes no otherwife belong to them, than as their actions flow from this generous principle. And therefore St. Paul faith of himleif, that if he gave all his goods to feed the pour, and if he gave his body to be burned, and had not charity, or a benevolent and generous temper of mind, it would profit him nothing; the promises of the golpel would then not belong to him. Befides, if felfithnefs is the ground and foundation, and the rule and meature of wisdom and folly, of good and evil, &c. and confequently is the only proper rule of action to intelligent beings, then, I fay, as before, that feeing our prefent behaviour has no neceffary connection with another world; therefore God, if he would act fuitably to his character as God, G muft

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