perfect knowledge or perception of every thing that is. God has been alfo actually present to every thing that has been, in every part of space, and through every point of duration that is paft; and, from hence, I think, we may justly conclude that God has likewise the most perfect remembrance of every thing that has been, through every point of duration that is paft, because every thing that has exifted has been actually prefent to him, and perceived by him. But then, God is not actually present to any thing that will be, in any point of duration to come; and therefore, we have not the like ground for concluding that he perfectly foreknows every thing that will be, as we have for concluding that he perfectly remembers every thing that has been. So that, tho' the divine Omniprefence is a proper and a fufficient foundation to ground these propofitions upon, viz. that God certainly knows every thing that is, because he is actually prefent with it; and, that he perfectly remembers every thing that has been, because he has been actually prefent with it, and it has been actually perceived by him; yet, it does not appear, that the divine Omniprefence lays a foundation for us to conclude, with equal certainty that God perfectly foreknows every thing that will be, because he is not actually present to any thing that will be, in any point of duration to come.

If it fhould be faid, that, tho' God is not actually present to any thing that will be; yet God can certainly prejudge, or determine what he himfelf will do, what free agents he will

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call into being, and what will be the conftitutions, difpofitions, and tempers of fuch agents; and, that this is a proper and a fufficient foundation in nature for God perfectly to foreknow, or infallibly prejudge, (which comes to the fame) what every agent will chufe to do, in every point of duration to come. Anfwer, first, this is begging the question, because the particular conftitution, difpofition, and temper of a perfon, may refult from the temperance or intemperance of his parent, or from other like causes; which caufes were the produce of the parent's free election or choice. So that here the point is prefumed, or taken for granted, which is in difpute, and ought to be proved. Again, I anfwer fecondly, admitting what is here prefumed, but not proved, viz. that God does foreknow what will be the particular conftitution, difpofition, and temper of every free being that will exift, it will not follow from hence that he can infallibly prejudge what every free being will chufe to do, in every point of duration to come. I fay, that this confequence does not neceffarily follow. For, tho' the particular conftitution, difpofition, and temper of each individual, may afford, or introduce particular motives or excitements to action; yet feeing the will is not neceffarily determined by those motives, but may and does chuse to act in oppofition, fometimes to one motive, and fometimes to another, and thus, in turn, in oppofition to them all, which occafions that mixture of good and bad, of wife and foolish actions, of which moft, if not all, mens chaX racters

racters are compounded; therefore, a foreknowledge or prejudgment of the particular conftitution, &c. does not appear to be a fufficient foundation in nature, for fuch prefcience as is here fuppofed. So that, I think, it is not very clear and plain that we have wherewith in nature or reafon to ground, with certainty, this propofition upon, viz. that God does perfectly foreknow, or infallibly prejudge what every free being will chufe to do, in every point of duration to come.

But admitting that God does foreknow, or prejudge as aforefaid, if our actions have no dependance upon the divine prescience, as, most certainly, they have not; then, our liberty cannot poffibly be affected by it, (which yet you seem to think it is) prefcience and liberty being as confiftent as any two things in nature can be. You add, for what God foreknows will be, cannot but be. Anfwer, if by [cannot but be] you mean no more than [will be] then, it is true, tho' it answers no purpose; because it amounts to no more than this, viz. what will be, will be. But if by [cannot but be] you mean [it must be from an abfolute neceffity in the nature of things] then, in this sense, it is not true. Let it be admitted, that God perfectly foreknows, or infallibly prejudges that there will be a future judgment; in this cafe, a future judgment will be so far from being the refult of any abfolute neceffity in the nature of things, that, on the contrary, it will refult wholly from God's free election or choice. So that, tho' God certainly foreknows there

will be a judgment to come; yet there may not be a judgment to come, with regard to any abfolute neceffity in the nature of things for fuch a judgment, becaufe a judgment to come, will not refult from fuch neceffity, but from the free determination of the Deity, as I have already obferved.

But farther, admitting that God does foreknow, or infallibly prejudge every thing that will be, and, confequently, foreknows that fome free beings will abufe their liberty, to their own hurt; yet, I think, this should not have been a reason to him, as a juft, wife, and good being, to have with-held his hand from giving being to them, which yet, you feem to think, it ought to have done. Suppofe five perfons in a boat upon the water to be in fuch danger, as that without your interpofition they must all perish; and fuppofing it to be in your power to fave them, but that you could not fave fome, without faving them all; and fuppofing you foreknew, or could infallibly prejudge, that two of the five would abuse your kindness to their greater hurt, fo that, upon the whole, it would be better for them to perish in the waters, than to have life lengthened out to them in this cafe, the questions would be, what you ought in reafon to do, under fuch circumftances, or what a juft, wife, and good being must do, to act fuitably to fuch a character; whether he must fave them all, or let them all perish. If you fave them all, this would be acting a kind and a good part by them, as it would fave their lives, and put it into X 2

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their power to improve the kindness to their greater future good. And, whereas two of the five would, upon the whole, be fufferers; yet that would not be the effect, of your kindness, but the produce of their own free election or choice. This would be the state of the cafe, fuppofing you faved them all. If you suffered them all to perifh, then indeed, it would, in the event, prove a negative good to two of them, as by it they would be prevented from bringing upon themselves a future greater evil, which otherwife would be their cafe. But then, this would be acting a most unkind and cruel part by the other three, who would not only lofe their lives, but would also be barred the enjoyment of fuch future greater good, as otherwise they would have procured to themselves. This is the ftate of the cafe, fuppofing you fuffered them all to perifh. In the former of these cafes, there is no injuftice done, nor unkindness shewed to any; whereas in the latter cafe, your conduct, to fay the least, would be greatly unkind to three of the five, who, I think, ought not in reason to be barred your goodness, because two of the company would abuse it to their greater hurt.

This, I think, may very juftly be applied to the conduct of the Deity, in the creation, and government of the intelligent and moral world. God has called into being a multitude of agents, who are the fubjects of moral government, on purpose that they might attain to happiness; but has left it to their option whether that end fhould be obtained by them, or not. And, tho' he

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