is fufficiently tryed by the many and strong temptations with which we are furrounded on every fide, without this expedient; and therefore, this expedient is not neceffary to answer that end. Befides, this expedient cannot an fwer any good purpose to us, but may answer many bad ones. It cannot raise in us a juft and worthy fenfe of God, but may raise in us a mean and unworthy fenfe of him; viz. as one who acts the part of an arbitrary and a tyrannical governor. It cannot excite in us the affection of love to God, but may excite in us a flavish fear and dread of him. It cannot increase our virtue, but may greatly increase our guilt, if our difobedience is to be confidered as fuch. And fuppofing we yield obedience to fuch commands, that obedience, to say the most, would be only yielding to the humour and unreafonable will of a law-giver, whom it would be wrong to contend with, or difoblige. And obedience, furely, in fuch cafes, cannot render a perfon equally valuable with him who obeys a moral law from a much nobler principle. And, to admit the fuppofition that the Deity would go fo far out of his way, (if I may so speak,) and would act fo contrary to his general character as a wife and good governor, by commanding as aforefaid, is, (I think,) little lefs than blafphemy, as it is blafting the moral character of the great governor of the universe. But then, it is to be remembered, that when I fay God will not act arbitrarily, my meaning is that he will not act

thus

thus when the reafon of things can be a rule of action to him, and as to all other inftances and cafes he muft a&t arbitrarily if he acts at all; and therefore, he may and will act thus when the reafon of the thing requires that he fhould. As thus, fuppofing a common or general good to have been the end of creation, to the Deity when he called the folar fyftem into being; then, there was a reafon refulting from the nature of things why God should create the folar fyftem rather than let it have remained in a state of non-existence. And, fuppofing it to have been perfectly indifferent whether the folar fyften were placed in that particular part of fpace in which it now exifts, or in fome other part of space; then, as there was a reason for the Deity to act in calling the folar fyftem into being, fo there was likewife a reafon that he fhould act arbitrarily, in appointing the particular part of space it fhould exift in; because without the latter, he could not have performed the former. And, this reafon will hold good in all parallel cafes, whether the Deity be confidered as acting the part of a Creator, or a Governor, or of a kind Phyfician to his creatures; fuppofing fuch cafes can take place when God acts in either of these capacities.

As to divine or pofitive inftitutions, (as they are commonly called,) if God gives any of thefe, he is to be confidered as acting the part, not of a governor or legiflator, but of a Phyfician to his creatures. And these

inftitutions

inftitutions are to be confidered, not as laws or rules of action, but as kind prescriptions to mankind; because this is more properly and truly the ftate of the cafe. Man, is not only weak, and infirm with regard to his body, but alfo with regard to his mind; and divine inftitutions are intended to answer the fame purpofe to the mind, as food and phyfick does to the body. The mind of man is liable to be over-acted, (if I may fo fpeak,) and thereby rendered weak and infirm various ways. The bufinefs, the cares, the troubles, the pleasures of life, and the like, are apt to engross the thoughts and captivate the minds of men, and render them weak and infirm; by which means man becomes lefs able to act a worthy and a manly part, and to stand out with firmnefs and refolution against the many and strong temptations with which he is furrounded. And this makes it neceflary that the mind of man, fhould be fometimes taken off from thefe, and turned to fubjects of a more ferious nature; by which the mind is recruited, and renews it's ftrength. And this is the purpose that divine inftitutions are intended to ferve, viz. to take off mens minds, for a time, from the business, the cares, the troubles, and pleafures of life; to awaken in them a just and worthy fenfe of God, to draw forth their minds in fuitable affections towards him; to excite in them a proper fenfe of the great end and business of life, to lead them to examine how far that end has been anfwered by them,

and

and wherein they have been defective, to point out to them how they ought to behave in time to come, and the like. These are the purposes that divine inftitutions are intended to ferve; and thus they become both food and phyfick to the mind of man. But then, in divine inftitutions there can be nothing dark or myfterious, because by fuch a conduct God would dif appoint the very end he propofes to obtain by them; viz. the ftrengthening and recruiting the mind of man. Mysteries in a prescription for the mind would anfwer the fame end as powder of poft, when called by a name that is not understood, would do in a prescription for the body, fuppofing powder of post to have no phyfical quality in it; that is, it would ferve only to amuse and mislead the patient, which furely can never be the cafe with respect to God, in his prescriptions (as a fpiritual Phyfician) to mankind. Darkness and mysteries are proper expedients to carry on and fupport. bafe and unworthy defigns; but God has no fuch defigns to execute; and therefore, we may be affured that he has nothing to do with darkness and myfteries in any of his prescriptions to mankind. It is true that nature is full of mysteries, and yet nature is of God; and the reafon of this is evident, viz. because our understandings are too weak to difcover all the fecrets and powers in nature. The myfteries in nature muft of courfe bear a proportion to that measure of understanding which every creature poffeffes for the contemplation

of

of it. If the understanding is weak, nature is more myfterious: if it is ftrong, nature is less myfterious. But then, what has this to do with divine prescriptions, which in the very nature of the thing ought to be plain and clear? Is it to be fuppofed that God will be darkness, where the reason of the thing requires he fhould be all light? Will God deal with his creatures in darkness and myftery, when the nature of the thing requires that he should deal with them in plainnefs and truth? No furely. God has no end to answer to himself by any prescription he may give to mankind; and, as fuch prefcriptions are intended for our good only; fo the nature of the thing requires that they should be delivered in the plainest and clearest manner. And therefore, if any prescriptions are at any time delivered to mankind that are dark and myfterious in whole, or in part, this, I think, proves to a demonstration that such prefcriptions are not divine. If it should be faid that prefcriptions for the body are generally dark and myfterious to the patient, and yet have their proper influence notwithstanding; and therefore, why may not prescriptions for the mind be dark and myfterious to the patient and have their proper influence allo? Anfwer, the prefcriptions for the body are phyfical, and as fuch have a phyfical influence upon the body; whereas prefcriptions for the mind are moral, and as fuch have a moral influence upon the mind. And therefore, tho' phyfical prescriptions for the body