nothing in nature but perfonal valuableness in us, which can render us the proper objects of God's approbation and affection; therefore, whatever befide this is reprefented as the grounds of our acceptance with the Deity, that must of neceffity be false religion, and cannot poffibly be otherwife. As to any instituted means of religion, thefe are to be confidered as means only, and not as the end which is intended to be promoted by them. And they become means, not by being inftituted, nor yet barely by being used, but only when. they are jo ufed, as to become fubfervient to that end, viz, the making us wife and good, which conftitutes true religion, in the prefent cafe.

Alas!

I am fenfible, that thefe are truths which will not be acceptable to many Religionists, even to many zealous and orthodox Chriftians, who are very unwilling to be convinced that virtue and happiness are fo neceffarily connected together, that the latter cannot be obtained without the former; that a man cannot obtain the happiness of another world, without becoming a good man in this. how many Chriftians are there who would much rather be carried fafe to heaven, by the ftrength and virtue of their Master's merits; than be obliged to follow him, in that narrow way, and through that freight gate of virtue and good works, which is the only path that leads thither. It is not the offering to God thousands of rams, nor ten thousands of rivers

of

of oil, nor the first-born of a man's offfpring, nor the first-born of every creature, which can poffibly render a man approvable to God; because as thefe do not render a man perfonally valuable in himself, they do not render him the proper object of the divine approbation and affection. But it is the doing justice, the loving mercy, and the walking humbly with God, which will render a man acceptable to the Deity; because thefe render him perfonally valuable in himSelf, and the proper object of the divine acceptance. And this is the cafe both with and without divine revelation, and whether men be in high or low ftations, and whereever their lot is caft, in any part of the world. The fum of the matter is this, true religion, (when the term is ufed to exprefs the grounds of our acceptance with God) confifts in the right ufe and exercise of our intellectual and active faculties, by our doing all that in reafon may be expected from us, in our refpective circumftances, to have our understandings rightly informed; and in an boneft and upright behaviour, in the general courfe of our actions, agreeably thereto. This, I fay, and this only, conftitutes true religion; because it is this, and this only, which renders us perfonally valuable in our felves, and the proper objects of divine regard. And whatever befides this is reprefented to be, or which may be relied upon as the ground of acceptance with God, all fuch things

are falfe grounds, and confequently, are false religion. This is the ftate of the cafe independent of any divine revelation or promulged law, and when confidered in the abftract nature and reafon of things. And this leads me to enquire,

Thirdly and lastly, whether religion, when the term is used to exprefs the grounds upon which finners obtain the divine mercy, is alfo founded in nature. And here, I think, it will be proper to state the notion of mercy, and fhew what idea we annex to that term, in the prefent cafe. By mercy, I think, we intend the remitting to an offender, in whole, or in part, the punishment which, by his offence, he had juftly rendered himself obnoxious to. So that mercy ftands oppofed first, to cruelty, whereof justice is the mean. He who lays upon the offender a greater punishment * than his crime deferves, is cruel. He who punishes equal to the offence, is juft. And he who remits that punishment, in whole, or in part, is merciful. Again, mercy ftands oppofed fecondly, to unmerciful; that is, to the punishing fuch offenders as have rendered themselves the proper objects of mercy. He who punishes fuch an offender as has rendered himself the proper object of mercy, is unmerciful; and he who remits that punishment, is merciful. Again mercy, or a merciful difpofition, is generally, and, I

* See my Collection of Tracts, page 142.

think, justly esteemed to be a perfection, or a good quality in the agent in which it takes place; and unmercifulness, or an unmerciful difpofition, is generally esteemed to be an imperfection, or an evil quality in the subject in which it refides. But then, this fuppofes that there is fomething in nature which renders an offender the proper object of mercy, for otherwife mercifulness could not be a perfection, nor unmercifulness an imperfection in nature. Befides, to fuppofe a perfection to take place in nature, and at the fame time to fuppofe that there is nothing in nature which corresponds with, and is the ground of that perfection, is the fame grofs abfurdity as to fuppofe an effect without a caufe. And if there is fomething in nature which renders an offender the proper object of mercy, (which must needs be the cafe) then, to fhew mercy to fuch an offender must be right and fit, for that very reason, namely, because he, viz. the offender, is become the suitable and proper object of such mercy. And to be unmerciful to fuch an offender as has rendered himself the proper object of mercy, by punishing him according to the demerit of his crime, must be wrong and blame-worthy, for the very fame reason, viz. because by his becoming the proper object of mercy he ceased to be the proper object of punishment, and therefore, to punish fuch an offender must be wrong. An offender,

* By perfection here is meant moral perfection.

by his offence, becomes the proper object of punishment, and muft continue fo to be, till he has fuffered the punishment his crime deferves, or till fomething takes place in him which renders him the proper object of mercy; and when either of these take place, then he ceafes to be the proper object of punishment. I fay, when either of these take place, because when the offender has rendered himself the proper object of mercy, and as far as he has done fo, then he thereby ceases to be the proper object of punishment, as much as he would, by his fuffering in whole, or in part, the punishment his crime deferved. I here put the cafe, when the offender has rendered himself the proper object of mercy, and as far as he has done fo; because, poffibly, * an offender an become the proper object of mercy in part, that is, fuch circumftances may attend him. as may render it reasonable that his punishment fhould be abated, but not wholly taken away. This must be the cafe, except we admit that an offender can be the proper object of mercy to the full, and of punishment to the full, at the fame time, which is an apparent contradiction; becaufe mercy confifts in the remiffion of punishment. So that it is not the fhewing mercy to any, or to all offenders, without any rule or reafon; but only

may

to

* I here admit the fuppofition that an offender may become the proper object of mercy only in part, but do not take upon me to maintain either fide of the queftion.