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choice, and one or the other must become his own, not by compulsion, but by free choice; for though he is not compelled to take either, yet he is necessitated to make choice of one or the other; choose he must, there is no alternative, but which he will choose he is perfectly free to decide. When once those presents are offered for man's acceptance— good and evil, from heaven and hell-that one or the other becomes his own is inevitable, just as much so as if it was irresistibly forced upon him. We say they are as much his own as if they were irresistibly forced upon him, but they are, when chosen, more his own than if they were forced upon him; and we say this, not because there is a possibility of them being made his own by any kind of external force, for the thing is impossible. There is no way into man, so that the thing which enters may become his own, but through his voluntary principle; his nature is such, that for anything to become his own by compulsion is an utter impossibility: it must first be chosen and appropriated by man's free will and coöperation, then it is of God's mercy and power assimilated and made one with the man. And this is the case whether the thing which is chosen be good or evil; for it is as great a mercy for God to allow man to appropriate evil, as it is to allow him to appropriate what is good; yea, it is a mercy of God to assimilate evil to man when he wills it, and that for man's good; for when he wills evil, he can have no enjoyment but in evil, and God created him for enjoyment; and if he will not enjoy what is good, God permits him to enjoy such things as he wills, for no other could he delight in; and if he was not permitted to enjoy such things as those for which he had qualified himself, he would be miserable indeed. So that if poor, unfortunate, perverse souls will not choose what is good, and enjoy happiness, God, in His mercy, permits them to enjoy such things as they choose and can enjoy; and He provides for them in their misery with the same tender care as He provides for the angels in the enjoyment of their happiness. "He is good to all, and His tender care is over all His works." And we say God assimilates to man what he chooses and appropriates, because without that assimilation there could be no enjoyment of any thing, either good or evil; man must first feel it as his own, before it can be enjoyed as his own; and it cannot be felt as his own except by assimilation. Man must will and choose, for it is one with his existence; willing and thinking are the existence of the mind, as acting and speaking are the existence of the body; in these consists man's voluntary life, and without them we can form no idea of human existence.

When man wills and chooses, though he wills and chooses in himself, as shewn above, yet the things which he chooses are not of himself; he

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cannot choose himself, for that he is already; but he must choose something which is not himself, but which nevertheless becomes assimilated to himself by virtue of his choice and adoption; and since the objects of his choice are the involuntary affections and thoughts from heaven and hell, it follows that he is necessitated to choose one or the other,— good or evil; and it as necessarily follows that he becomes of the quality of that which he chooses; for when it is chosen it becomes assimilated, and when it is assimilated it is identified with man, whatever be its quality. It may be very plainly seen, that man's choice of external things is of little importance in comparison with his choice of those which are internal, which are, as shewn, the involuntary affections of the mind; for man does not become of the quality of his external or worldly possessions, but he does become of the quality of his internal possessions; and inasmuch as the affections and thoughts, which are the objects of man's choice, are nothing separate from himself, his choice of good or evil is not so much a choice of possessions as it is a choice of quality.

That man's free will, concerning his eternal destiny, is exercised in the choice of a quality, rather than of external possessions, is a truth which merits particular attention; for however little we may think of it, we are all deeply concerned in it; and though it is not a choice of external possessions, still the use and enjoyment of them depend upon man's quality, acquired by his choice of internal objects.

Man may exercise his will in the choice of external things, and he may also succeed in obtaining them; but still, when they are obtained, the possession of them gives him no quality,―he neither becomes better nor worse thereby. Man can exercise his free will respecting the external objects of this world, and he can exercise it in respect to the internal objects which exist in the mind, and he is as free in one case as in the other; but it is in the choice of the internal, or mental, objects that he obtains a quality, and it is by the choice of these that his quality becomes changed, and made better or worse, or more or less pure. Man's choice, in itself, cannot give any quality, still his quality depends upon his choice; all his quality is from the principle which he chooses, and makes his own by voluntary appropriation. Those principles are presented objectively within him as affections and thoughts. It is not man's free will from which he derives his quality, for it has no quality; his will is always neutralized as to good and evil, otherwise it would not be free to choose good or evil, but would be led of necessity by its own quality, whether that was good or evil. This condition of the will continues whilst man remains in this world, and it is essential to

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a state of probation, and his progressive purification. But the objects of man's choice, which have relation to his soul, have quality, and they consist of opposites; and whichsoever he chooses, that becomes appropriated and assimilated to himself, and imparts its quality to him, for it is then identified with him.

With respect to the internal objects of man's choice, it may be asked— If they be one with man's substance, how can they be objects of choice? Or how can they be said to be presented, when they are of his own substance, which, of course, is always present? Is not the choice of these like a man choosing himself? Those affections and thoughts which are objects of man's choice, are not objects in the sense of distinct and separate things, but they are objects in the sense of being forms induced upon existing substance, which is susceptible of impressions from extraneous things; which may be compared to and illustrated by those which are received by the eye or the ear, which, though they are not anything separate from the organs themselves, yet they are forms in the organs; they are not parts of the substance of the organs, for the organs are complete and perfect without them; still they are distinct forms, which are plainly perceived. They are also of opposite qualities, and are both simple and complex; some of which are agreeable, whilst others are disagreeable; and one may be chosen, and another rejected. When any of those forms are rejected by man's voluntary disapproval of them, they do not instantly disappear, but remain for a time, but how long man cannot tell; he has no control over them, neither in causing them to come nor to go, but they are removed of Divine Providence when the Lord sees good to remove them, which is, no doubt, when they have fully answered their purpose; and as it is with the forms in the organs of sensations, so is it with those of the mind. And as man cannot decide as to the time that rejected forms shall remain after their rejection, it will follow that the good man will have those present with him which will cause anxiety and grief, and the wicked will have those which will make him sad and miserable.

Now these objects in the mind, although only induced forms, without any addition of substance, are as really objects of choice as anything can be; and when produced in the mind, they are perceived as manifestly as if substance was really introduced into the mind, which, nevertheless, is an impossibility. For those effects are not the result by a process answering to that by which food is taken into the mouth and passed into the stomach, but by a process answering to that by which forms enter by the organs of sensation, which is not by the introduction of any substance, but by the impression of forms thereon, which simply

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produces a variation of the form of the organ itself, and the change effected by the variation is an induced form. So far are mental objects from being effected by the introduction of substance into the mind, that if any substance were introduced, in the way that the objects of man's choice are introduced, it would prevent all distinct consciousness of forms as objects of choice; just as the introduction of substance into the eye would prevent its seeing, or if into the ear, would prevent its hearing. And if substance were introduced into the soul after the manner that food is passed into the stomach, man would not be conscious of its presence there, but it would be in the soul as food is in the stomach, therefore not an object of choice.

Affections and thoughts, which are the internal objects of choice, are principles of life, and therefore, by man's choice of them, he procures for himself a principle of life, which gives him his quality. It also gives quality to everything that he possesses.

We have said that affections and thoughts are the internal objects of man's choice, now we say they are principles of life; between which statements it may appear that there is some discrepancy. But there is not any discrepancy when the difference between constitutional and induced forms is seen, which may be illustrated by any of the organs of sensatfon. For instance, the eye. The constitutional form is the eye itself as a substance, consisting of its various parts; and its induced form is its condition, which has been effected by a variation of its original form, produced by the action of some agent separate from itself. Not that the eye is thereby changed as to its constitution-this remains the same—but an internal variation is effected by the operation of light, the consciousness of which is sight; and with respect to the organ as a substance, sight is that variation of form. Now in the eye there may be two induced forms produced, and these may be opposite to each other, as beautiful and ugly; and though there is no substance either added to or taken away thereby, yet they are plainly objects which may be perceived, and between which we can make a clear discrimination; and though millions of such forms might be effected in the eye, yet the eye remains the same as to its constitutional form, neither more nor less than the same organ of sensation. And it is similar with respect to the constitutional and induced forms of the soul. The soul, like the eye, never perceives anything out of itself, and what it perceives in itself are only variations of its own form; and in these variations are perceived the whole of its conscious life, consequently its happiness or its misery; just as the eye has no sight only in its variations of form.

As the eye perceives its variations as sight, which is the consciousness of the eye, so the soul perceives its variations as affections and thoughts;

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those of the will as affections, and those of the understanding as thoughts; and in these is the consciousness of the soul. Affections

and thoughts are principles of life, because they are variations which are effected by the activity of life-not as permanent forms, but as excitements of forms, which continue with the continuation of the activity, and cease with the cessation of it. Affections and thoughts are not effected by the introduction of forms into the will and understanding, but by the excitement of simple rudimental forms, which have been impressed upon the memory, where induced forms are made permanent, and in which they are retained as in an eternal storehouse; which is a wonderful provision of Divine Providence. Each affection and thought is an arrangement of those simple forms by the activity of life, exhibiting in their complex forms the quality of the life by which they are presented, and of the subject whence they proceed; and thus, as they are the excitements of forms, and are also the arrangement of them by activity or life, and also as their presence implies the continuation of the activity of life, they are in the proper sense principles of life, or, what is the same thing, life in form. Life cannot be presented to man but in some form, and the form in which it is presented, and which is perceived, is an object of man's choice; so that affections and thoughts are both objects of choice and principles of life: objects of choice as to their forms, and principles of life as to their activities. This being seen, it will be manifest that in the choice of affections and thoughts man procures for himself a quality, according to which is the use or abuse of all his external possessions, which possessions are not altogether objects of choice, but are given of Divine Providence, in greater or less abundance, to some by birth, and therefore without labour, to others as an acquisition by labour; whilst others are destitute by birth, and can procure but few with the most prudent application of skill, and their earnest and diligent application of labour.

It may be thought that we have diverged from the subject under consideration by dwelling upon the internal and external objects of choice, and endeavouring to show the difference between them; but a knowledge of these things is so necessary to the understanding of free will, that we trust we shall be excused for the apparent digression. And by the description given we shall be able to see, not only that the internal objects of choice are principles of life, but we shall be enabled to perceive also that these are always both present, and at man's free disposal; so that, at any time, by virtue of his free will, he may possess them; but that it is not so with the external objects of choice, for though these may be present, and man may will to have them, he may not be able to possess them. These are, as said above, not so much at

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