HAVING in the preceding part treated on Freedom in connection with Free-will, we now come to make a few remarks on Spiritual Equilibrium, connected with the same subject.*

We would remark, first, that it is not possible to arrive at a correct knowledge of Swedenborg's meaning of the terms he uses from any particular instance, he employing them variously, according to the subject treated of, and the specific idea intended to be conveyed. Hence we shall err if we understand the same word in the same sense in all cases. In order to understand him, we must take the whole of his different applications of the same words with their apparent discrepancies, and endeavour to ascertain his meaning from the context, and his use of the same words in other parts of his writings; by doing which, we shall seldom fail to discover that he applies them in two senses, at least, viz., a general and a particular sense, the particular application designating some specific thing or property; and the general, something common, including certain particulars. But to understand Swedenborg in any one instance, requires only particular attention to the subject under consideration, at the same time being careful to lay aside preconceived notions, these being the greatest barriers in the way to the understanding of his writings.

In every instance where the term equilibrium occurs in relation to man's freedom, the word equipollence may with propriety be substituted, as being more strictly expressive of the idea intended to be conveyed; equilibrium meaning a balance existing between equal weights, but equipollence signifying an equalisation of forces or powers.

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Swedenborg, when speaking in a general sense, appears to identify spiritual equilibrium with free-will; he saying positively that spiritual equilibrium is free-will, as in the following instance :-"Man, during his abode on earth, walketh and is held in the midst between heaven and hell, and thus in a spiritual equilibrium, which is his free-will." (T. C. R. 383.) Though it is here stated that spiritual equilibrium is man's free-will, yet a little reflection will enable us to see that, particularly considered, they are very different things; free-will being a power in man, and spiritual equilibrium a state of things out of and distinct from him,—the former being not only in man, but it is not anything separate from him; whilst the latter is not only out of him, but it is a state in which he is; and though indispensable to his present state of existence, yet it existed before he was born, being preserved continually by the Lord himself. Notwithstanding its being said that spiritual equilibrium is free-will, yet we are told, when he is speaking particularly on that subject, that "equilibrium is the balance between two forces, one of which acts, and the other re-acts; the state of rest which results from equal action and re-action being what is called equilibrium." (H. H. 589.) In these words we have a clear definition of equilibrium, viz., a state of rest caused by the action of two opposite forces or powers. This is very different to free-will, which is not a state of rest, or an inactive principle, but an active principle in man, being life in the will accompanied by a consciousness of independent possession of that life, together with the means of bringing it into effect as of and from himself. Though spiritual equilibrium is defined to be a state of rest existing between the action of two equal powers, yet it is not between two abstract powers, but between equal powers as they exist in recipient subjects, who are spiritual men in the world of spirits, and which powers are of and from those subjects, being emanations of their lives as general influx. The same author gives us a definition of free-will; and though in an interrogative form, yet most emphatic. After pathetically cautioning man against the counsels of men, and exhorting him to depend upon the Word of God, which is above all counsels, he says― ·

"It may possibly be imagined that the free-will with which man is gifted in spiritual things was the mediate cause of evil; consequently that if such free-will had not been given him, he could not have transgressed. But, my friend, stand still awhile, and consider with yourself whether any man could possibly have been created without free-will in spiritual things, and still be a man; if you remove from him that freedom, you make him a statue, and not a man.”

Then follows the definition

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"For what is man's free-will but a power of willing and acting, of thinking and speaking, to all appearance as of himself?" (T. C. R. 489.)

And what he says of the identity of equilibrium and free-will, he says also of the identity of freedom and equilibrium. (T. C. R. 496, also in H. H. 590.)

Now with such a man as Swedenborg, who saw clearly the nature of things, and ushered into the world so many new truths, and threw light upon those which were previously known, so that they no longer remained as things merely known, or obscurely seen, but became elevated into the region of true reason, and seen in the light of the understanding, these statements cannot be contradictions, but only apparent discrepancies, arising from his extensive mode of viewing subjects, and speaking at one time absolutely, and at another only relatively; when speaking in the latter case his meaning is more wide and diffuse, when in the former more confined and precise. There is such clear distinction between man's free-will and spiritual equilibrium, that if Swedenborg had not left us precise definitions of both, yet from the exquisite manner in which he has pourtrayed man, and the distinct way in which he has pointed out man's dependencies as a free and rational being, we could not fail to see that distinction, it being so wide and obvious; one being man's primary capability as a human being, the other a state of things out of himself so arranged as that his capability should be able to exist; every power in man requiring a certain condition of the things which are out of him, in order that it may come forth into manifest and open existence.

It has been shewn that man must have a will, as the source of all his motives and actions, and that this will must be furnished with powers and means, and also with objects of choice, by which it should be able to think, determine, and act; the objects of choice being the involuntary affections and thoughts, both good and bad, which are produced in the mind by attendant spirits. It has also been shown that it is necessary that the influences which produce those affections and thoughts as objects of choice, should be so regulated as to act with equal force upon man; for should one act with greater power than the other, that would predominate, and give a bias to him, in which case he could not be free, but like a buoyant substance upon a stream, would be carried away with the current. And as these influences act upon the will, if one was allowed to prevail, man would have no ability or inclination to choose, but, as a subject void of resistance, would inevitably be carried away with the prevailing power. The adjustment, or equalization of those influences, is what is called equilibrium, and is effected by the Lord alone. Swedenborg writes thus-s

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"To know and perceive which way the balance inclines, and to regulate and equalize it with perfect exactness, is not within the power of any angel, but of the Lord alone." (H. H. 593.)

Again

"Unless the Lord governed both the heavens and the hells, no equilibrium could be preserved; and if there were no equilibrium, neither heaven nor hell could exist; for all things in the universe, that is, in the natural world and in the spiritual, maintain their stations by equilibrium.” (H.H.592.)

We are also informed that though the forces which are held in equilibrium are from heaven and hell, yet man is not in immediate communication with either, but the spirits who are present with him, though good and evil, are not angels and devils, but inhabitants of the world of spirits, those who have departed this life, and have not arrived at their final abodes, yet they are the media through whom influences from heaven and hell have access to man in this world. (H. H. 600.)

It must be obvious that man's will or power of choosing and acting would be useless, if it were so circumstanced as that it could not make choice of the things which were presented; and as the will is essential to man's existence as the power of choosing and acting, so an equilibrium between the influences which are man's mediate life, producing the internal objects of his choice, is also essential; the former being an active power in man, the latter being a passive condition of things out of him, the effect of which is nevertheless continued into him, on the plane on which his will and thought can be exercised.

The interior principles on which man's will is exercised as objects of choice, it must be remembered, though they are as passive objects to man's choice, are living principles, and are perceived in the will as tendencies, and in the understanding as thoughts; and were these not regulated in such a manner as that one should be equal to the other, and one counteract the other, man could not be poised between them, but the stronger would prevail and carry him with it; because to him those principles appear to be his own, they not appearing to flow in, but to originate with him. The equilibrium in which man is held by the Lord, in order that he may be in a position to exercise his will at liberty, may be compared to one man being placed between two others of equal strength, or between two horses of equal strength, or between two locomotives of a thousand horse power each; the amount of power being immaterial, providing the opposing forces be equal, for being equal neither can prevail, but a third power is necessary, in order that action may exist and an effect be produced. But man, being placed between those powers, and connected with both, the slightest effort on his part would give the predominance to either;

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however feeble he might be, seeing the powers between which he was placed were equal, he could not be influenced by either, for they being counteracted, so far as action is the subject under consideration, man would be as though he were not placed between powers at all. But although those powers do not influence man, nor cause him to act without his consent, or irresistibly, yet without them he could not act at all, nor could his will be exercised in choosing one thing in preference to another, so as to give it predominance, and allow it to actuate him, and he obtain a quality thereby. (H. H. 537.) The equilibrium in which man is held may also be compared to a balance, in the scales of which are placed equal weights; so long as they remain uninfluenced they are poised, and neither prevails; but if the least weight be added to either, that will preponderate. (T. C. R. 478.)

The equilibrium in which man is held by spiritual influences has also been compared to a gate hung upon hinges, and acted upon by contrary winds of equal force; so long as these were not interfered with by a third power, the gate would remain motionless, because poised between them. The gate, in this state, illustrates the equilibrium in which man is held between the influences from heaven and hell; and the winds which counteract each other, represent those influences. Now, suppose the gate to have the power to turn itself upon its hinges, -which supposition must be granted, that the illustration may be complete, in order to represent man, who is both a sentient and a voluntary subject-then the least effort of the gate would cause it to turn, in agreement with its own will, in the direction of either one or the other power. In this illustration we have a representation both of free-will and the equilibrium of the spiritual forces which act upon man, of equilibrium, by the gate being poised between the winds of equal force; and of free-will, by its power of giving the predominance to either force by the determination of its own power.

Now, if man had the powers present with him represented by the men, horses, &c., and had not the capability of willing one in preference to the other, those powers would be entirely useless, and must for ever remain in a counteracted condition; so that the powers, however great in themselves, being counterpoised, they would be inactive, like a statue upon a pedestal, or like a post when immoveably fixed between two props. And on the other hand, if man had the capability of willing, and had not those powers out of which to choose, his capability would be altogether unavailing,-it could not be free, because it would not have anything on which it could be exercised; in which case man would have no quality, the will's quality being obtained from its objects of choice.