430 ORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL FORCES shall be free to go to the community direct in search of a better deal. If this problem is approached, as suggested in the beginning, with mutual understanding and a sympathetic attitude it is almost inconceivable that a reasonable and mutually satisfactory agreement as to terms cannot be reached. The autonomy of the local branch on one side and the degree of control to be exercised by the national headquarters on the other side is probably the oldest issue between national agencies and local co-ordinating groups, such as councils of social agencies and community funds. Budget reviews have resulted in recommendations to local branches which have conflicted with the policies urged or the programs ordered by national headquarters. National agencies have claimed a sort of vested interest in certain services sometimes on the grounds that they first discovered the need or at least were the first in proposing the particular remedy in question. Others have urged similar prerogatives in given fields of service locally because working agreements with other national agencies assigned that field of service to them. Still other national agencies have based their claims to the right to undertake definite work in a given community regardless of whether some other local agency or the branch of some other national agency was doing the job, because the work in question was included in their nationally outlined program or in the printed objects set down for their agency in their charter or articles of incorporation. The local council of social agencies and the community fund management, on the other hand, have maintained that representatives of the local community-(first) those interested in the special lines of work involved; (second) those interested in related local problems and undertakings; and (third) those responsible for the support of such work-sitting together as a sort of a case on committee national agencies should determine when and how the branches of national agencies should undertake new work in the community and how local contributions should be used even in the conduct or promotion of work elsewhere by the national agency. To this end community funds in most cities insist upon each local service having at least a local advisory board with veto powers, first, as to the use of funds, second, as to activities to be initiated in the local community, and third, as to the acceptance of officers or agents assigned to the local community by the national organization. All national organizations have not yet granted this degree of local autonomy. The branch of one such agency was admitted several years ago to a financial federation in a midwestern city. A very competent and genuinely interested local advisory committee was secured. Then came the day when, on more critical examination of the local work program in its relation to the needs of the city and the work of other agencies, said advisory board declined to approve of the program submitted by the officers assigned to that community from national headquarters. The officer immediately announced that he had excused his board from further service. Needless to say, the federation likewise excused the agency from further participation in the community fund. This illustration is extreme but it may help some city where central financing is contemplated to decide what degree of local autonomy it wishes to demand of participating agencies. Mere advisory boards selected and appointed by the national agency's own representative will not long prove acceptable if their advice is to be utterly disregarded in this way. National organizations for the most part, it should be said, have learned to appreciate that local strength and support are in direct ratio to the local interest aroused and responsiblity accepted. Yet it is not an uncommon experience of the local community fund secretary to discover the board of some national agency branch sud denly in an almost hostile attitude toward suggestions from their national headquarters because some field agent or letter has brought to them a threat of withdrawal of charter or demotion in rank if certain action is or is not taken. Out of years of experience one of our oldest and strongest national agencies has gone so far in granting local autonomy that its local branches are not only free from dictation by headquarters but may retain their full voting strength in the policy-making councils of the national organization whether or not they have accepted any financial responsibility for the support of their state and national work. Strange as it may seem our reports from several community fund organizations indicate that the influence of the national headquarters of this same national agency is probably more powerful with its local branches than any other and the proportionate amount of support that those branches demand for their state and national departments is always large. Full local autonomy of branch agencies is we believe not only essential from the point of view of the local community but likewise the best policy for the prosperity of the national agency and the advancement of the cause it promotes. DIVISION IX-PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND ADMINISTRATION SOME ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC WELFARE DEPARTMENTS Gertrude Vaile, American Association for Organising Family Social Work, Denver This past year a committee of the American Association for Organizing Family Social Work, of which I have been a member, has considered the problem of the organization of public welfare departments, especially as they concern the administration of family social work. This paper is mainly the report of that committee, whose work, however, is still incomplete, but I have expressed some opinions of my own, which are not necessarily wholly the opinions of the rest of the committee. In their study the committee had in mind mainly city or county departments, and have considered state departments only as they have thrown light on the general principles involved. I must do the same in this paper. The first and largest question to be met is where the responsibility and authority for the work of a public welfare department should lie. Should it be vested in a board or a single elective official? This problem was laid before the members of the Governmental Research Conference, with a request for their opinions as to the proper administrative basis for public welfare departments both state and municipal. They gave the matter very generous consideration, nineteen men replying. Of these, fifteen believed that (as one expressed it) "centralization of authority and responsibility should be secured by the appointment of the welfare head by the mayor or governor." Three of the fifteen thought that a purely advisory board might have some value. Only four of the nineteen favored a board with authority, one of those questioningly. The question was also submitted to a number of persons who had had practical experience in social welfare administration under public authority, and answers were received from eighteen. Of these all except two strongly favored a board, and one of those two said that civil service regulation would be a necessary protection against political changes. It would appear that the theory of the Governmental Research men is based largely upon two assumptions. The first is that the average voter knows, at least in a general way, whether or not he is getting what he voted for. Following this assumption he should be able to place responsibility clearly in order to express his approval or disapproval. The second assumption is that the subject-matter concerned is of such fixed and concrete nature that the average voter can easily understand it. The applicability of the governmental theory diminishes, I should say, in proportion to the remoteness of the work from the personal observation of the average voter, and in proportion to the intangibility and variableness of the work itself. In many departments of government the average voter has a fair opportunity to see the results of the administration, and feels himself directly affected, but of all departments of government probably the welfare department is the most remote from the personal knowledge and concern of the general public. Therefore the fixing of respon432 sibility upon an elected official, however admirable in theory, is likely to be meaningless in practice in this connection because the official is not likely to be elected on this issue, and the welfare department usually remains a helpless non-combatant, its fate determined by other issues. As to the second question, the nature of the work itself, have the Governmental Research men possibly over-rated the administrative side, and have they underestimated some other sides? As our correspondents concerned with the administration of public departments repeatedly pointed out, these departments are dealing with human beings and not with things. For those infinitely varying human beings in their varying circumstances it is seeking to diminish suffering and evil and to increase well-being and righteousness. In this effort it is dealing constantly with subtle things that cannot be seen nor weighed nor measured things moreover in regard to which knowledge and methods of work and even ideals themselves are constantly changing. A public welfare department especially in county or city must adapt itself to serve its own community. It must have active relationships with all other social agencies, public and private. Also it must bear always in mind not only what the law prescribes but the purpose back of the law and what extra-legal efforts and implied duties that may involve. Of all departments of government probably the Welfare Department is not only the most remote from the personal knowledge of the voter but also the most intangible, the most variable, and the most likely to be misunderstood by the average voter. These peculiarities of the public welfare work point to the needs of a board for this particular department. If the interests of helpless people are to be protected and sound programs worked out in relationship with other agencies, it is more than ordinarily important that there be continuity of policy and personnel, and that the personnel be very well qualified for the work. Yet because of the defenseless position of this department, as already indicated, if there is no board, but the head of the welfare department is appointed by an elected official, he is very likely to go out of office with the official who appointed him, or at least at any time when politically minded forces become very active. And under such circumstances persons not properly qualified are very likely to be appointed. We witness such disruption of good work as befell New York City some years ago, when the work which had been built up under Commissioner Kinsgbury in Mayor Mitchell's administration went to pieces under a Tammany successor, and such as, in a measure, befell Illinois in the change from Governor Lowden to Governor Small. More serious changes were reported to be pending there had not Governor Small's other difficulties prevented. Even a board cannot always prevent breakdown. The Public Welfare Board of Kansas City finally fell under political domination and lost much of its social effectiveness. Probably no scheme of government can ever be devised by the mind of man that cannot be defeated by the minds of men who are determined to set it at naught. I know of one city where a board, even of limited official power, is now standing between a public welfare department and political destruction, and has done so successfully for years. A board helps to secure stability not only by the force of holding good personnel in office when it is threatened, but because the holdover members constantly inform and influence the new members who in turn inform and influence the official who appointed them and thus the foundations of a real stability and continuity are laid. This suggests my next point-that a board is needed as an interpreter, not only between the department and the governmental powers above it, but also between the department and the general public. Since in a democracy, every function of government rests finally upon the understanding and will of the people, and since the mass of the people have no way of understanding this department through their own experience and observation, and since moreover the work is peculiarly difficult for popular understanding and liable to be misunderstood, there would appear to be imperative need that a group of disinterested and highly respected citizens should be made intimately acquainted with the work and responsibile to interpret it to the public. Finally, a board is needed because the nature of the work itself calls for a council of minds. The mind of the department head alone, however wise he may be, cannot bring to bear the various points of view needed, considering the subtle human elements and intricate community relationships involved. I must confess myself a little puzzled by this demand for extreme centralization of governmental functions in single individuals, for the sake of business efficiency, when business itself, banks and great industrial concerns, have their boards of directors. And such boards, I understand, are important not only to give voice to the stockholders but to determine policies. Perhaps the difficulty in estimating the value of these welfare boards lies in the fact that they are of such different types. They seem to be of three main varieties, although they cannot be sharply classified, but merge into each other. There is first the board that is advisory only with no actual authority; and second, the board which has final authority for the policies and general conduct of the work, and which appoints or removes the chief executive, but leaves him in complete charge of carrying out the policies and holds him responsible, the board assuming none of the administrative functions of the executive; and, third, the board which itself undertakes more or less of the carrying out of administrative functions, such for example, as the board of a poor department whose members receive application for relief. The first kind of board is likely to be ineffective and of little value. It is difficult to get really able people to serve steadily, and especially to take the trouble to inform themselves with such thoroughness that their judgment will be valuable, when they feel that they have no real responsibility for the outcome of their advice. The third type the board assuming administrative details—is likely to result inconsistent, inefficient work and no clear-cut responsibility. This is a common of board and possibly it is the type that has come especially under the observati the Governmental Research men. Certainly they have made an important cont. tion in their emphasis on the unwisdom of this form of administration. ment as for others, In concluding this part of our discussion I would say that one member of our col mittee, studying this subject, felt that in a municipality having a city manager plan, the city manager would have to be directly responsible for this d and a board, if appointed, should be only advisory. The rest while a city manager plan minimized the danger of unfortun pared with appointments by an elected official, yet the prol still remained, since the city manager himself has but an inde that all the other reasons for a board with authority are the sa -com |