came to terms and Lodí testified his submission by costly gifts to the Emperor. The proud Afghán thus humbled himself to a Chagátáï only because he desired to fulfil the sacred duty of vengeance; in the first surge of passion he armed himself to call the royal murderer to account but the chiefs who were serving with him deserted him, mutiny broke out among his troops and he was compelled to retire with a handful of devoted followers to Rhoțás, a fort in south Bihar, on the N. W. bank of the Són. Harassed sorely here by Dáúd's troopers, he was led to ask help of the Khán-khánán who willingly sent a reinforcement by the aid of which he may well have expected that some favourable opportunity would place the important fortress in his own hands. Dáúd had established himself in Garhí and there with spendthrift hand was scattering his father's treasure in enlisting mercenaries, to revive a power which waned with the loss of his truest and ablest counsellor. Mun'im Khán did not feel himself equal to coping with these ever-growing complications and his sovereign-whose presence he so ardently desired,—was still persistently fighting. in Gujrát.

981H.

As has been mentioned, Akbar had spent the interim between the first and second campaigns: 2nd Çafar 981H. of Gujrát-from 3rd June to 23rd 24th Rabí'u-s sání Aug. 1573 at Síkrí. There he had been besieged by repeated petitions for aid from the perturbed Khán-khánán and, in compliance with these, had despatched Chalmah Beg, the Khán 'Alam, and Ashraf Khán with other commanders to render active assistance. At the same time he issued a farmán to Mun'im Khán in which, while making

prominent mention to his zeal and fidelity, the most definite orders were conveyed to him to set forth at once to chastise the rebels and to conquer the eastern provinces. Mun'im Khán put in hand extensive equipment for the new expedition but Akbar had had only too frequent experience of Mun'im's want of decision and therefore commissioned his own sharp-sighted man of business, Todar Mall, to report upon the state of the preparations and upon the strength and temper: of the troops in the eastern theatre of war. The Emperor's confidant made a searching examination and was able to report reassuringly.

The plans for action in Bengal were suddenly thwarted by the renewed outbreak of disturbances in Gujrát and their progress brought to a stand by the famous ride to Ahmadábád. The Emperor by no means underesti-. mated the range of the troubles in the east and with his unfailing prescience ordered Todar Mall, his best superintendent, to build upon the stocks at Agrah and to equip, a flotilla of some thousand transports, destining them to convey him for a decisive struggle down the sacred river to the delightful plains of Bengal. When Gujrát had been subdued and Akbar had returned to his capital, the plan of conquering Bengal was revived; Lashkar Khán and other jágírdárs were sent out to call up the wardens of the marches and to conduct them, together with their own levies, to the chiefin-command, Mun'im Khán. Evidence of the importance which Akbar attached to the Bengal expedition is afforded by the fact of his giving Todar Mall a second commission and, as his plenipotentiary, entrusting him with with the conduct and surveillance of operations. Todar Mall laboured zealously to secure a definitive result to

this campaign. There can be no doubt that this hardheaded rajah who ignored everything but the execution of his master's orders, was almost hateful to the Mughul commanders who were men grown grey in the profession of arms, both because he was a Hindú and also because, as a soldier he did not belong to their guild. To all his arrangements, they opposed an obstruction which was all the more formidable that it was unobtrusive. On his arrival, Todar Mall had found Mun'im assiduously engaged in preparing for a speedy decampment and soon three columns marched eastward. Permission was given to several officers to cross the Ganges; on the opposite bank they fell in with a division of Afgháns which although occupying a strong position, took to flight. Many of the Mughuls were cut to pieces during the pursuit which ensued. The campaign in general may be described as a series of surprises; one such occurred now, when a horseman brought in the astounding news that Lodí Afghán who was believed to be at deadly and irreconcileable feud with Dáúd, had come to terms with him, had got rid by friendly means of the imperial auxiliaries at Rhoțás and, acting for Dáúd, had subsequently compelled them to swift retreat. Lodí's renewal of adherence to Daúd and his assumption of the direction of the movement for the independence of Bengal greatly augmented the gravity of the situation. The Mughuls well knew with what manner of opponent they had to deal: hardly had he taken up his old appointment than he stood ready to strike and the imperialists saw on the other side of the Són, the spacious, well-ordered and well-fortified camp of the Afgháns of Bengal. In the interim when both sides were arming for a pitched

battle, the Són, as before the Ganges, was the scene of water skirmishes.

After Lodí's return, his enviers and enemies and, in particular, Qutlú Khán ensnared the fickle Dáúd in a mesh of intrigue. Dáúd's whole life was a game of frivolity and sensual pleasure; his jealousy, his consciousness of sin, his fear that a man whom he had so deeply injured as Lodí and who possessed such ample power, might cast him down and usurp his place-all these motives led him to give ready ear to malicious innuendos. He followed the march of Lodí's army as far as the house of Jalál Khán of Chatwara and there summoned Lodí and his vakil to a council. They suspecting nothing, attended almost without escort; suddenly, on a signal from Dáúd, Qutlú Khán and his accomplices burst into the room, took them at unawares and after a brief struggle in which Lodí's sword-bearer was hewn in pieces, overpowered and bound them. Lodí who knew his former ward well, saw now that there was no escape for him. Long before this time, the idea must have dawned upon him that the power of the eastern Afgháns was on the wane; at this crisis of his fate his sagacity must have read that idea as a certainty. When some Muhammadan historians aver that he had aimed at supreme power, an explanation of this statement, if it be in any degree warrantable, may be found in the impulse which prompted him to retard yet a little the inevitable downfall of his countrymen. Waiving the argument that no authority we have consulted, gives authentic proof of the allegation against him and also that all praise his pre-eminent powers of mind and his virtues, it speaks to the contrary that he should have made peace with Dáúd

whom he bitterly hated and should have allied himself with him loyally and enthusiastically for the service of the Pathans and their ruling house. Dáúd had murdered Lodí's son-in-law; Lodí sacrificed the duty of vengeance to the loftier claims of fidelity to his race or he postponed it till such time as he should not be hampered by a conflict of duty-for retaliation, by one's own hand, the Biblical "eye for eye, tooth for tooth" is interwoven with every fibre of an Oriental's being. Now death at the hands of Dáúd's executioners stared him in the face; his last words were no curse but a sage warning to his murderer. When he had begged that Dáúd would not dishonour his wives, he said to him. "After I am killed, fight "the Mughuls without hesitation. If you do not do so, "they will attack you and you will not be able to help "yourself."*

The death of Lodí avenged itself by its immediate consequences for, as Abul Fazl says, "the commotion "and dissension which it created in the Afghán camp

were so great that if the imperialists had dealt an instantaneous blow, the war could have been ended with "ease." With careful prevision however, the royal army marched towards Patnah, within the walls of which was Dáúd who, seized by swift repentance for his insane crime, ventured not to offer battle but "like a poltroon

*These words occur both in Nizamuddín Ahmad (Elliot V, 373) and Badáoní, idem, 512. I have however omitted a warning as to "hollow peace" from the text, because it is manifestly at variance with the facts as given in Abul Fazl's accurate and detailed narrative, since fighting had again commenced. Both chroniclers had no doubt in their eye the sham peace mentioned at page 216; and both therefore place Lodí's murder at a too early date. This "dying speech" is not otherwise doubtful, it is an injunction to take the offensive with energy.