ciples and modes of government which afterwards extended through the greatest part of Europe, and produced fuch extraordinary effects with regard to its fituation and affairs.

Of all the people of Germany, none feem to have had a more independent fpirit, or to have more fteadily preferved, and more wifely improved, the fyftem which they brought with them from the continent, than our Anglo-Saxon ancestors. It cannot justly be denied that, from their inftitutions have been derived feveral of the moft valuable cuftoms, and of the most important privileges, which fubfift among us at prefent. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Saxon conftitution fhould be deemed a noble object of ftudy, by English lawyers, politicians, and scholars; and we believe that it will be found, upon enquiry, to have been the completeft model of government which hath ever been carried into practice. Such, at leaft, is the opinion of our moft judicious and enlightened antiquarians; and, among the reft, of the fenfible Writer of the work before

us.

It is to be lamented that we have fo great a scarcity of hiftorical evidence, with refpect to many things which relate to this admirable form of policy. Our Author obferves, however, that there are four fources from whence we may draw our intelligence concerning the principles and manner of conducting the first establishment of our mode of government in this kingdom: firft, from the great remains of it we have, in our government, now in ufe; fecondly, from the feveral Saxon eftablishments that are ftill in being, but of no ufe, with refpect to the end of their first establishment; thirdly, from the glimmering lights of ancient hiftory; and, laftly, from the known alterations that have taken place at and fince the conqueft. There are alfo, he fays, many cuftoms, forms, principles, and doctrines, that have been handed down to us by tradition, which will ferve us as fo many land-marks to guide our fteps to the foundation of this ancient ftructure, which is only buried under the rubbish collected by time, and new cftablishments. Our Effayift, availing himself of thefe advantages, hath given a curious and entertaining account of the firft fettlement of our conftitution by the Saxons, to what is commonly called the Norman conqueft; which account we shall Jay fomewhat largely before our Readers.

Having premifed, that the principle of annual election is the first principle of a government that is founded on the natural rights of mankind, he defcribes the establishment made by our ancestors, under the heptarchy, in the following manner:

They firft divided the land into fmall parts, and that divided the inhabitants upon that land, and made them a distinct and feparate people from any other. This divifion they called a tithing.

Here

Here they established a government, which was, no doubt, the fame as that under which they lived in their mother-country; and, with as little doubt, we may fay, it was the fame which is ufed in our corporations at this day; as will hereafter more fully appear. They had two forts of tithings, one called a town-tithing, and the other a rural tithing. Thefe were governed upon the fame principles, only thus diftinguifhed; as one is expreffive of a town, having fuch a number of inhabitants as to make a tithing of itself; and the other of a tithing fituated in the rural part of the kingdom. Thus they went on, as they conquered the country, to divide the land, till they had cut the whole kingdom into tithings, and eftablished the fame form of government in each.

In this manner they provided for the internal police of the whole country, which they vefted in the inhabitants of the refpective tithings, who annually elected the magiftrates that were to adminifter justice to them, agreeable to the laws and cuftoms they had_ brought with them from their mother-country. And this internal police was fo excellent in its nature, that it hath had the encomiums of moft Authors of our hiftory, who obferve, that, in the reign of Alfred, it was in fo great perfection, that, if a golden bracelet had been expofed upon the high road, no man durft have touched it.

The principal officer of a tithing was vefted with the executive authority of the tithing. They had, likewife, a legislative authority in every tithing, which made laws and regulations for the good government of the tithing. Beudes thefe they had a court of law, whofe jurifdiction was confined within the fame limits: all which were created by the elective power of the people who were refident inhabitants of the tithing; and the right of election was placed in every man that paid his fhot and bore his lot. From hence we may cafily perceive, that, under the establishment of thefe tithings, by reafon of their fmalinefs, the natural rights of mankind might very well be preferved in the fullest extent, as they could delegate their power by election, without any confufion or inconvenience to the

inhabitants.

Having advanced thus far, I would make one obfervation; which is, that all elective power in the people at large, after it had established the executive and legiflative authority in the tithing for one year, and duly vefled the officers in their respective departments, then ftopped, and proceeded no farther than the tithings. But the principal officer of each tithing (whom for diftinétion's fake we fhall call mayor) had afterwards the whole care of the intereft of the people of the tithing vested in himself alone, in every matter that refpected their connection with the higher orders of the flate: for thefe tithings were the root from whence all authority in the higher orders of the ftate fprung.

For

The first connection the tithings had with one another, was to form an establishment for the military defence of the country. this end, a number of these tithings were united together, fo far as related to their military concerns. This union neceffarily created a larger divifion of the land, equal to the number of tithings that were thus united; and this they called a wapentake, or weapontake.

Here, likewife, they established a court of council, and a court of law, which laft was called a wapentake-court. In the court of council, the chief magiftrates of every tithing affembled to elect the officers of the militia to their refpective command, and regulate all matters relating to the militia; in which every individual tithing was concerned. The court of law was to enforce these regulations

within that jurifdiction.

'Let us now confider the third and last divifion which they made in the land. This was compofed of a certain number of wapentakes united together, which they called a fhire, or one complete share or part, into which they divided the land. This divifion completed their fyftem of internal police, by uniting all the tithings within the fhire into one body, fubject to fuch laws and regulations as fhould be made in their thiregemots, or fhireparliaments, for the benefit and good government of the fhire.

The members that compofed the fhiregemot were still the chief officers of the tithings; who always reprefented the tithings in every thing in which they were concerned. It was in this fhiregemot where the great officers of the fhire were elected to their office; who, confequently, were elected by the immediate reprefentatives of the people, but not by the people at large. This feems to fatisfy what hiftorians obferve, that the great officers of the thires were elected by their peers. What I underftand by this is, that they were elected by men who were members of the wittenagemot, or parliament, and confequently peers or equals, at that day, to any men in England. There were many titles that feem to have belonged to their fuperior orders of men; but they were only titles of office, and not perfonal titles of honour. And we fhall, hereafter, have occafion to obferve, that, when the office by which they held their titles was abolished, from that time the title vanifhed with it.

As this divifion comprehended many tithings, and many people, fo it had the greatest court of council in England, except the high court of parliament; and the chief officer was vefted with as high a jurifdiction in the fhire, as the king in the kingdom. He was veited with the executive authority, and was commander in chief of all the militia; in fhort, he was the fame in the fhire, as the king was in the kingdom. They had, likewife, a court of law, called the fhire-court; to which, I make no doubt, every man might appeal who thought himfelf injured by the inferior courts in the fhire. These divifions in the land are what I call the fkeleton of the conftitution, which was animated and put in motion by all thefe eftablishments.

We may confider each fhire as a complete government, furnished with both a civil and a military power within its own jurifdiction. The expence atten ing each government of a fhire was merely local, and confined to the fhire, which was fupported by taxes charged upon the people by the fhiregemot, with the affittance of certain lands, appropriated to that purpofe, which was a clear and diftin&t thing from a national expence, and never brought to the national account at all. And, indeed, it is the fame at this day, though conducted in a different manner; for the internal government of this kingdom is no expence to the ftate, and is founded upon this equitable principle, that whatever expence concerns only a part,

ought

ought to be paid by that part only; but what concerns the whole community ought to be paid by the whole community. I would here just beg leave to obferve, that the government established for the internal police of our American provinces, is founded upon the fame principles as that which our Saxon forefathers established for the government of a fhire. And their connection with, and duty to the legislative authority of the whole united kingdom, is, conftitutionally confidered, the fame in each.

Let us now fee by what mode of union thefe fhires became united together into a kingdom. And it will be found, I apprehend, that they pursued the fame principles which they had ufed in every other establishment; that is to fay, wherever a combined intereft was concerned, and the people at large were affected by it, the immediate deputies of the people, who were always the chief officers of the tithings for the time being, met together to attend to the refpective interefts of their conflituents; and a majority of voices always bound the whole, and determined for any measure that was tuppofed to operate for the good of the whole combined body. This meeting of the deputies of the people was called, by the Saxons, the wittena-gemot, or an affembly of the wife men of the nation, which compofed this national council and legislative authority.

Let us fuppofe, for instance, that one of thefe fmall kingdoms was composed of five fhires; then a deputy from every tithing within the five thires, meeting together, would compofe the conftituent parts of the parliament of the little kingdom to which they belonged. This agrees with what St. Ammon fays, in his Effay on the Legiflative authority of England, that the judges, or chief officers of the tithings, reprefented the tithings in the Saxon wittena-gemot, or parliament.

We know very well what town tithings, or boroughs are, because they are now in ufe, in fome refpects, for the fame purpose as formerly; but we are not fo well acquainted with the dimensions of the rural tithings, according to their ancient eftablishment. But it is very probable that the divifion in the land, which we now call the high conftable's divifion, was the bounds of the ancient rural tithings: and what makes this the more probable is, that the high conftable, in his divifion, is a man of a very high authority, even at this day, and as ancient a peace officer as any in the kingdom. However, be that as it will, from what has been faid we may conclude, that the conftituent parts of the legislative authority, during the heptarchy, confifted of two bodies of men, which were both elective; and refpectively reprefented the inhabitants of the towns, and the inhabitants of the rural parts of the kingdom.

But as a confiderable alteration was made, in this refpect, at the union of the feven kingdoms into one, by Alfred the Great, it will be proper here to remark the conftituent parts of the parliaments, and the rights of election of the people, during the heptarchy. First, the reprefentatives of the town tithings, or boroughs, were always their chief magiftrates for the time being, by virtue of their office; to which they were annually elected, by every man that was a refident inhabitant of the town, and that paid his fhot and bore his lot.

The Author fhould have faid, St. Amaud.

'

Secondly, the reprefentatives of the rural tithings were, likewife, their chief magiftrates for the time being, by virtue of their office; to which they were annually elected, by every man that was a refident inhabitant of a rural tithing, and that paid his shot and bore

his lot.

:

• Hence it is evident, that the people never delegated their power to their members of parliament for a longer tinte than one year because the powers, vested in them, muft of courfe expire with their office; they being mayors, or chief magiftrates, in their refpective divifions and before fuch a member was out of his office, as mayor he was obliged by law (ex officio) to affemble the people of the town, for the election of officers, to ferve for the enfuing year; the principal of whom was their mayor elect, who, confequently, was their member elect: and, for the fame reason, it was not in the power of the king to continue the fame parliament longer than one year. Thus we fee that the conftitution hath doubly armed itself against long parliaments, by confining the power of the members within the duty of an annual office.'

From the state of things under the heptarchy, our Author proceeds to the state of things under the monarchy; and introduces this part of his fubject with fome obfervations concerné ing the origin of our houfe of Lords, and the excellent character of Alfred the Great. When, under the heptarchy, it was neceffary for the Saxon nations to unite together for their mutual protection and defence, one of the feven kings was always chofen generaliffimo over the whole body; and they appointed him a standing council, of a certain number of deputies, from each state, without whose advice and concurrence it is probable he could not act. The deputies, who compofed this great ftanding council, were raised to their truft by the joint confent of the king and parliament of the little kingdom from whence they were fent. When Alfred united the feven kingdoms into one, he, undoubtedly, (fays our ingenious Writer) with the approbation of the people, incorporated this great council, as a feparate branch of the wittena-gemot, or parliament; fo that they ftill continued to be the king's great council, and a branch of the legislative authority, which they are at this day. In confirmation of which it is obfervable, that the confent of the parliament continued neceflary for creating a baron of the realm, about as low down as Henry the Seventh.'

When one parliament was to be established in the room of feven, for the fervice of the whole united kingdom, the queftioni muft have been how to reduce the reprefentatives to fuch a number as would be convenient for tranfacting the business of the nation, and yet preferve the elective power of the people unhurt. Our Saxon ancestors, according to the account given by our Author, were exceedingly happy in their removal of this difficulty. • They

RAY. June 1771.

I i