guished by their pious and excellent writings, mean no more by this phraseology, than I have studied to express by that certainty which I have shewn may, and to the Divine Mind, does ever accompany moral, as well as physical causes. But I conceive their language to be exceptionable, and liable to dangerous abuse. Their reasonings in many of their principles, too evidently coincide with the doctrines of the Hobbesian school.

The certainty of all the purposes of God, is the chief ground on which these writers maintain the doctrine of necessity. The one they presume to be involved in the other. On the contrary, I conceive, that there is a clear and intelligible distinction between the ideas of necessity and of certainty, which, as happens in many other moral and intellectual truths, can be more easily conceived, or understood, by an internal feeling, than explained in precise and definite terms, which must convey ideas too fine and simple to be analyzed in language. All men can easily understand the difference between a thing certainly done by a free cause, and the same thing accomplished by an internal but unperceived force, so that it could not be otherwise than it is.

Many excellent men who profess to be the patrons of this system of necessity, but whose language, I am persuaded, is more in error than their hearts, lay it down as an axiom in their metaphysics, that the will is irresistibly determined by

the strongest motive at the time before the mind, and cannot act otherwise than it does; not sufficiently attending to the entire difference between the nature and movements of mind and of matter, of motive, and of physical impulse. How can it be known that it is the strongest motive which, in every instance, governs our choice? Do you say, as is commonly done, because it does govern? This circle is obviously begging the principle in question-it governs our choice because it is the strongest motive; and it is the strongest motive because it governs our choice. In opposition to this pretended maxim, the soundest metaphysicians, and the most accurate observers of the operations of the mind, agree with the learned and profound Dr. Reid of Glasgow, that we often act according to the direction of a weaker motive; and sometimes act without any perceptible motive at all.

Although the mind seldom acts without motive; yet it is not motive which exclusively determines its volitions; or is the sole cause of action. This would be reducing action to a mechanical operation, and justify those material analogies, in explaining its nature, which I have before condemned.The proper effect of motive is to solicit and excite the mind, and to put it into a state of action. But I have a power within me which determines my choice, on a view more deliberate, or more rapid, of the motives before it. If you ask me to explain that power-I feel it-I am sensible that I exercise it-and, in the feeling and exercise I understand the act.

Every man may, in the same manner, feel and understand it by attending to the operations of his own mind. But I am no more capable of explaining it in terms, than I can explain the sensation of seeing. The perception is too simple. It is understood by the mind, only in the act of perceiving, or exerting its power of volition. This does not lessen the clearness and certainty of the idea. It is, perhaps, the reason why this idea is peculiarly clear. It is among the pri mary sensations of our nature. And in no other way, than these original sensations, are those ideas that are emphatically and happily called first truths, or axioms in science, which are the elements, and clearest materials of all our knowledge, conveyed to the intellect. They are the impressions of the hand of God upon the mind; convictions resulting from the very constitution of our nature. Thus am I conscious of my liberty, or power over my own acts, in the acts themselves.

Upon the whole view of this subject, the result is, that I act with the most perfect freedom. Motive, though it influences, does not necessarily determine my choice. Yet such certainty there is in the actions of rational and moral beings, according to their dispositions, education, habits, and the whole atmosphere of motives which encompasses them, as lays as a foundation, among men themselves, in their social relations, for the most useful general knowledge of one another, and in God for the most perfect foreknowledge of all

the actions of life, he having formed the various temperament of individuals, and disposed, in his providence, the whole train of motives, to the most minute, and often imperceptible, which continually operate upon all the springs and principles of action; both which, the temperament of the individual, and the succession and combination of motives he has constituted, and ordained, and governs, in such a manner, in his church, under the all-wise direction of his Holy Spirit, as most effectually, yet most freely, to accomplish all his most wise and holy purposes.

Thus have I unfolded the ideas involved in the technical and systematic phrase-the Decrees of God; which, being interpreted by the obvious and philosophic language of the Laws of Nature, or its various powers and tendencies of action, from which proceed, under God, as his organs of opera tion, all events, whether natural or moral in the universe, these decrees, which appear, to certain writers, with such a formidable aspect, stand on plain and intelligible ground, acknowledged, when rightly understood, by all the best friends of science and religion.

From the whole of these reflections it results, that the decrees of God are eternal, like his will and purposes in the laws of nature;-they are most certain in their consequences, that is, they are absolutely ordained, a term equivalent to the former, except that it seems to carry in it more of the author

ity on which all depends; and, finally, like the same laws, they are immutable. This is, obviously, the amount of the proposition in our confession, and catechisms, that the decrees of God are absolute and unchangeable, which to some sects of christians, has given great, and, I presume, unneces sary offence.

From the interpretation which has been given to this im portant proposition, we perceive the coincidence of reason, with religion; and the support which science, justly explained, may often render to revelation.