which makes us often feel Pain in the Senfations where we expected Pleasure, gives us new Occafion of admiring the Wisdom and Goodness of our Maker; who defigning the Prefervation of our Being, has annex'd Pain to the application of many Things to our Bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do, and as Advices to withdraw from them. But he not defigning our Prefervation barely, but the Prefervation of every Part and Organ in its Perfection, hath, in many Cafes, annex'd Pain to those very Ideas which delight us. Thus Heat, that is very agreeable to us in one Degree, by a little greater increate of it, proves no ordinary Torment; and the moft pleasant of all fenfible Objects, Light it felf, if there be too much of it, if increas'd beyond a due Proportion to our Eyes, caufes a very painful Senfation. Which is wifely and favourably fo order'd by Nature, that when any Obje&t does by the vehemency of its Operation, diforder the Inftruments of Senfation, whole Structures cannot but be very nice and delicate; we might by the Pain be warn'd to withdraw before the Organ be quite put out of Order, and fo be unfited for its proper Function for the future. The Confideration of those Objects that produce it, may well perfuade us that this is the end or ufe of Pain. For tho' great Light be infufferable to our Eyes, yet the highest Degree of Darkness does not at all disease them; because that caufing no diforderly Motion in it, leaves that curious Organ unharm'd in its natural State. But yet excefs of Cold as well as Heat pains us, because it is equally deftructive to that Temper which is neceffary to the Preservation of Life, and the exercise of the feveral Functions of the Body, and which consists in a moderate degree of Warmth; or if you please, a Motion of the infenfible Parts of our Bodies, confin'd within certain bounds.

§. 5. Beyond all this we may find another Reason, why God hath scatter'd up and down feveral Degrees of Pleasure and Pain, in all the Things that environ and affect us, and blended them together in almost all that our Thoughts and Senfes have to do with; that we finding Imperfection, Diffatisfaction, and want of compleat Happiness, in all the Enjoyments which the Creatures can afford us, might be led to feek it in the Enjoyment of him, with whom there is fulness of Joy, and at whofe right Hand are Pleafures for evermore.

Pains

§. 6. Tho' what I have here faid, may not perhaps make the Ideas of Plea- Pleasure and Jure and Pain clearer to us than our own Experience does, which is the only way that we are capable of having them; yet the Confideration of the Reason, why they are annex'd to fo many other Ideas, ferving to give us due Sentiments of the Wisdom and Goodness of the fovereign Difpofer of all Things, may not be unfuitable to the main end of these Enquiries: The Knowledg and Veneration of him being the chief end of all our Thoughts, and the proper Business of all our Understandings.

§. 7. Existence and Unity are two other Ideas that are fuggefted to the Under- Existence and ftanding by every Object without, and every Idea within. When Ideas are in Unity. our Minds, we confider them as being actually there, as well as we confider things to be actually without us; which is, that they exift, or have Existence: And whatever we can confider as one Thing, whether a real Being or Idea, fuggefts to the Understanding the Idea of Unity.

§. 8. Power alfo is another of thofe fimple Ideas which we receive from Senfa- Power. tion and Reflection. For obferving in our felves, that we can at pleasure move feveral Parts of our Bodies which were at reft; the effects alfo that natural Bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our Senfes, we both these Ways get the Idea of Power.

§. 9. Befides these there is another Idea, which tho' fuggefted by our Senfes, Succeffion yet is more conftantly offer'd us by what paffes in our own Minds ; and that is the Idea of Succeffion. For if we look immediately into our felves, and reflect on what is obfervable there, we shall find our Ideas always whilft we are awake, or have any Thought, paffing in Train, one going and another coming, without intermiffion.

§. 10. These, if they are not all, are at least (as I think) the moft confidera- Simple Ideas ble of thofe fimple Ideas which the Mind has, and out of which is made all its the Materials other Knowledg; all which it receives only by the two foremention'd ways of of all our Senfation and Reflection.

Nor

Knowledg.

Nor let any one think thefe too narrow bounds for the capacious Mind of Man to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the Stars, and cannot be confin'd by the Limits of the World; that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmost expansion of Matter, and makes Excurfions into that incomprehenfible Inane. I grant all this, but defire any one to affign any fimple Idea which is not receiv'd from one of those Inlets before-mention'd, or any complex Idea not made out of thofe fimple ones. Nor will it be fo ftrange to think these few fimple Ideas fufficient to employ the quickest Thought, or largest Capacity; and to furnish the Materials of all that various Knowledg, and more various Fancies and Opinions of all Mankind, if we confider how many Words may be made out of the various compofition of twenty four Letters; or if going one ftep farther, we will but reflect on the Variety of Combinations may be made, with barely one of the above-mention'd Ideas, viz. Number, whofe ftock is inexhauftible and truly infinite: And what a large and immenfe Field doth Extenfion alone afford the Mathematicians ?

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther Confiderations concerning our Simple Ideas.

Pofitive Ideas . 1.

from privative Caufes.

•C%

ONcerning the fimple Ideas of Senfation 'tis to be confider'd, that whatfoever is fo conftituted in Nature as to be able, by affecting our Senfes, to caufe any Preception in the Mind, doth thereby produce in the Understanding a fimple Idea; which, whatever be the external Caufe of it, when it comes to be taken notice of by our difcerning Faculty, it is by the Mind look'd on and confider'd there to be a real pofitive Idea in the Understanding, as much as any other whatsoever: tho' perhaps the Caufe of it be but a Privation in the Subje&

. 2. Thus the Ideas of Heat and Cold, Light and Darkness, White and Black, Motion and Reft, are equally clear and pofitive Ideas in the Mind; tho' perhaps fome of the Caufes which produce them are barely Privations in thofe Subjects, from whence our Senfes derive those Ideas. These the Understanding, in its view of them, confiders all as diftin& politive Ideas, without taking notice of the Causes that produce them; which is an Enquiry not belonging to the Idea, as it is in the Understanding, but to the Nature of the Things exifting without us. These are two very different things, and carefully to be diftinguifh'd; it being one Thing to perceive and know the Idea of White or Black, and quite another to examine what kind of Particles they must be, and how rang'd in the Superficies, to make any Object appear White or Black.

. 3. A Painter or Dyer who never enquir'd into their Causes, hath the Ideas of White and Black, and other Colours, as clearly, perfectly, and distinctly in his Understanding, and perhaps more diftinctly, than the Philofopher who hath bufy'd himself in confidering their Natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its caufe Politive or Privative; and the Idea of Black is no less pofitive in his Mind, than that of White, however the cause of that Colour in the external Object may be only a Privation.

D. 4. If it were the Defign of my prefent Undertaking, to enquire into the natural Caufes and Manner of Perception, I fhould offer this as a Reason why a privative Cause might, in lome Cafes at least, produce a pofitive Idea, viz. That all Senfation being produc'd in us only by different Degrees and Modes of Motion in our animal Spirits, variously agitated by external Objects, the abatement of any former Motion muft as neceffarily produce a new Senfation, as the variation or increase of it; and fo introduce a new Idea, which depends only on a different Motion of the animal Spirits in that Organ.

9. 5. But whether this be fo or no I will not here determine, but appeal to every one's own Experience, whether the Shadow of a Man, tho' it confifts of nothing but the abfence of Light (and the more the abfence of Light is, the more difcernible is the Shadow) does not, when a Man looks on it, cause as clear and pofitive an Idea in his Mind, as a Man himself, tho' cover'd over with

clear

clear Sun-fhine? And the Picture of a Shadow is a pofitive thing. Indeed we have negative Names, which ftand not directly for pofitive Ideas, but for their Abfence, fuch as Infipid, Silence, Nihil, &c. which Words denote pofitive Ideas; v. g. Tafte, Sound, Being, with a Signification of their abfence.

9. 6. And thus one may truly be laid to fee Darkness. For fuppofing a Hole Pofitive Ideas perfectly Dark, from whence no Light is reflected, 'tis certain one may fee the from privaFigure of it, or it may be painted; or whether the Ink I write with makes tive Causes. any other Idea, is a Question. The privative Causes I have here affign'd of pofitive Ideas, are according to the common Opinion; but in truth it will be hard to determine, whether there be really any Ideas from a privative Cause, till it be determin'd, whether Reft be any more a Privation than Motion.

Mind, Qualities in Bodies

§. 7. To discover the Nature of our Ideas the better, and to difcourfe of them Ideas in the intelligibly, it will be convenient to diftinguifh them as they are Ideas or Preceptions in our Minds, and as they are modifications of Matter in the Bodies that caufe fuch Perceptions in us; that fo we may not think (as perhaps ufually is done) that they are exactly the Images and Refemblances of fomething inherent in the fubject; moft of thofe of Senfation being in the Mind no more the likenefs of fomething exifting without us, than the Names that ftand for them are the likeness of our Ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us. §. 8. Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it felf, or is the immediate Object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call Idea; and the Power to produce any Idea in our Mind, I call Quality of the Subject wherein that Power is. Thus a Snow-ball having the Power to produce in us the Ideas of White, Cold, and Round, the Powers produce thofe Ideas in us as they are in the Snow-ball, I call Qualities; and as they are Senfations or Preceptions in our Understandings, I call them Ideas: Which Ideas, if I fpeak of fometimes, as in the things themfelves, I would be understood to mean those Qualities in the Objects which produce them in us.

lities.

§. 9. Qualities thus confider'd in Bodies are, firft, fuch as are utterly infepa- Primary Qua rable from the Body, in what Eftate foever it be; fuch as in all the Alterations and Changes it fuffers, all the Force can be us'd upon it, it constantly keeps ; and fuch as Senfe conftantly finds in every Particle of Matter which has bulk enough to be perceiv'd, and the Mind finds infeparable from every Particle of Matter, tho' lefs than to make it self fingly be perceiv'd by our Senfes. v. g. Take a Grain of Wheat, divide it into two Parts, each Part has ftill Solidity, Extenfion, Figure, and Mobility; divide it again, and it retains ftill the fame Qualities, and fo divide it on till the Parts become infenfible, they must retain ftill each of them all those Qualities. For Divifion (which is all that a Mill, or Pettle, or any other Body does upon another, in reducing it to infenfible Parts) can never take away either Solidity, Extenfion, Figure, or Mobility from any Body, but only makes two or more diftinct feparate Maffes of Matter, of that which was but one before; all of which diftin&t Maffes, reckon'd as fo many diftin&t Bodies, after Divifion make a certain Number. Thefe I call original or primary Qualities of Body, which I think we may obferve to produce fimple Ideas in us, viz. Solidity, Extenfion, Figure, Motion, or Reft, and Number. §. 10. 2dly, Such Qualities which in truth are nothing in the Objects themfelves, but Powers to produce various Senfations in us by their primary Qualities, i. e. by the Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of their infenfible Parts, as Colours, Sounds, Taftes, &c. thefe I call Secondary Qualities. To these might be added a third Sort, which are allow'd to be barely Powers, tho they are as much real Qualities in the Subject, as those which I, to comply with the common Way of speaking, call Qualities, but for diftinction Secondary Qualities. For the Power in Fire to produce a new Colour, or confiftency in Wax or Clay by its primary Qualities, is as much a Quality in Fire, as the Power it has to produce in me a new Idea or Senfation of Warmth or Burning, which I felt not before by the fame primary Qualities, viz. the Bulk, Texture, and Motion of its infenfi

ble Parts.

§. 11. The next Thing to be confider'd, is, how Bodies produce Ideas in us; and that is manifeftly by impulfe, the only Way which we can conceive Bodies operate in.

How primary
Qualities pro-

duce their I
deas.

§. 12.

ry.

§. 12. If then external Obje&s be not united to our Minds, when they produce Ideas in it; and yet we perceive thefe original Qualities in fuch of them as fingly fall under our Senfes, 'tis evident that fome Motion must be thence continu'd by our Nerves or animal Spirits, by fome Parts of our Bodies, to the Brains, or the Seat of Senfation, there to produce in our Minds the particular Ideas we have of them. And fince the Extenfion, Figure, Number and Motion of Bodies of an obfervable Bignefs, may be perceiv'd at a Distance by the Sight, 'tis evident fome fingly imperceptible Bodies muft come from them to the Eyes, and thereby convey to the Brain fome Motion, which produces thefe Ideas which we have of them in us.

How Seconda- §. 13. After the fame manner that the Ideas of these original Qualities are produc'd in us, we may conceive, that the Ideas of Secondary Qualities are also produc'd, viz. by the Operation of infenfible Particles on our Senfes. For it being manifeft that there are Bodies, and good Store of Bodies, each whereof are fo fmall, that we cannot, by any of our Senfes, difcover either their Bulk, Figure or Motion, as is evident in the Particles of the Air and Water, and other extreamly smaller than thofe, perhaps as much fmaller than the Particles of Air or Water, as the Particles of Air or Water are fmaller than Peafe or Hail ftones: Let us fuppofe at prefent, that the different Motions and Figures, Bulk and Number of fuch Particles, affecting the feveral Organs of our Senfes, produce in us thofe different Senfations, which we have from the Colours and Smells of Bodies; v.g that a Violet, by the impulfe of fuch infenfible Particles of matter of peculiar Figures and Bulks, and in different Degrees and Modifications of their Motions, causes the Ideas of the blue Colour, and sweet Scent of that Flower, to be produc'd in our Minds; it being no more impoffible to conceive that God fhould annex fuch Ideas to fuch Motions, with which they have no fimilitude, than that he fhould annex the Idea of Pain to the Motion of a Piece of Steel dividing our Flesh, with which that Idea hath no resemblance.

§. 14. What I have faid concerning Colours and Smells, may be understood alfo of Taftes and Sounds, and other the like fenfible Qualities; which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the Objects themfelves, but Powers to produce various Senfations in us, and depend on thofe primary Qualities, viz. Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of Parts; as I have faid.

Ideas of priS. 15. From whence I.think it is easy to draw this Obfervation, That the mary Quali- Ideas of primary Qualities of Bodies are Refemblances of them, and their Patterns ties are Re- do really exilt in the Bodies themfelves; but the Ideas, produc'd in us by thefe Semblances; of Secondary, Secondary Qualities, have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our Ideas exifting in the Bodies themselves. They are in the Bodies, we denominate from them only a Power to produce thofe Senfations in us: And what is fweet, blue or warm in Idea, is but the certain Bulk, Figure and Motion of the infenfible Parts in the Bodies themselves, which we call fo.

not.

§. 16. Flame is denominated hot and light; Snow, white and cold; and Manna, white and fweet, from the Ideas they produce in us: Which Qualities are commonly thought to be the fame in those Bodies that those Ideas are in us, the one the perfect refemblance of the other, as they are in a Mirror; and it would by moft Men be judg'd very extravagant, if one would fay otherwife. And yet he that will confider that the fame Fire, that at one Distance produces in us the Senfation of Warmth, does at a nearer approach produce in us the far different Senfation of Pain, ought to bethink himfelf what Reafon he has to say, that his Idea of Warmth, which was produc'd in him by the Fire, is actually in the Fire; and his Idea of Pain, which the fame Fire produc'd in him the fame Way, is not in the Fire. Why is Whiteness and Coldnefs in Snow, and Pain not, when it produces the one and the other Idea in us; and can do neither, but by the Bulk, Figure, Number and Motion of its folid Parts ?

§. 17. The particular Bulk, Number, Figure and Motion of the Parts of Fire, or Snow, are really in them, whether any one's Senfes perceive them or no; and therefore they may be call'd real Qualities, because they really exift in those Bodies: But Light, Heat, Whiteness or Coldness, are no more really in them, than Sicknefs or Pain is in Manna. Take away the Senfation of them; let not the Eyes fee Light, or Colours, nor the Ears hear Sounds; let the Palate not

tafte,

taste, nor the Nofe fmell; and all Colours, Taftes, Odours and Sounds, as they are fuch particular Ideas, vanifh and ceafe, and are reduc'd to their Causes, i. e. Bulk, Figure and Motion of Parts.

9. 18. A piece of Manna of a fenfible Bulk, is able to produce in us the Idea of a round or fquare Figure, and by being remov'd from one place to another, the Idea of Motion. This Idea of Motion reprefents it, as it really is in the Manna moving: A Circle or Square are the fame, whether in Idea or Existence, in the Mind, or in the Manna; and this both Motion and Figure are really in the Manna, whether we take notice of them or no: This every body is ready to agree to. Befides, Manna by the Bulk, Figure, Texture and Motion of its Parts, has a Power to produce the Senfations of Sicknefs, and fometimes of acute Pains or Gripings in us. That thefe Ideas of Sickness and Pain are not in the Manna, but Effects of its Operations on us, and are no where when we feel them not: This alfo every one readily agrees to. And yet Men are hardly to be brought to think, that Sweetness and Whiteness are not really in Manna; which are but the Effects of the Operations of Manna, by the Motion, Size and Figure of its Particles on the Eyes and Palate; as the Pain and Sickness caused by Manna, are confeffedly nothing but the Effects of its Operations on the Stomach and Guts, by the Size, Motion and Figure of its infenfible Parts (for by nothing else can a Body operate, as has been prov'd) As if it could not operate on the Eyes and Palate, and thereby produce in the Mind particular diftinct Ideas, which in it felf it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the Guts and Stomach, and thereby produce diftin&t Ideas, which in it felf it has not. These Ideas being all Effects of the Operations of Manna, on several Parts of our Bodies, by the Size, Figure, Number and Motion of its Parts; why those produc'd by the Eyes and Palate fhould rather be thought to be really in the Manna, than thofe produc'd by the Stomach and Guts; or why the Pain and Sickness, Ideus that are the effects of Manna, thould be thought to be no where when they are not felt; and yet the Sweetnefs and Whiteness, effects of the fame Manna on other parts of the Body, by ways equally as unknown, fhould be thought to exist in the Manna, when they are not feen nor tafted, would need fome Reason to explain.

not.

§. 19. Let us confider the red and white Colours in Porphyre: Hinder Light Ideas of pribut from ftriking on it, and its Colours vanifh, it no longer produces any fuch mary QualiIdeas in us; upon the return of Light, it produces thefe Appearances on us ties, are Reagain. Can any one think any real Alterations are made in the Porphyre, by the femblances; prefence or absence of Light; and that thofe Ideas of Whitenefs and Redness, of Secondary, are really in Porphyre in the Light, when 'tis plain it has no Colour in the dark? It has, indeed, fuch a Configuration of Particles, both Night and Day, as are apt by the Rays of Light rebounding from fome Parts of that hard Stone, to produce in us the Idea of Redness, and from others the Idea of Whiteness; but Whiteness or Redness are not in it at any time, but fuch a Texture, that hath the Power to produce fuch a Senfation in us.

. 20. Pound an Almond, and the clear white Colour will be alter'd into a dirty one, and the fweet Tafte into an oily one. What real Alteration can the beating of the Pestle make in any Body, but an Alteration of the Texture of it ?

. 21. Ideas being thus diftinguifh'd and understood, we may be able to give an account how the fame Water, at the fame time, may produce the Idea of Cold by one Hand, and of Heat by the other; whereas it is impoffible that the fame Water, if those Ideas were really in it, fhould at the fame time be both hot and cold: For if we imagine Warmth, as it is in our Hands, to be nothing but a certain fort and degree of Motion in the minute Particles of our Nerves, or animal Spirits, we may underftand how it is poffible that the fame Water may, at the fame time, produce the Senfation of Heat in one Hand, and Cold in the other; which yet Figure never does, that never producing the Idea of a Square by one Hand, which has produc'd the Idea of a Globe by another. But if the Senfation of Heat and Cold be nothing but the Increase or Diminution of the Motion of the minute Parts of our Bodies, caus'd by the Corpufcles of any other Body, it is eafy to be understood, that if that Motion be greater in one Hand than in the other; if a Body be apply'd to the two Hands, which has, in Vol. I. its

H