its minute Particles a greater motion, than in those of one of the Hands, and a lefs than in those of the other; it will increase the Motion of the one Hand, and leffen it in the other, and fo caufe the different Senfations of Heat and Cold that depend thereon. §. 22. I have in what juft goes before been engag'd in phyfical Enquiries a little farther than perhaps I intended. But it being neceflary to make the Nature of Senfation a little understood, and to make the difference between the Qualities in Bodies, and the Ideas produc'd by them in the Mind, to be diftin&tly conceiv'd, without which it were impoffible to difcourfe intelligibly of them; I hope I fhall be pardon'd this little Excurfion into natural Philofophy, it being neceffary in our prefent Enquiry to diftinguish the primary, and real Qualities of Bodies, which are always in them, (viz. Solidity, Extenfion, Figure, Number, and Motion, or Reft; and are fometimes perceiv'd by us, viz. when the Bodies they are in are big enough fingly to be difcern'd) from those secondary and imputed Qualities, which are but the Powers of feveral Combinations of thofe primary ones, when they operate, without being diftinctly difcern'd; whereby we alfo may come to know what Ideas are, and what are not Refemblances of fomething really exifting in the Bodies we denominate from them. Three forts of §. 23. The Qualities then that are in Budies rightly confider'd, are of three First, The Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation and Motion, or Reft of their folid Parts; thofe are in them, whether we perceive them or no; and when they are of that Size that we can difcover them, we have by thefe an Idea of the thing as it is in it felf, as is plain in artificial Things. Thefe I call primary Qualities. Secondly, The Power that is in any Body, by reafon of its intenfible primary Qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our Senfes, and thereby Produce in us the different Ideas of feveral Colours, Sounds, Smells, Taftes, &c. Thefe are ufually call'd fenfible Qualities. Thirdly, The Power that is in any Body, by reafon of the particular Conftitution of its primary Qualities, to make fuch a change in the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of another Body, as to make it operate on our Senfes differently from what it did before. Thus the Sun has a power to make Wax white, and Fire to make Lead fluid. Thefe are ufually call'd Powers. The first of these, as has been faid, I think, may be properly call'd real original, or primary Qualities, because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceiv'd or no; and upon their different Modifications it is, that the fecondary Qualities depend. The other two are only Powers to act differently upon other things, which Powers refult from the different Modifications of thofe primary Qualities. The first are neither are, nor are thought for §. 24. But tho' thefe two later forts of Qualities are Powers barely, and nothing Refemblan but Powers relating to feveral other Bodies, and refulting from the different ces. The le Modifications of the original Qualities; yet they are generally otherwife cond thought Refemblan thought of. For the fecond Sort, viz. The Powers to produce feveral Ideas in ces, but are us by our Senfes, are looked upon as real Qualities, in the Things thus affecting us : nt. The third But the third fort are call'd, and esteem'd barely Powers, v. g. the Idea of Heat, or Light, which we receive by our Eyes, or touch from the Sun, are commonly thought real Qualities, exifling in the Sun, and fomething more than mere Powers in it. But when we confider the Sun, in reference to Wax, which it melts or blanches, we look on the Whitenefs and Softnefs produc'd in the Wax, not as Qualities in the Sun, but Effe&s produc'd by Powers in it: Whereas, if rightly confider'd, thefe Qualities of Light and Warmth, which are Perceptions in me when I am warm'd, or enlighten'd by the Sun, are no otherwise in the Sun, than the changes made in the Wax, when it is blanch'd or melted, are in the Sun. They are all of them equally Powers in the Sun, depending on its primary Qualitics, whereby it is able in the one Cafe, fo to alter the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of fome of the infenfible parts of my Eyes or Hands, as thereby to produce in me the Idea of Light or Heat; and in the other it is able fo to alter the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of the infenfible Parts of the Wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the diftin&t Ideas of white and fluid. . 25. The reafon why the one are ordinarily taken for real Qualities, and the other only for bare Powers, feems to be, becaufe the Ideas we have of diftin& Colours, Colours, Sounds, &c. containing nothing at all in them of Bulk, Figure, or Motion, we are not apt to think them the Effects of thefe primary Qualities, which appear not to our Senfes, to operate in their Production; and with which they have not any apparent Congruity, or conceivable Connexion. Hence it is that we are fo forward to imagine, that thofe Ideas are the refemblances of fomething really exifting in the Objects themselves: Since Senfation discovers nothing of Bulk, Figure or Motion of Parts in their Production; nor can Reafon fhew how Bodies, by their Bulk, Figure, and Motion should produce in the Mind the Ideas of Blue or Yellow, &c. But in the other case, in the Operations of Bodies, changing the Qualities one of another, we plainly discover that the Quality produc'd hath commonly no refemblance with any thing in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare Effect of Power. For tho receiving the Idea of Heat, or Light from the Sun, we are apt to think 'tis a Preception and Refemblance of fuch a Quality in the Sun; yet when we fee Wax, or a fair Face, receive change of Colour from the Sun, we cannot imagine that to be the Perception or Refemblance of any thing in the Sun, because we find not thofe different Colours in the Sun it felf. For our Senfes being able to obferve a likeness or unlikeness of fenfible Qualities in two different external Objects, we forwardly enough conclude the Production of any fenfible Quality in any Subject, to be an Effect of bare Power, and not the Communication of any Quality, which was really in the Efficient, when we find no fuch fenfible Quality in the thing that produc'd it. But our Senfes, not being able to discover any unlikeness between the Idea produc'd in us, and the Quality of the Object producing it; we are apt to imagine, that our Ideas are refemblances of fomething in the Objects, and not the Effects of certain Powers. plac'd in the Modification of their primary Qualities; with which primary Qualities the Ideas produc'd in us have no resemblance. perceivable; . 26. To conclude, befides those before-mentioned, primary Qualities in Bodies, Secondary Qualities two viz. Bulk, Figure, Extenfion, Number, and Motion of their folid Parts; all fold; Firft, the reft whereby we take notice of Bodies, and diftinguifh them one from ano- immediately ther, are nothing elfe but feveral Powers in them depending on thofe primary Qualities; whereby they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our Bodies, to produce feveral different Ideas in us ; or elfe by operating on other Bodies, fo to change their primary Qualities, as to render them capable of producing Ideas in us, different from what before they did. The former of thefe, I think, may be call'd fecondary Qualities, immediately perceivable: The latter, secondary Qualities, mediately perceivable. able J. I. 1.PE Erception, as it is the firft Faculty of the Mind, exercis'd about our I- Perception the firft fimple Ideas; fo it is the first and fimpleft Idea we have from Reflection, and is dea of Reflec by fome call'd Thinking in general. Tho' Thinking, in the propriety of the tion. English Tongue, fignifies that fort of Operation of the Mind about its Ideas, wherein the Mind is active; where it, with fome degree of voluntary Attention, confiders any thing. For in bare naked Perception, the Mind is, for the most part, only paffive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving. §. 2. What Perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he is only when does himself, when he fees, hears, feels, &c. or thinks, than by any difcourfe of mine. Whoever reflects on what paffes in his own Mind, cannot miss it: And if he does not reflect, all the Words in the World cannot make him have any notion of it. S. 3. This is certain, That whatever Alterations are made in the Body, if they reach not the Mind; whatever impreffions are made on the outward Parts, if they are not taken notice of within; there is no Perception. Fire may burn our Bodies, with no other effect, than it does a Billet, unless the Motion be Vol. I. H 2 continu'd the Mind repression ceives the Im Children, tho' they have Ideas in the Womb, have none innate. evident. continu'd to the Brain; and there the Senfe of Heat, or Idea of Pain, be produc'd in the Mind, wherein confifts actual Perception. §. 4. How often may a Man obferve in himself, that whilft his Mind is intently employ'd in the Contemplation of fome Objects, and curiously furveying fome Ideas that are there; it takes no notice of Impreffions of founding Bodies made upon the Organ of Hearing, with the fame Alteration that uses to be for the producing the Idea of Sound? A fufficient impulfe there may be on the Organ; but it not reaching the Obfervation of the Mind, there follows no Perception: And tho' the Motion that uses to produce the Idea of Sound, be made in the Ear, yet no Sound is heard. Want of Senfation in this cafe, is not through any defect in the Organ, or that the Man's Ears are lefs affected than at other times when he does hear: but that which ufes to produce the Idea, tho' convey'd in by the ufual Organ, not being taken notice of in the Understanding, and fo imprinting no Idea on the Mind, there follows no Senfation. So that wherever there is Senfe, of Perception, there fome Idea is actually produc'd, and prefent in the Understanding. 9. 5. Therefore I doubt not but Children, by the exercife of their Senfes about Objects that affect them in the Womb, receive fome few Ideas before they are born; as the unavoidable Effects, either of the Bodies that environ them, or elfe of thofe Wants or Difeafes they fuffer: Among which (if one may conjecture concerning Things not very capable of Examination) I think the Ideas of Hunger and Warmth are two; which probably are fome of the first that Children have, and which they fcarce ever part with again. §. 6. But tho' it be reasonable to imagine that Children receive fome Ideas before they come into the World; yet thefe fimple Ideas are far from those innate Principles which fome contend for, and we above have rejected. These here mention'd being the effects of Senfation, are only from fome Affections of the Body, which happen to them there, and fo depend on fomething exterior to the Mind; no otherwife differing in their manner of Production from other Ideas deriv'd from Sense, but only in the precedency of Time: Whereas those innate Principles are fuppos'd to be quite of another nature; not coming into the Mind by any accidental Alterations in, or Operations on the Body; but, as it were, original Characters imprefs'd upon it, in the very firft moment of its Being and Conftitution. Which Ideas §. 7. As there are fome Ideas which we may reasonably fuppofe may be introfirft, is not duc'd into the Minds of Children in the Womb, fubfervient to the Neceffities of their Life and Being there; fo after they are born, thofe Ideas are the earliest imprinted, which happen to be the fenfible Qualities which firft occur to them: Amongst which, Light is not the leaft confiderable, nor of the weakeft efficacy. And how covetous the Mind is to be furnish'd with all fuch Ideas as have no pain accompanying them, may be a little guefs'd, by what is obfervable in Children new-born, who always turn their Eyes to that part from whence the Light comes, lay them how you please. But the Ideas that are most familiar at first being various, according to the divers Circumstances of Childrens first entertainment in the World; the Order wherein the feveral Ideas come at first into the Mind, is very various and uncertain alfo; neither is it much material to know it. Ideas of Sen9. 8. We are farther to confider concerning Perception, that the Ideas we refation often ceive by Senfation are often in grown People alter'd by the Judgment, without our chang'd by the taking notice of it. When we fet before our Eyes a round Globe, of any uniFudgment. form Colour, v. g. Gold, Alabafter, or Jet; 'tis certain that the Idea thereby imprinted in our Mind, is of a flat Circle variously fhadow'd, with several degrees of Light and Brightnefs coming to our Eyes. But we having by ufe been accuftom'd to perceive what kind of appearance convex Bodies are wont to make in us, what Alterations are made in the Reflections of Light by the difference of the fenfible Figures of Bodies; the Judgment prefently, by an habitual custom, alters the Appearances into their Causes: So that from that which truly is variety of Shadow or Colour, collecting the Figure, it makes it pafs for a mark of Figure, and frames to it feif the Perception of a convex Figure and an uniform Colour; when the Idea we receive from thence is only a Pain variously colour'd, as is evident in painting. To which purpose I fhall here infert a Pro blem blem of that very ingenious and ftudious Promoter of real Knowledg, the Learned and Worthy Mr. Molineux, which he was pleas'd to fend me in a Letter fome Months fince; and it is this: Suppofe a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his Touch to diftinguish between a Cube and a Sphere of the fame metal, and nighly of the fame bigness, fo as to tell when he felt one and t'other, which is the Cube, which the Sphere. Suppofe then the Cube and Sphere plac'd on a Table, and the blind Man to be made to fee: Quare, Whether by his Sight, before he touch'd them, he could now diftinguish and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube? To which the acute and judicious Propofer anfwers: Not. For tho' he has obtain'd the Experience of, how a Globe, how a Cube affects his Touch; yet he has not yet attain'd the Experience, that what affects his Touch Jo or fo, must affect his Sight fo or fo: Or that a protuberant Angle in the Cube, that prefs'd his Hand unequally, shall appear to his Eye as it does in the Cube. I agree with this thinking Gentleman, whom I am proud to call my Friend, in his anfwer to this his Problem; and am of Opinion, that the blind Man, at firft fight, would not be able with certainty to fay which was the Globe, which the Cube, whilft he only faw them; tho' he could unerringly name them by his Touch, and certainly diftinguifh them by the difference of their Figures felt. This I have fet down, and leave with my Reader, as an occafion for him to confider how much he may be beholden to Experience, Improvement, and acquir'd Notions, where he thinks he has not the leaft ufe of or help from them: And the rather, because this obferving Gentleman farther adds, That having, upon the occafion of my Book, propos'd this to divers very ingenious Men, he hardly ever met with one that at first gave the answer to it which he thinks true, till by hearing his Reasons they were convinc'd. 9. 9. But this is not, I think, ufual in any of our Ideas, but thofe receiv'd by Sight: Because Sight, the most comprehenfive of all our Senfes, conveying to our Minds the Ideas of Light and Colours, which are peculiar only to that Senfe; and alfo the far different Ideas of Space, Figure, and Motion, the feveral varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper Object, viz. Light and Colours; we bring our felves by ufe to judg of the one by the other. This, in many Cafes, by a fettled habit, in things whereof we have frequent Experience, is perform'd fo conftantly and fo quick, that we take that for the Perception of our Senfation, which is an Idea form'd by our Judgment; fo that one, viz. that of Senfation, ferves only to excite the other, and is fcarce taken notice of it felf: As a Man who reads or hears with Attention and Understanding, takes little notice of the Characters, or Sounds, but of the Ideas that are excited in him by them. §. 10. Nor need we wonder that this is done with fo little notice, if we confi der how very quick the Actions of the Mind are perform'd: For as it felf is thought to take up no Space, to have no Extenfion; fo its Actions feem to require no time, but many of them feem to be crouded into an inftant. I fpeak this in comparison to the Actions of the Body. Any one may cafily obferve this in his own Thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an inftant, do our Minds with one glance fee all the parts of a Demonftration, which may very well be call'd a long one, if we confider the time it will require to put it into words, and ftep by step fhew it another? Secondly, We fhall not be fo much furpriz'd, that this is done in us with fo little notice, if we confider how the facility which we get of doing things, by a cuftom of doing, makes them often pafs in us without our notice. Habits, especially fuch as are begun very early, come at laft to produce Actions in us, which often efcape our Obfervation. How frequently do we, in a Day, cover our Eyes with our Eye-lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark? Men that by cuftom have got the ufe of a By-word, do almoft in every Sentence pronounce Sounds, which tho taken notice of by others, they themselves neither hear nor obferve. And therefore 'tis not so strange, that our Mind fhould often change the Idea of its Senfation into that of its Judgment, and make one ferve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it. §. 11. This Faculty of Perception feems to me to be that, which puts the diftin- Perceptionputs Etion betwixt the animal Kingdom and the inferiour parts of Nature. For how the difference ever Vegetables have, many of them, fome degrees of Motion, and upon the between Anidifferent Application of other Bodies to them do very briskly alter their Figures ferior Beings. and mals and in Perception the and Motions, and fo have obtain'd the name of fenfitive Plants, from a Motion which has some resemblance to that which in Animals follows upon Sensation: yet, I fuppofe, it is all bare Mechanifm; and no otherwife produc'd, than the turn of a wild Oat-beard, by the infinuation of the Particles of Moifture; or the fhortening of a Rope, by the Affufion of Water. All which is done without Senfation in the Subject, or the having or receiving any Ideas. any §. 12. Perception, I believe, is in fome degree in all forts of Animals ; tho' in fome, poffibly, the Avenues provided by Nature for the Reception of Senfations are fo few, and the Perception they are receiv'd with fo obfcure and dull, that it comes extremely fhort of the Quickness and Variety of Senfations which is in other Animals: But yet it is fufficient for, and wifely adapted to, the state and Condition of that fort of Animals, who are thus made. So that the Wifdom and Goodness of the Maker plainly appear in all the Parts of this ftupendous Fabrick, and all the feveral Degrees and Ranks of Creatures in it. §. . 13. We may, I think, from the Make of an Oyfter, or Cockle, reasonably conclude that it has not fo many, nor fo quick Senfes, as a Man, or several other Animals; nor if it had, would it, in that State and incapacity of transferring it felf from one Place to another, be better'd by them. What good would Sight and Hearing do to a Creature, that cannot move it felf to, or from the Objects, wherein at a distance it perceives Good or Evil? And would not Quickness of Senfation be an Inconvenience to an Animal that muft lie ftill, where Chance has once plac'd it; and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul Water, as it happens to come to it? . 14. But yet I cannot but think, there is fome fmall dull Perception, whereby they are diftinguifh'd from perfect Infenfibility. And that this may be fo we have plain inftances, even in Mankind it felf. Take one, in whom decrepid old Age has blotted out the Memory of his paft Knowledge, and clearly wiped out the Ideas his Mind was formerly ftor'd with; and has, by deftroying his Sight, Hearing, and Smell quite, and his Tafte to a great Degree, ftop'd up almost all the Paflages for new ones to enter: Or, if there be fome of the Inlets yet half open, the Impreffions made are fcarce perceiv'd, or not at all retain'd. How far fuch an one (notwithstanding all that is boafted of innate Principles) is in his Knowledg, and intellectual Faculties, above the Condition of a Cockle or an Oyfter, I leave to be confider'd. And if a Man had pafs'd fixty Years in fuch a State, as 'tis poffible he might, as well as three Days; I wonder what difference there would have been in any intellectual Perfections, between him and the lowest degree of Animals. S. 15. Perception then being the first Step and Degree towards Knowledg, and the Inlet of all the Materials of it; the fewer Senfes any Man, as well as any other Creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the Impreffions are that are made by them; and the duller the Faculties are that are employ'd about them, the more remote are they from that Knowledg which is to be found in fome Men. But this being in great variety of Degrees (as may be perceiv'd amongft Men) cannot certainly be discover'd in the several Species of Animals, much lefs in their particular Individuals. It fuffices me only to have remark'd here, that Perception is the firft Operation of all our intellectual Faculties, and the Inlet of all Knowledg into our Minds. And I am apt too, to imagine that it is Perception in the lowest degree of it, which puts the boundaries between Animals and the inferiour Ranks of Creatures. But this I mention only as my Conjecture by the by; it being indifferent to the matter in Hand, which way the Learned fhall determine of it. СНА Р.Х. TH Contemplati . 1.THE next Faculty of the Mind, whereby it makes a farther progress towards Knowledg, is that which I call Retention, or the keeping of 012. thofe fimple Ideas, which from Senfation or Reflection it hath receiv'd. This is done |