Estremadura was no longer possible, and that he should retreat into Andalusia. A chapel, which had been converted into a powder magazine, was now blown up, that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy. This explosion, and the preparations which were made for further flight, excited the utmost terror in the inhabitants of Truxillo, and their lamentations increased the confusion and alarm of the soldiers. It now became a rout ;—most of the troops deserted, plundering the towns and villages through which they passed. Those who still followed the general were now under no restraint; they went through Miajadas, Medellin, and Quintania, and in four days reached Zalamea, above 100 miles from Jaraicejo. Here it had been appointed to halt, and here Galluzo found himself with not more than 1000 men. Nothing could be worse than the conduct of the men during their flight, some sold their musquets, some threw them away,houses were broken open, and upon one individual a piece of church plate was found, a species of robbery which excites peculiar horror in Spain. The officers, instead of endeavouring to restrain these excesses, were some of them active themselves in pillage; it is probable, indeed, that had they done their duty, the men would have discharged theirs, for those officers to whom the more difficult task of bringing off the artillery had been entrusted, and who were therefore picked men, effected their object: though without an escort they lost only two pieces of cannon, and carried 17 to Miajadas,-from whence part were sent to Badajoz, the rest followed Galluzo to Zalamea. Trias also effected a far more dangerous retreat than his commander in good

order. He set forward from Castanar for Fresnedoso, and when within a mile of the place, learnt that the French were there, having won the bridge of Almaraz. He had now to tread back his steps, and endeavour to reach Jaraicejo. After a day's march he found that the French were there also, and making for Truxillo, again discovered the enemy in possession of the place to which he was bound. Nevertheless he preserved discipline in his little troop, and that preserved confidence; instead of losing his men by desertion, he collected stragglers as he went, and arrived at Zalamea with a larger force than Galluzo himself had brought there.

Before the incapacity of Galluzo was thus decidedly manifested, it had been in agitation to remove him from the command, and appoint Cuesta in his place. This general had been put under arrest for his violent conduct toward Valdes, the deputy for Leon, and, as an arrested person, followed the junta on their flight from Aranjuez. It so happened, that while he was at Merida, some soldiers belonging to the scattered army of Estremadura gathered together in that city, and the owner of the house in which Cuesta lodged persuaded them to demand him for their leader, as it were by acclamation. The junta of Merida upon this sent up a representation to the central junta requesting that Cuesta might be appointed to the command. It was replied, that this ought not to be done without the approbation of the junta of Badajoz, which had made such signal exertions in the patriotic cause, and that junta was not willing to supersede Galluzo whom they had appointed. But now, after this disorderly flight, he was immediately de

prived of the command, and put under arrest, and Cuesta was then nominated to succeed him. This was an imprudent choice after the battle of Rio Seco, and the subsequent conduct of this general; but at a time when the cry of treachery once raised against a commander was sufficient to break up an army, it was an object of considerable importance to find a leader in whom the men would have confidence; and as they called for Cuesta, that circumstance in some degree justifies the government for giving him the command. At this moment the whole of Estremadura to the very walls of Badajoz was open to the enemy, and the central junta trembled for Seville. Brigadier Don Josef Serrano Valdenebro was sent with as many men as he could collect to guard Santa Olaya and El Ronquillo, in the western passes of the Sierra Morena, and cooperate with Cuesta in covering An

dalusia on that side. These means of defence would have been as inef fectual as they were feeble, if Buonaparte had not thought it of more importance at this time to drive the English out of Spain, than to pursue his victories in the south. He re called a large proportion of the troops from that quarter, to bring them against Sir John Moore, and the di version which was thus occasioned enabled the Spaniards to form another army, and recover Estremadura. Calamitous as the retreat of the English was, it produced this good. For tunately, too, for the character of Great Britain, the British government entertained more generous hopes and acted upon wiser views than its general; and at the very time when it might have appeared by his movement that Spain was to be abandoned to its fate, a treaty of alliance was concluded with the Spanish nation.

HAPPILY for the interests of England, and for its honour, which of all interests is the most momentous, the ministry entertained wiser opinions, and better feelings, with regard to Spain, than either Sir John Moore or the opposition. At the very time when the Spaniards had sustained the heaviest losses, and our own army was known to be in full retreat, a treaty was signed at London between Great Britain and the Spanish nation acting in the name of Ferdinand. It proclaimed, in the name of the most holy and undivided Trinity, a Christian, stable, and inviolable peace between the two countries, a perpetual and sincere amity, and a strict alliance during the war with France; and it pronounced an entire and lasting oblivion of all acts of hostility done on either side in the

course of the late wars in which they had been engaged against each other. His Britannic Majesty engaged to continue to assist the Spanish nation in their struggle to the utmost of his power, and promised not to acknowledge any other King of Spain, and of the Indies thereunto appertaining, than Ferdinand VII., his heirs, or such lawful successor as the Spanish nation should acknowledge; and the Spanish government engaged, on the behalf of Ferdinand, never, in any case, to cede to France any portion of the territories or possessions of the Spanish monarchy in any part of the world. The contracting parties bound themselves to make common cause against France, and not to make peace except by common consent. It was agreed by an additional article, that as the existing circumstances

did not admit of the regular negociation of a treaty of commerce with all the care and consideration due to so important a subject, such a negociation should be effected as soon as it was practicable; and meantime mutual facilities should be afforded to the commerce of the subjects of both countries, by temporary regulations, founded on principles of reciprocal utility. Another separate article provided that the Spanish government should take the most effectual measures for preventing the Spanish squadrons, in all their ports, from falling into the power of France.*

of

It was asked by Mr April 20. Ponsonby, in what sense the words legal successor were to be understood in this treaty Mr Canning replied, that it was understood, that in the event of the removal of Ferdinand VII. and the immediate successors to the throne, who were then in the power of France, by demise, it would become a matter grave question among the Spanish jurists, upon whom the superior right of succession would devolve; and therefore it was but prudent to word that part of the treaty so as it might bear a prospective relation to such an event; for, in a question of that na ture, this country would have no right to interfere with the exclusive privilege of the Spanish people. The treaty was never formally discussed in Parliament; enough, however, was incidentally said upon the subject to shew, that if government had been in other hands Spain would have been left to its fate. Mr Tierney said, that his Majesty's name ought not to have been so rashly and formally committed, and that it was imprudent to enter into such a treaty with

a junta, some of whom had turned out traitors. Cobbett also, whose heart has never been in the right through all his changes of opinion, and who addresses himself to the malignant passions even when he argues in a good cause, poured out his usual strain of gratuitous assertion and coarse invective upon this occasion. Ministers, he said, had now concluded a treaty of alliance with a man "whom Buonaparte had living upon a pension, or at board wages in France. They might make new treaties, they might make new ambassadors, and they might fasten those new ambassadors on us for life, but they could do nothing for the restoration of the Bourbons in Spain." But his arguments were levelled against the Spaniards as well as the Bourbons; having predicted ill of the Spaniards, he now hated them: "They had no scru ple," he said, " to cringe to the devil, and why should they scruple to cringe to Joseph Napoleon?" According to him the contest was over, and its fatal termination was to be ascribed to the reluctance of our ministers to see a free government established in Spain.

While the Spaniards were thus calumniated by this demagogue, and by all the adherents of the opposi tion, and while they were for a time abandoned by their allies, in conse quence of Sir John Moore's retreat, they never, amid all their disasters, lost heart. There were Englishmen at Coruna who, when the troops were preparing for their escape, doubted whether the inhabitants would protect their embarkation. In the bitterness of grief and indignation, they said, "should the Galicians tell us that we came into a mountainous province,