each capable of containing a garrison of 5 or 600 men, a hospital, and provisions for four months; by this means the people might be kept in check, the principal passes closed, points of support would be provided for the columns acting in the province, in whatever direction they moved, and where they might receive assistance and deposite their sick. This, he said, was a very powerful consideration, for it was not to be concealed that the present circumstances had a great effect upon the minds of the soldiers, knowing as they did, that if they were wounded or seized with a fever at a distance from a place of safety, they were liable to perish for want of assistance, or to be put to death by the peasantry.

A million of French money, according to Soult's opinion, would suffice to put Galicia in this state of defence, and no money could be employed to better purpose, especially as a smaller number of troops would then suffice to occupy it. Lugo should be fortified, three blockhouses erected on the line of Villafranca in the Bierzo, and the fortifications of Tuy, Monforte, Monterey, Viana, and the Pueblo de Sanabria restored, which might easily be done. A few other posts might be added if needful. Some of these measures he had persuaded Marshal Ney to undertake, but Ney at this time, instead of fortifying Lugo, was flying beyond Astorga. Soult's letters also discovered the state of feeling among the French themselves; there had been intrigues or conspiracies in his army

Un affoiblessement moral.

when he quitted Porto; some of his generals had not always done what was in their power for the success of the operation with which they were entrusted, others had shewn symp toms of what he called a moraldebility. "In this kind of war," said he, " and with the sort of enemy with whom we have to contend, it is of great importance that the chiefs who are at the head of the troops should be not only immoveable, but that they should possess that force of mind which places them in all circumstan ces above events even the most † vexa tious." The moral debility of which Marshal Soult complained, implied that some of his officers were shock ed at the atrocities which they were ordered to commit. The peasantry from the beginning repaid these cruelties, and carried on a war of ex termination against these ruffians; the Spanish army were long before they could resolve upon executing the dreadful principle of retaliation, but they were at length compelled to it. At Lourizon, thirty monks and forty-nine of the principal inhabitants were hung by the French, who the set the place on fire. In return for this, 130 of the prisoners taken at the battle of St Payo were put to death. Barrios, who commanded one of the detachments, repeatedly remonstra ted with Ney upon the barbarities which that general committed upon the patriots: his remonstrances were in vain, and at length he executed the threats with which he enforced them, by throwing 700 French prisoners at one time into the Minho.

THE head-quarters of Marshal Victor, after he returned from his movement in favour of Soult to his former position, were at Truxillo: Cuesta was on his left flank, having his head-quarters at Fuente del Maestro, and his advance at Calemonte on the Guadiana, a league from Merida. Sir Arthur formed a plan for cutting off the enemy's retreat by a movement through Castello Branco and Plasencia to the bridge of Almaraz; this he relinquished, partly because it did not coincide with Cuesta's opinion, and also because he found it impossible to prevail upon that general to chuse a secure position, or to concentrate his army, which was distributed with so little judgement in an open country, that if Victor had ventured to attack it, an easier victory might have been obtained than that of Medellin. The French have seldom suffered such opportunities to pass by, and Sir Arthur was very apprehensive that the army, which had been raised with such exertions, would be defeated and dispersed be

fore he could possibly effect a junc tion with it. Victor, however, wai content to forego this advantage rather than risk the danger of being cut off from Madrid by such an ope ration as Sir Arthur had meditated; he broke up, therefore, at the begin ning of June, and retreated across the Tagus at Almaraz; Cuesta followed, but without obtaining any advantage over him in his retreat, and sufficiently fortunate that the French Marshal was in too much fear of a better army, to profit by the want of discipline in the Spa niards and the want of skill in their commanders.

When Sir Arthur had given p his original plan in consequence Cuesta's incapacity, it was concerted that he should join that general at Badajoz. Victor's retreat rendered this unnecessary, and it was then agreed that he should advance, as he had at first proposed, by way of Pa sencia. The army of La Mancha at this time, consisting of 16,000 foot and 1300 horse, was under Venegas,

subject, however, to Cuesta's orders. This was the side on which the French were most exposed; Albuquerque, by one operation, though it had only partially succeeded, had retarded the plans of the enemy for more han a month, and, had he not been withheld by the positive orders of nen who were unworthy to control im, there is every reason for beliering that he would have prevented many of the disasters which afterwards occurred. His patriotism was undoubted; no man, indeed, ever more passionately loved his Country: his military talents were uperior to those of any other of the Spanish generals, after the death of Reding, Romana perhaps alone excepted; and when these moral advantages concurred, his high rank and illustrious family ought to have been considered as circumstances to recommend him, giving him, as they would have done, additional claims to the respect of the army and people. With both he was exceeding ly popular, especially among the La Manchans; having been a sucesssful general, and almost the only one who had obtained any success, the soldiers had an opinion of his good fortune as well as of his talents, and this of all things is the most important. Mr Frere, who estimated the merits of the duke as they deserved, was exceedingly desirous that he should have the command in La Mancha, and suggested it to Cuesta. "An army," he said, "which had been torn by factions, thrown into confusion by the successive removal of its officers, and discouraged by ill fortune, could have no hope of being speedily re-established and conducted to victory, except by a general who was known to them for his successes, and who was personally po

pular among them, and in the province wherein he was to act. The Duke de Albuquerque was the only one who united in himself these advantages; and for the situation which he at present held in General Cuesta's army, Venegas would not be less useful, having always served under General Cuesta, and not only near his person, but immediately under his eyes. Unhappily Cuesta was jealous of the duke's popularity, and the supreme junta were jealous of his rank and influence. Mr Frere's advice was rejected, and this may be considered as a prime cause of the failure of the campaign.

It had at first been doubted whether the French would make any thing more than a shew of resistance on this side of Madrid, and a plan was proposed for menacing their retreat and the rear of the metropolis, by detaching a considerable Spanish corps through the Puerto de Arenas to Avila, Arevalo, and Segovia. Such a movement, it was thought, would compel the enemy either to retreat, or to detach a force of correspondent magnitude, and thus a material advantage would be afforded to the British army, which, when concentrated, amounted only to 20,000 men. Cuesta had about 38,000, well armed, but ill disciplined and ill clothed, which, in their state of discipline, was an evil of more consequence than may immediately be obvious. The intruder, with 9000 of his guards, and the greater part of the garrison of Madrid, had joined Sebastiani's army in La Mancha, and attempted to bring Venegas to action; but finding this in vain, they left 200 men to defend Toledo against him, and prepared to bring their whole disposable force, consisting of about 50,000, against the united Spa