66 prospect of fighting the enemy, the men were then orderly, and seemed pleased, and determined to do their duty."-Lord Liverpool warned his opponents, that if they insisted upon the production of this dispatch, they would see the impropriety of making it public, when too late. Something, to doubt, in this part had been suppressed. Of what nature," it was asked, "was this misconduct with which General Moore so roundly accused a whole army, almost with his dying breath? Did the officers be have ill, or the men, or both? Did they refuse to fight, or did they refuse to fly? What had they done, or what had they omitted to do?" These questions were asked by the wiser part of the public, and the narratives of the campaign, which were afterwards published, amply answer. ed them. It then appeared that the army, from the hour in which it was turned into a rout, considered themselves like sailors after a shipwreck -released from all discipline by the common ruin ;-that they plundered, burnt, and destroyed before them; that while many of the officers murmured against the conduct of the commander, the men cried out loudly against the disgrace of running away; that order, discipline, temperance, and even humanity, were laid aside by them in their desperation ; but that they had never forgotten the honour of England; and that whenever a hope of facing the enemy was held out to them, order was instantaneously restored, they were themselves again, and, in spite of all their fatigues and sufferings, manifested that invincible courage which, happily for themselves and for their country, they were allowed to prove upon the French at Coruna. It is not a little remarkable, that when this dis- Jan. 24. patch was first called for by Mr Whitbread, General Stewart expressed his hope it might be published; because, he said, he was satisfied that it would be to the army the greatest gratification they could receive. A stigma upon the discipline of the troops could not, indeed, have appeared at a more unfortunate season; for at this time a heavy charge was pending against his Royal Highness the Commander-inChief; and immediately after the first debate upon that subject, the Earl of Suffolk made a speech in praise of the army, as an act of justice towards him; and instanced the conduct of these very troops in this very retreat, as the effect of his able administration. "The whole object," he said, " of the illustrious duke had been to bring the army to that state of perfection which, by its recent demeanour, it had so nobly proved. It was that discipline which enabled our troops, after a march of upwards of 400 miles, through a barren tract of country, and at an in Jan. 31. A passage from Milton was most appositely quoted upon this subject in the Quarterly Review. Descent and fall To us is adverse: Who but felt of late, When the fierce foe hung on our broken rear, hospitable season, to give battle to their adversaries, and gain over them a signal victory; it was that discipline which enabled them to sustain all the hardships and all the privations which they endured in that retreat, and finally to secure and save themselves from a tremendous enemy. This was the effect of the discipline introduced and acted upon throughout the British forces." But it now appeared that all discipline had been at an end as soon as the army began to fly. What else could be expected, when they fled with such precipitation? The dragoons marched 72 miles in 26 hours, during 24 of which they were actually on horseback. When the 1st regiment, or Royals, reached Betanzos, they only mustered, with the colours, nine officers, three serjeants, and three privates: the rest had dropt on the road; and many of those who joined at all, did not join for three days. There was a memorable instance, in this part of the retreat, of what might have been accomplished by presence of mind. A party of invalids, between Lugo and Betanzos, were closely pressed by two squadrons of French cavalry. Serjeant Newman, of the 2d battalion 43d, was among them he made an effort to pass three or four hundred of these poor men, then halted, rallied round him those who were capable of making any resistance, and directed the others to proceed as they could. This party he formed regularly into divisions, and commenced firing and retiring in an orderly manner, till he effectually covered the retreat of his disabled comrades, and made the cavalry give up the pursuit. However grievous it might be to hear thus of the misconduct of our retreating army, the thing itself was what might have beenexpected, as the inevi my, table consequence of such a retreat. But Sir John Moore's dispatch contained a more melancholy and startling avowal. "He had been advised," he said, "to propose terms to the enethat he might be permitted to embark quietly." This was indeed an unexpected shock. What! were there then officers in this army, and of such rank in it as to offer advice to the general, who were for asking leave of the French to embark, and purchasing by a convention, which might, by its blacker dishonour, have put that of Cintra out of remembrance, that safety which half the army, without horse, and almost without artillery, won for themselves gloriously, at the bayonet's point! From this inexpiable disgrace Sir John Moore had saved us; redeeming his own honour, and that of the Bri tish troops. But who were the men who had so little confidence in Bri tish valour, that they would have robbed us of the battle of Coruna? Who were they who despaired of victory, when victory was so possi ble, that half our force obtained it? Who were they who, instead of relying upon their own hearts and hands, would have solicited terms from Marshal Soult, and set the Spaniards an example of pusillanimity which would for ever have disgusted them, and to which every coward or every traitor among them might have ap pealed, as a precedent for any baseness? Some pledge ought to have been called for from government, that these men should never, on any future occa sion, be trusted with command. But not a single comment was made in Parliament upon this subject, nor upon any of the information contained in the long-withheld dispatch. It furnished no matter of reproach against ministers, and therefore it was not the kind of information which their opponents wanted. Ministers themselves could make no use of it; for, having it in their hands, they had past a vote of thanks to the officers and men, of whose previous miscon. duct they possessed these proofs; and instead of defending their own mea sures, by arguing that the campaign might have turned out well, or at least less disastrously, if the commander had acted with more vigour and more enterprise, they asserted that every thing had been ably executed, as well as wisely planned. CHAP. IV. Proceedings respecting Mr Frere's Correspondence with Sir John Moore. Earl Grey's Motion of Censure against Ministers, for the Conduct of the War in Spain. Pension granted to the Brother of Sir John Moore. Earl Temple's Motion of Censure. Attack upon Colonel de Charmilly. General Moore's conduct examined. MR FRERE'S letters to Sir John Moore were among the papers laid before Parliament. The opposition had now obtained what April 18. they wanted. Earl Grey affirmed there could now be no doubt that the fatal event of the campaign was in consequence of Mr Frere's interference; and Earl Darnley thought the House would be wanting in their duty, if they did not move an address to his Majesty for the immediate recal of April 21. that minister. Shortly afterwards, Earl Grey moved an address, declaring the full conviction of the House that, "owing to the rashness and mismanagement of ministers, the hopes which the nation had been led to entertain had been disappointed; a large and useless expenditure of the means and resources of the country had been in curred; a great and dangerous accession of political, naval, and military strength had already been obtained by the enemy; and above 7000 of his Majesty's brave troops, together with their gallant commander, had been sacrificed without advantage, in an enterprise without plan, combination, or foresight, and equally illtimed and misdirected." The motion was introduced by a long speech, in which he argued that the reverses of the Spaniards had arisen from one of two causes ;-either because there was not a persevering spirit of patriotism in Spain, or because, if the elements of such a spirit existed, there was not a government capable of properly directing it whichever were the case, the English ministers were blameable. Either they had information, or they had not :-if they had not, they stood charged with culpable negligence; if they had, and held out hopes which that information did not justify, they stood in a much higher degree responsible for their conduct. After reasoning at great length upon these points, he came to the subject of Mr Frere's correspon dence; a gentleman," said he, "who, whatever may be his talents in other respects, and however painful and unpleasant it may be to me to make the observation, appears to be wholly unqualified, from his folly, ignorance, and presumption, for that high and important station which he at present occupies. To prove the incompetence of this gentleman, I need only refer to the letter in which, appearing to be ignorant of the arrival of reinforcements to the French army, he mentions to Sir John Moore how desirable it would be for him, and how politic, to make an attack upon the French army before it should be reinforced; and yet at the date of that letter the French army had been increased to 113,000 men! Another reason which he assigned for the advance of the general was, that France was always weak after a great effort! Sentiments such as these can. not fail to remind one of the case of those, who, from being in the constant habit of telling stories, come at length to believe them themselves." His lordship then endeavoured to prove that the advance of the army from Salamanca was the work of this Mr Frere." "Lord Castlereagh," he said, " in his instructions to General Moore, directed him to be guided in every thing respecting the junta of government by, and to take all his information on that, and all the subjects concerning the state of Spain, from Mr Frere; not, however, that he was to submit to his communications as to commands, but to pay every attention to them short of what should be paid to commands. From these instructions it may be judged what weight the advice of Mr Frere must have had in determining Sir John Moore's conduct. He recommended him to suspend his retreat for the present, because, he said, such was the spirit of the people, that if they should be abandoned by the British army, he was convinced they would still accomplish their object. When Mr Frere stated the determined spirit of the Spaniards,-nay, when he went the length of alleging, that even if that people were left to themselves, he had no doubt of their ultimate success, he still urged Sir John Moore to advance; adding, that such a movement was at that time of so much importance to the interests of Spain, and he was so certain † of its * The passage alluded to in Lord Castlereagh's letter is as follows:-" Whenever you shall have occasion to make any communications to the Spanish government, you are to correspond with it through the minister at Madrid, and all communications from the Spanish government to you are to be made through the same channel: and although communications, either from the Spanish government or the British minister, are not to be considered by you as in the nature of orders, you will, nevertheless, receive such requisitions or representations, upon all occasions, with the utmost deference and attention; and in case you shall feel it your duty to dissent from them, you will take care to represent, in the fullest manner, your rea sons for so doing, as well to the British minister, for the information of the Spanish government, as to the government at home." As for any directions to General Moore, that he should take all his information from Mr Frere, no such were given: the thing is too absurd to be possible. † Mr Frere's words are these:-" I cannot forbear representing to you, in the strongest manner, the propriety, not to say the necessity, of supporting the determination of the people of this country, by all the means which have been entrusted to you for that purpose. I have no hesitation in taking upon myself any responsibility which may attach itself to this advice; and I consider the fate of Spain as depending absolutely, for the present, upon the decision which you adopt. I say for the present; for such is the spirit and determination of the people, that if abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of their ultimate success." |