66 fear?" Truly, God still possesses his claim to man's supreme love, and unreserved submission. Nor is it fit that he should surrender his claims. What! a God who is, in fact, the only one who is "good,"-who giveth to all life and breath, and all things,-"to surrender his claim to love, or to allow of a rival in the world and sin? What! What! a God" of whom are all things, and through whom, and to whom are all things," surrender his claim to obedience? More proper would it be for a creditor to surrender his claims on a spendthrift debtor. And then for God to surrender his claims up to Satan-to admit of a competitor in him! It cannot be-the very thought is absurd and horrid! Moreover, man is not less a fit subject for government, or accountability since the fall, than he was before it; for, as to government, he has still the means of knowing God and his will, if not in revelation, yet in the light and law of nature, as well as the consequences of his good or bad behaviour; he has still the principle of self-love in his nature to prompt him to seek his own happiness, and avoid his own unhappiness; he has still the power of consideration, whether a thing be for his welfare, or for his injury; he has still a power to choose what he likes best, without compulsion from others; and wherein he needs help, he has a resource in his Maker. And as to accountableness, he has still a conscience that bears witness, and thoughts that accuse or else excuse him. If it were not so, his King and Governor would not address Israel, a part of this fallen race as he does, saying by Moses, "I have set before you life and death, the blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live;" nor again by Joshua, saying, "Choose you this day whom you will serve.” If it were not so, he would not blame man as he does -condemn man as he does-punish man as he does. If men have an "evil imagination from their youth," yet, having the means of correcting it as they have, they need not "walk" after that evil imagination as they do ; if they have an inclination for evil deeds, yet, warned as they are of the consequences of them, and informed as they are where strength may be obtained against that inclination, they need not indulge it, and strengthen it as they do for the power of consideration natural to them, and the influence of self-love natural to them, might prompt them to do otherwise. A will of determination might, through the power of consideration and self-love, be formed directly contrary to the will of inclination, even by the use of their natural or physical faculties. Hence it is, that the Lord imputes crime to man, and blames him because he "walks after the evil imagination of his heart;" because he "refuses to receive instruction," or to "hearken to receive instruction," whereby he might be corrected; because he "makes his neck stiff that he might not hear, nor receive instruction."* The antidote to the poison received, even as soon as the fall, has been presented to man; and the truth is, that nothing but positive personal perverseness, engendered by the practice of "evil deeds," which he might avoid, prevents his availing himself of it: for these " evil deeds," as our Lord states it, make him unwilling to come to the light; and not coming to the light of life, his will * Jer. xvii. 23. 66 cannot be renewed; and so, not willing to come to Christ, he cannot have life from him! Thus it is: first, the sinner practises evil deeds, which he might avoid; secondly, when light is given to him to bring him out of the darkness, he will not admit it, or turns away from it, lest these his evil deeds should be reproved; then, thirdly, he hardens himself so as to become unpersuadable; and then, lastly, being unpersuadable to evidence, he does not believe, and hence follows the "condemnation." "This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, but men love darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil.” We said just now, that "a will of determination" might, through the power of consideration and selflove, be formed "in the sinner," directly contrary to the will of inclination, even by the use of his natural or physical faculties. But, as a correct judgment concerning moral responsibility depends so much on a just discriminating acquaintance with the human will in its distinct operations of inclination and ultimate determination, we will assign to this subject a distinct Section; and with it we shall connect some other things that have an important bearing upon the subject. SECTION IV. On the Human Will, as to its Will of Inclination, and its Will of Determination; also, as to its Physical and Moral Liberty; likewise its State, as by Nature and by Custom: and the bearing of the whole Subject on Man's Responsibility. To which is added, a View of the Will in the Regenerate. As it is important in theology to distinguish between the natural faculty of willing, and the moral perversion of that faculty, so we conceive, that it is important to distinguish between the will of inclination or spontaneity,-that will to a thing which we have irrespective of consideration,—and that will of determination, which is the result of, or is formed upon consideration and deliberation; nor is this distinction, when correctly represented, at all above the apprehension of common minds. We feel a will, or are inclined to a thing, and yet, on consideration, we do not will it of this, who is not sensible? Thus Christ willed that the cup of suffering might pass from him; yet, for certain reasons, in another sense, he did not will it. Both the Latin and Greek languages recognize the distinction. In the Latin, voluntas is used for the will of inclination, and arbitrium for the will of determination or purpose. In Greek, Oéλnua, from Oéxw, "I will," for the former; and θέλημα, θέλω, βούλημα οι βουλὴ, from βούλομαι, “ I purpose or think or proper," for the latter. And the sacred writers have thought proper to use both words in the same distinctive sense in the New Testament, which it would be well for the Greek scholar to notice. 66 Besides these preparatory remarks, let the reader turn to that part of this work which we have called "The Connecting Link," and he cannot fail to see the use of the distinction here made. We now proceed to consider them in their order. 1. The will of inclination, as distinguished from that of determination; of desire from that of purpose. may We illustrate as well as confirm this distinction from Scripture. In Exod. xxiii. 5, the Lord supposes a case, in which a man might see his enemy's ass "lying under his burden, while he would forbear to help him." But the command, notwithstanding, is—“ Thou shalt surely help him." Now, what is the purport of this commandment? It is this: though thy will of inclination be to "forbear," he being thy enemy, yet thy will of determination shall be to "help him." Again, in 1 Cor. vii. 37, the apostle supposes that a man, in reference to his continuing in a single state, might have such "power over, or concerning his own will,” that he might purpose in his heart to continue in it. And what is the import of this? That though a man may have the will of inclination or desire to the married state, yet, for certain reasons, he might have such a power over that will as to form a will of determination or purpose to the contrary. And is not this difference of willing observable in common life? Are there not a thousand things that an individual may have a desire for, that his will of purpose avoids? man has a will of inclination to sleep late in the morning, but certain considerations produce in him a will of determination to rise. Again, another man's will of inclination rejects medicine, but, alarmed through fear of some fatal disease, his will of determination is for taking the medicine prescribed; nay, though the medicine were to be procured by labour and expense only, yet, averse as he is from labour and expense, still will his love of life prompt him to make the sacrifice. And whence has arisen that difference? Consideration and self-love. Indeed, who is there A that is not conscious that, in innumerable instances, he determines directly the reverse of his desire, and that he has a physical power of doing so. Now, this |