interest, though not the chiefest, in the practical judgment and will of the unsanctified. Whether, you will say, that the same man hath two distinct inconsistent ends; one as regenerate, the other so far as he is still carnal; or whether you will give the name of an end only to that good which hath the greatest interest in him, I will not contend about a word. If that only be called our end, which is prevalently intended in the main course of our lives, then it is God only that is our end: but if that may be called a man's end which is intended in his distempers and deviations, then the creature may be called our end so far as we are still carnal; for it is not only as a wrong-chosen means to our right end, that we sinfully adhere to the creature; but it is more as it stands in competition with our right end, and as we will and love our flesh-pleasing for itself. It is true, the sensual appetite may desire it for itself, because it belongs not to carry us higher, and to intend an end: but the rational power must subordinate both creatures, and our natural delight in them to God. And I do not think that it is by the mere brutish irrational motion that the godly adhere too much to the creature.

I did therefore deliver my thoughts on this point thus: that as the act is denominated from the object, and specified by it, so the grace that is saving must, as to the acts, consist not only in the absolute, but comparative judgment, and in that choice or comparative willing that follows thereupon; and though there be forty intricate, philosophical controversies about man's willing the end and means, which stand in their way that would make the most exact discussion of this point, yet every Christian may safely go on these grounds, and conclude that when Christ's interest is predominant, or greatest in the 'soul, there is saving grace; but where it is not, there is none, though yet he may have some interest there. Here is a double pre-eminence that Christ must have, or a double prevalency of grace, that it may be saving. 1. The object must be preferred before that which stands in competition with it. 2. The act must be prevalent in degree against its contrary, so far as that the heart and life may be denominated from it. 1. The absolute act of the judgment "makes no comparison; therefore in that only the latter must be looked after. Assent to God's word upon his authority, must be prevalent against our dissent; and that will appear in our serious obeying it, &c. 2. In the comparative act of the judgment there must be both. God must be valued and esteemed

above all creatures; and our esteem must be prevalent against our slighting and disesteem of him. 3. The main point of trial is in the will, and there must be both these prevalencies before-mentioned. God must be willed as better than all creatures; and our willing of him must be in a prevalent degree against our nilling or unwilling. For there is in the best on earth some remainders of averseness to God, which may be called a hating of him, so far as they are carnal, though they are not therefore fitly to be called haters of God, but lovers of him ; because they must be denominated from the prevalent part, The like may be said of all the affections, so far as they are of the rational part; for of the sensitive passions there is not so sure a judgment to be made, as I expressed p. 213, and in my 'Method for Peace of Conscience.' In the choice of means all this is clear, if not much more. Christ must be preferred be fore all competitors, and all rejected for him; and our willingness must be in a degree that is prevalent against our unwillingness, and our faith as prevalent against unbelief, and our subjection must prevail against our rebellion, and our obedience against our disobedience in the course of our lives. He must have the main bent of our hearts and endeavours, though in a particular act the flesh may prevail. This is it that I have asserted, and with a consent to this I am satisfied. As for the point of specification of our acts, I never look to see the schools ⚫ agreed about it, how confidently soever Mr. K. talks, as if they all conspired with him. Call the difference gradual or specifical, as you please, so we agree in the sense, I am content. I choose to call it a moral, specifical difference, and in that sense do maintain, that the faith of the best of the unsanctified is not specifically the same with that of the sanctified, and so of love and other graces. As to that saving faith, all other is but analogically called faith, as I have showed in the section before cited against Mr. Blake. But yet I am not of Mr. K.'s opinion about the natural specification of acts, for all his confidence. I yet think that acts are naturally, and not morally, specified from their objects, considered physically; and are morally specified by those objects, as related to the laws that command, forbid, threaten, promise, and so by the laws themselves; which Dr. Twiss will needs say are no species of acts, though vulgarly so called, 'Vind. Grat.' lib. ii. par. 2. digres. 9. p. 410.

I now desire no more of the reader than to consent, 1. To the express words of Scripture which I cited in that chap, 11.

sect. 15, which I desire him to review; 2. And to that which Mr. K. and I are agreed in. I hope you will take this for a reasonable motion, it being unlike that the Cretian pen of so bold a man, so self-conceited, and superciliously scornful, should grant me much more than he needs must. Let us examine his concessions for matter and words. 1. For sense, he confesseth, p. 137, thus: "I am of Mr. Baxter's mind, that no sober divine will tell us, that if we love God never so little without dissembling, yet he will accept it, though we love our lusts before him." So oft he yieldeth that all sincere love to God doth prefer him before all other. Where then is our differ-· ence? Why, he thinks that no others believe or love God at all but those that love him above all. I did affirm, that as to that same moral species of faith and love, they do not at all believe and love God, but as to another species they do, and truly do it. How oft doth Scripture say of the unsanctified, that they believe in Christ, at least for a time? But I shall leave it till I speak to Mr. K. himself, to prove that men unrenewed may have faith and love to Christ, though not saving. And whereas, our Doctor, according to the complexion of his conscience, doth prefer me to succeed Pelagius in his chair, for affirming that a carnal man, by the greatest help of common grace, as I opened my meaning, may have weak inclinations to spiritual and superior good, while he hath stronger to inferior, I would have him to review his sobriety, in making all divines and churches of Christ, since the apostles' days, so far as I am able to discern by my small reading, or by reports, to be Pelagians. I never heard of any that thought so basely of the highest measure of that grace which is not proper to the saints as this man doth. If it no whit lead to God, how is it grace? If this doctor dare warrant his hearers that they shall all be saved that have the least faith, or love, or inclination to God, I dare not imitate him. Except they love him above all, I dare not tell them that they are true disciples. Nor do I think that nature itself is averted from God in the highest degree, nor all the wicked of one degree of sinfulness, nor yet as bad as they shall be in hell. Our divines that tell us how far hypocrites may go, do not talk in the strain of this doctor.

Well, but how far are we yet disagreed even in terms? Why, I said, that it is not a natural, but a moral, specific difference, and so doth he. Page 109, he saith, "But against whom, I pray, do you dispute then? &c. I dare be bold to say there is

not one that affirms a natural or physical difference, as you call it, between acts of common and saving grace in this your sense.' And is not it a pity that this doctor, that is so well agreed with me for sense and terms, should be put to the trouble of so tedious a digression? Forsooth, I did unhappily express myself, because I used not, his term "appretiative," which though I neglected, I think, on sufficient reason, yet, to please him, I will use it when I think on it, and have no better. And so we had best part while we are friends.

TO THE READER.

READER,

I AM SO loth to leave thee under any mistake of my meaning in this point, that I shall yet make some further attempt for the explaining of it. And whereas I understand that some readers say that this nice distinguishing doth but puzzle men; and others still fear not falsely to give out, that I make common grace and special to differ only gradually, and not specifically, in despite of my express asserting of the contrary, I entreat the first sort to tear that leaf out of the book which speaks of this subject, that it may not trouble them; or to be patient while we speak a few words to others that understand that which they are but puzzled with. And I desire the second sort once more to remember, 1. That I still affirm, that common grace and special do differ by a moral specific difference, and not a gradual only. 2. But that this moral specific difference doth materially consist in a physical, gradual difference. 3. And it being a moral subject that we have in hand, our terms must be accordingly used and understood; and therefore it is most proper, when we speak of any unsanctified man, to say, that he is not a believer, he hath no faith, he hath no love to God, &c., because we are supposed to speak only of a true christian saving faith, love, &c. 4. But yet, when it is known that we speak of another faith and love, we may well say that an unsanctified man hath these; and when we inquire of the difference, we must be as exact as possible, in showing wherein it lieth, lest we delude the hypocrite, and trouble the regenerate. That the faith, and love, and sanctity of the ungodly are but equivocally, or analogically, so called, in respect to the faith and love of the saints, I have proved in my Fifth Disputation of Right of Sacraments.

That which I shall now add to make my sense as plain as I can, shall be these following distinctions and propositions.

We must distinguish between, 1. Those gracious acts that are about our end, and those that are about their means. 2. Between God considered generally as God, and considered in his