thereon would go, and be payable in case such purchase or purchases were actually made. The testator died possessed of very large personal property; and after providing for the payment of his debts and funeral expences, and of the legacies and annuities given by his will, the interest of the clear residue of his personal estate in the hands of his executors amounted to many thousand pounds per annum. The bill was filed by the first tenant for life, A., within a year after the death of the testator, against his children the tenants for life in remainder, and against the executors for the purpose of having the question determined, whether he was entitled to the annual interest of the clear residue of the testator's personal estate from the time of his death; or whether the amount of such interest during the first year after the testator's death formed part of the general residue of the testator's personal estate for the benefit of the plaintiff during his life, and of the devisees in remainder after the decease of the plaintiff. The Lord Chancellor, in his judgment, proceeded to say, I take the cases of Sitwell v. Bernard, Entwistle v. Markland, and Stuart v. Bruere', not only not to govern this case, but to be directly the converse of it. In all those cases an accumulation was directed, and the intention was, that the intermediate rents and profits until the purchase was made, should form part of the monies to be laid out; no person was to take any interest until the trusts with respect to the purchase were completed, and those trusts could not be completed until the intermediate profits were laid out. In Sitwell v. Bernard, the question was, what the Court 6 Ves. 528. 1 Cited 6 Ves. 529., and mentioned in a subsequent part of this chapter. was to do, where the testator directed the interest to accumulate and be laid out with the principal; and it was held, that the direction for accumulation should only operate for one year, and that although the personalty remained as personalty, it should at the end of the year be considered as converted; that the beneficial enjoyment should be the same as if the conversion had been made and that decision appears to have been right, nor was it inconsistent with the preceding cases, although the same rule had not been laid down. The principle upon which the Court proceeded in that case was this, that such a conversion must be made as was most for the benefit of all parties, and that by compelling the trustees to proceed with all diligence to get in the personal estate, to arrest mortgages, file bills of foreclosure, and sue upon bonds, the accumulation would in all probability be much less than if more temperate proceedings were taken. The Court therefore in that case, contemplating all the difficulties which belonged to such a trust, cut the knot, and said, that after the end of a year the accumulation should cease, and what was real should be enjoyed as real, and what was personal should be enjoyed as personal. Those cases essentially differ from this, in which the testator directs that when the personal estate shall be collected, not that the interest thereafter to arise shall be laid out with the principal, but shall be enjoyed by the person entitled to the rents and profits: the question then is, whether (as the testator has given the tenant for life an immediate interest in the real estates, and has directed that if in the course of the year an estate shall be bought, the tenant for life shall be entitled to the rents from the time of the purchase, although the year has not elapsed, and has also directed as to the personal estate, that it shall be laid out on mortgage, or in the stocks; a direction which would not compel the trustees if they found money on good security to call it in,) there can be any inconvenience in saying, that the tenant for life is entitled to the interest of the personal estate from the death of the testator. This case is clearly distinguishable from those which direct an accumulation, and therefore, with respect to the interest of so much of the personalty bearing interest, as is not necessary to be applied for the payment of debts or legacies, the tenant for life is entitled to it from the death of the testator. m Nor is there any ground to say, if the fund for conversion be constituted out of residuary personal estate, that consequently the enjoyment of the tenant for life does not commence for a year from the testator's death; for although in the case of Stott v. Hollingworth TM, the Vice-chancellor said, that it was a legal presumption, that until the end of a year the residue cannot be ascertained, and that what is ascertained at the end of the year to be residue shall be capital, to the interest of which the tenant for life of the residue shall be entitled ; yet in the subsequent case of Hewitt v. Morris", where a testator after giving several pecuniary and specific legacies, gave and bequeathed the residue of his estate and effects, upon trust, to turn into money, and invest the same in the funds, or upon securities, the interest to be paid to A. for life, and after his death, the prin cipal to be held upon trust for his children; the Lord Chancellor, having stated the question to be, whether the tenant for life was to have the interest which pro m 3 Madd. 161. n 1 Turn. 241. proceeded from the fund, so far as it was not necessary to be disturbed for the payment of debts and legacies, from the death of the testator; or whether the interest for the first year was to be added to the bulk of the residue, held, that the tenant for life might be entitled to this interest from the testator's death; and it is presumed, that whether this fund, constituted of residuary personal estate, remain always as personalty, or its ultimate disposition be a conversion into realty, the claims of the tenant for life to the interest of it will be founded upon the same principle. It appears then, that in a question between the tenant for life and remainder-man, when by the testator's residuary personal estate, a fund is constituted to be invested in land to be settled to uses in strict settlement, with a general clause of accumulation as to the interest of the personalty, until called in and invested; such clause will be restricted in its operation to a year from the testator's death, from which period the tenant for life will be entitled to the interest of the fund until converted into realty, when he will receive the rents and profits. That if there be no such clause of accumulation inserted, there is no reason why the residuary estate, if clear, and there is no inconvenience in doing it, may not be handed over by the executors, and the interest of the tenant for life commence immediately. It may not be improper here to add, that the residuary personal property may be of so fluctuating a nature, that a considerable increase of it may occur in the period between the testator's death, and the earliest and most convenient time of conversion, a question then may arise, whether the tenant for life is entitled to any benefit from this increase; whether, in fact, his interest is to take its date from the death of the testator or from the time of the conversion. In the case of Gibson v. Bott, a testator gave all the rest, residue, and remainder of his goods, &c. to his executors upon trust, that they should, as soon as conveniently might be after his decease, sell all such parts thereof as should not consist of money, and should place out the sums arising from such sale at interest, and stand possessed of the money so invested upon trust, as to one moiety, to pay the interest to J. D. for life, and after her decease to dispose of the stock amongst her children equally; and a similar trust was declared as to the other moiety. Between the testator's death and the sale a considerable increase had taken place in the testator's property, chiefly consisting of farming stock, and the question was, to what interest in the increased produce, during the period above mentioned, the tenants for life were entitled? And the Lord Chancellor, after observing that when a testator gives interest of a fund, to be created by a sale as soon as conveniently could be, he meant only the interest from the time the property could be conveniently sold, decreed that the persons entitled for life should have the interest from the time of the sale, as it had taken place in a reasonable time. It is submitted, that, upon the same principle, if the testator had directed the fund constituted by the produce of the sale of his effects to be laid out in real estate, and settled to uses, in a question between the tenant for life and the executor, the tenant for life would likewise be entitled to the interest of the produce arising from the increase in the period between the tes • 7 Ves, 89. |