be, that they (the trustees) should, as soon as conveniently might be after the testatrix's decease, sell the same, and out of the money arising thereby, and the rents and profits accruing before such sale, pay and discharge certain incumbrances, and place out the remainder of all such profits of the said premises until such sale on government securities, and pay the interest and dividends of such government securities unto the plaintiff for life, and after his decease to his son or sons, if more than one, equally for life; and after the decease of the son or sons to transfer the securities as therein mentioned. After the death of the testatrix, the plaintiff, who was her heir at law, by his bill insisted that he was entitled to receive the rents and profits of the real estates, and the dividends of the money in the funds from a reasonable time after her decease, and that they ought not to be considered as principal to be laid out upon the trusts of the will until all the estates were sold. By the decree the sales were ordered to be made, and the money to be laid out according to the will; and the title of the plaintiff to the interest of the fund was declared to be constituted by the decree. The sales having been delayed, the plaintiff presented a petition to the Chancellor, insisting that, under the circumstances, the general intention being, that he should have the beneficial interest of the fund for his life, he ought not to be delayed in the perception of that benefit by the non-execution of the trusts; and that the rents and profits of the real estate ought not to go to the capital, nor the sales to be delayed, when that intention was clear: but Lord Loughborough held, that the petitioner was entitled to receive the rents and profits, making the necessary abatements for debts, &c. from the period of the first decree, and

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not from the period of one year after the death of the testatrix. Lord Eldon, however, adverting to the principle upon which this period was fixed, said, that although it happened that the difference in time was not much, yet the difference in principle was very material; for Lord Loughborough, by his order, made upon the petition and a report of the state of the funds, notwithstanding the language of the decree was that the rents and profits until the sale, and the interest and dividends of the stock until converted into money, should go to form one fund, the interest of which the plaintiff was to take, considered the sales as made, in the view of the Court, by the decree which ordered them to be made, and, taking care to reserve a sufficient fund for debts and legacies, gave him the rents and profits and the interest of the fund unconverted from that period; which, in point of fact, was supposing that there was a principle in the justice of the Court requiring him to consider that as done, when it was ordered to be done; that is, from the date of the decree when procured; differing from Lord Thurlow, who considered it as ordered to be done from the death of the testator. But it is not the right rule to say, that when a decree is obtained, directing a trustee to do some act, the time is that of the decree; for the language of the decree is no more than the language of the will: the Court orders it to be done only because the testator ordered it to be done; and can never intend that the decree, because the money was not laid out in convenient time, is to give date to the enjoyment of the property, as if it had been laid out in convenient time; since if the trustees have not done what they ought, the Court orders it without prejudice to the interest of the persons entitled, as if it had been done.

In this case there were words pointing to an accumulation, although, indeed, altogether so ambiguous as to leave it extremely doubtful whether the intention was to postpone the enjoyment of the tenant for life, or to encrease for the benefit of the remainder-man, that fund, of which, at some time or other, the tenant for life was to have the enjoyment. It appears that Lord Eldon's opinion was, that Lord Loughborough gave the interest prior to the end of the year, because, probably, he saw in the report that he could have provided for the interest of the debts and legacies at the time of the decree.

Hence it is clear that no general principle meeting with the approbation of the present times could be deduced from this case, to regulate the decisions in similar instances: but, whether it be personalty directed to be converted into realty, or realty into personalty, with a general clause of accumulation, in the one instance, of the rents and profits, in the other of the dividends, until the conversion had been duly effected; as well the interests of the tenant for life and remainder-man are alike consulted, and the intention of the testator promoted, by confining the operation of the accumulation clause to the period of one year from the death of the

testator.

It is therefore submitted, that in the conversion by will of realty into personalty :

1stly, That, generally, this conversion must be considered to take effect from the death of the testator.

2ndly, That a conversion to be effected "with all convenient speed," will likewise be considered as effected from the testator's death; nor will words of absolute power to the trustees to convert at their discretion enable them to delay a sale of the testator's real estate to an unreasonable period.

3rdly, That the enjoyment of the interest under this conversion may be deferred by the intention of the testator when clearly expressed; when the postponement is not for an indefinite period.

4thly, That a general accumulation clause of the rents and profits until sale, will, in a question between the tenant for life and remainder-man, most probably be restricted to one year from the testator's death.

5thly, That unless such accumulation clause be added, there will be no reason why the tenant for life of the interest of the fund to arise from such conversion should not enjoy the rents and profits until sale.

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OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A CONVERSION OF PERSONALTY INTO REALTY. EFFECT OF THE STATUTE OF MORTMAIN ΟΝ ΜΟΝΕΥ DIRECTED TO BE LAID OUT IN LAND. - SUBSTITUTION OF

LAND FOR MONEY COVENANTED TO BE INVESTED, &c.

FROM the period at which the conversion of property may be considered to have been effected, we are naturally led to the consideration of its consequences.

We have said that equity considers real estate, or personal, as that species of property into which it is directed to be converted; and as it is the course of succession and the law of descent which are the true characteristics of, and constitute the proper difference between, real estate and personal, so we shall endeavour to ascertain, by these incontestible proofs, the transubstantiation which, in the eye of equity, the property has undergone. It will, then, be apparent from an inspection of the cases, that money will as strictly adhere to the principles of real estate in all its various devolutions and complex limitations, as land will to the laws by which personal estate is regulated.

In the present chapter we shall exclusively consider the effects of a conversion of personalty into realty; as, when once money is impressed with the character of realty, it will be chargeable, transmissible, and descendible as such, until that impression has been duly removed; the means of doing which will be discussed in the concluding chapter.