PROP. VI. GOD is a Spiritual or Immaterial Being. SINCE GOD is the caufe of all things, as appears from the foregoing propofitions, he must be the caufe of all the motions in the material world. If therefore God be not an immaterial being, then matter may be the cause of all the motions in the material world. But matter is a mere paffive thing, of whofe very effence it is, to be endued with a vis inertia; for this vis inertia prefents itself immediately in all our obfervations and experiments upon it, and is infeparable from it even in idea. When we confider any of the active powers of matter, as they are called, fuch as gravitation, magnetifm, electricity, or the attractions and repulfions, which take place in the cohefions and feparations of the fmall particles of natural bodies, and endeavour to refolve thefe into fome higher and fimpler principles, the vis inertia is always the common bafis upon which we endeavour to erect our folutions. For the active party, which is fuppofed to generate the gravitation, magnetifm, &c. in the paffive one, must have a motion, and a vis inertia, whereby it endeavours to perfist in that motion, elfe it could have no power; and, by parity of reafon, the paffive party must have a vis inertia alfo, elfe it could neither make refiftance to the active party, nor imprefs motion on foreign bodies. Let us proceed therefore as far as we please in a series of fucceffive folutions, we fhall always find a vis inertiæ inherent in matter, and a motion derived to it from fome foreign caufe. If this caufe be fuppofed matter always, we shall be carried on to an infinite feries of folutions, in each of which the fame precife diffi culty will recur, without our at all approaching to the removal of it. Whence, according to the mathematical doctrine of ultimate ratios, not even an infi-: nite feries, were that poffible in this cafe, could remove it. We must therefore stop somewhere, and fuppofe the requifite motion to be imparted to the fubtle matter, by fomething, which is not matter; i. e. fince GOD is the ultimate author of all motion, we must suppose him to be immaterial. The fame thing may be inferred thus: if there be nothing but matter in the world, then the motions and modifications of matter must be the cause of intelligence. But even finite intelligences, fuch as that of man, for instance, fhew fo much fkill and design in their conftitution, as alfo to fhew, that their caufes, i. e. the appropriated motions and modifications of matter, must be appointed and conducted by a prior and superior intelligence. The infinite intelligence of GOD therefore, proved in the third propofition, fince it refults from the motions and modifications of matter, requires another infinite intelligence to direct thefe motions, which is abfurd. God is therefore proved to be immaterial from his infinite intelligence. It is true, indeed, that our fenfes convey nothing to us but impreffions from matter; and, therefore, that we can have no exprefs original ideas of any things, befides material ones; whence we are led to conclude, that there is nothing but matter in the univerfe. However, this is evidently a prejudice drawn from our fituation, and an argument taken merely from our ignorance, and the narrowness of our faculties. Since therefore, on the other hand, mere matter appears quite unable to account for the fimpleft and moft ordinary phænomena, we must either fuppofe an immaterial fubstance, or else fuppofe that matter has fome powers and properties different and fuperior to thofe which appear. But this last supposition is the fame in effect as the first, though, on account of the imperfection of language, it seems to be different. At the fame time it ought to be observed, that if a perfon acknowledges the infinite power, knowledge, and goodness of GOD, the proofs of which are prior to, and quite independent on, that of his immateriality, this perfon acknowledges all that is of practical importance. But then, on the other hand, it is also to be observed, that the opinion of the materiality of the divine nature has a tendency to leffen our reverence for it, and, confequently, to invalidate the proofs of the divine power, knowledge, and goodness. How far the fcriptures deliver the immateriality of God in a strict philofophical fenfe, may perhaps be doubted, as their ftyle is in general popular. However, there is a ftrong prefumption, that they teach this doctrine, fince the popular sense and natural interpretation of many fublime paffages concerning the divine nature infer its immateriality. There is therefore fome evidence for this attribute, to be taken from revelation, confidered as ftanding upon its own diftinct proofs. COROLLARY. Since GOD is immaterial, matter must be one of the works of his infinite power. In the mean time, this does not feem to me to exclude the poffibility of its having exifted from all eternity. But then, neither have we, on the other hand, any reafon to conclude, that the whole material fyftem, or any part of it, could not have been created in time. It is, perhaps, most probable, i. e. fuitable to the divine attributes, that infinite material worlds have existed from all eternity. But it becomes us, in all these things, to diftruft our own reafonings and conjectures to the utmost. PROP. VII. GOD is an Eternal and Omniprefent Being. GOD's eternity, à parte ante, appears from the fecond propofition, in which his independency is proved; and the eternity, à parte post, is infeparably connected with that à parte ante. Both are also included in the idea of infinite power, or of infinite knowledge; and, indeed, when we fay, that GOD is eternal à parte ante, and à parte poft, we do, we can, mean no more, than to tay, that his power and knowledge extend to all times. For we muft not conceive or affirm, that he exifts in fucceffion, as finite beings do; through whofe imaginations, or intellects, trains of ideas pafs. All time, as was faid before, is equally present to him, though in a manner of which we cannot form the least conception. In like manner, by GoD's omniprefence, or ubiquity, we must be understood to mean, that his power and knowledge extend to all places. For as time, and its exponent, the fucceffion of ideas, is a thing that relates merely to finite beings; fo space and place relate, in their original fenfe, to material ones only; nor can we perceive any relation that they bear to immaterial ones, unless as far as we feign a resemblance between material and immaterial beings, which is furely an inconfiftent fiction. We cannot, therefore, discover any relation which space or place bear to the divine existence. It is a fufficient acknowledgment both of GOD's eternity and omniprefence, that we believe his power and knowledge to extend to all times and places, though we be entirely at a lofs how to conceive or exprefs the manner of this infinite extent of thefe attributes. And there is a remarkable agreement between innumerable paffages of the fcriptures, and this practical notion of GOD's eternity and omniprefence. PROP. VIII. GOD is an Immutable Being. THIS follows from the infinity of the divine power, knowledge, and goodness, i. e. from his infinite perfection. For if the divine nature admitted of any variation, it would alfo admit of different kinds and degrees of perfection, and therefore could not always be infinitely perfect. This is the most abstracted and philofophical way of confidering the divine immutability. In a popular and practical fense, it excludes all that which we call inconfiftent, arbitrary, and capricious, in finite beings; and becomes a fure foundation for hope, truft, and refignation. We may confider ourselves as being at all times, and in all places, equally under the direction and protection of the fame infinite power, knowledge, and goodness, which are fo confpicuous in the frame of the vifible world. PROP. IX. GOD is a Free Being. THE authors who have treated upon the divine nature and attributes, ufually afcribe liberty or freedom to God, and suppose it to be of a nature anaiogous to that free-will which they afcribe to man. But it appears to me, that neither the philofophical |