By FREEDOM's ray! Oh FREEDOм hither come, He taught the world to know, "THE RIGHTS OF MAN." The ready champion for the general good; Mild, though undaunted; firm, but not severe; Prone to detect the sycophantic slave, In judgment, lenient; and though cautious, brave; That gave to FREEDOM's rule COLUMBIA's land. Inspire my song, which fain would laud thy friend; The thoughts of thee his generous bosom fired, "THE AGE OF REASON" burst upon mankind. Whom thee, or true Religion never knew; To worldly views, nor yield one thought to Heaven; Affright the feeble, and mislead the blind, This day EQUALITY we give to thee, This was the natal day of him who sleeps, But, hark! whence those sounds on our silence now breaking, The homage of nations, is paying to THEE, Shall hail THEE! who dared COMMON SENSE to maintain, REFLECTIONS MORAL AND POLITICAL. Or suppose a dispute to arise between a party whose land adjoins the society's, and that society; and such difference might be adjusted by the society giving up or paying a trifle; but the six being rich, haughty, and consequential, would rather contest the point, at the risk of losing one of their shares, than to seem to submit to any other party, whose rank and power they did not consider equal to their own; for if they were to acknowledge their error, or to give way in the least, it then might appear that their consequence and pride were lessened. This arbitrary disposition, which is always produced by pride, might cause the society an expence of some hundreds of pounds, and then, if they were to compel each person (not the shares mind) to pay an equal share of the loss it would be but triflingly felt by the six who are rich, but the nineteen who are poor would feel it severely. Now, if the six had retained only one votę each, instead of twenty-one votes, then the other nineteen would have been a check on that arbitrary feeling which pride and riches always produce. And all would have an equal interest in the society in proportion to their shares; for if one gained a profit of five pounds by his share, he who held four would gain twenty; and an equal right in making the laws would also tend to check arbitrary and haughty members from creating disputes and contentions in the society. Just the same will it be with a nation when its members are to have a power in making the laws in proportion to their property. And this is precisely the case with the English system of govern ment. For that class of men who have the greatest share in the wealth of the country consists of men called Peers of the Realm, and they constitute what is called the House of Lords. Their number is about three hundred and seventy-five, and they have a power equal to that of about twenty-two millions of persons. These twenty-two millions are supposed to be represented in what is called the Commons' House, which is intended to act as a check on the Lords, so that neither the one nor the other can make a law without both consent to it. Here, then, we see that because these three hundred and seventy-five individuals have immense property, or possess half the land in the country, they pretend to, have as much interest and anxiety for the welfare of it, and claim as much right to an equal power in making the laws for it, as the twenty-two millions! But this is not the extent of the evil in this system of government; it not only gives the Lords a power equal to the Commons, but it also gives them the right of nominating the majority of the members in the House of Commons. About one hundred and forty-four of them do actually nominate three hundred members: one hundred and eighty-seven more members forming a majority, are nominated by government and one hundred and twenty-three rich individuals; consequently, the three hundred and seventyfive peers have the whole power, without any check whatever, to make such laws and to form such a government as they themselves may think necessary and proper. Now, if these individuals have the same interest, advantage, and disadvantage, in all the laws which they do or might make in proportion to their shares or property in the country, then the danger would not be so great, or perhaps there might not be any; but if we find their interest is diametrically opposite to that of the twenty-two millions, what else can be expected but disaffection, disorder, confusion, and misery? We will suppose that these lordly legislators should have a desire to enlarge the territory of the nation of which they are the rulers, on a supposition that it might be an advantage to the nation and to themselves, and if it were not, at least it would be sure to add to their power and profit, which would be a sufficient stimulus to them to make the attempt; for the desire of power is so common, that we see when men have a little they want more, and when they have a great deal they want a great deal more; in what way is the territory of this nation to be enlarged except by taking from some other, either by a mutual agreement between the two, or by force? If by the former, it is right; if the latter, wrong. But whenever we find rich men who thirst after increased riches and power, we also find in them ambition, which, when directed to improper objects, is one of the principal causes of all the evils that exist in society. Therefore, if none but the rich are the rulers, and in them lurks that deadly ambition which may lead them to make a claim where they have no right, they will then endeavour to establish that right by force, and this will produce contention and war, misery and bloodshed. To carry on this contention or warfare which ambition has created, would probably require the lives of many of the people; at all events, it would require money of all, for continuing and defraying the expences of the contest. And if these ambitious rulers make a law and decide who are to pay these expences, and in what proportion each shall contribute towards them; if they should charge them on persons, instead of property, by levying taxes on the common necessaries of life, that the poor must pay the same proportion as the rich; and if such expences as are collected in the name of taxes should go on increasing until the poor are deprived of nearly all the necessaries of life, and then become the slaves to the rich; and that those of little property, and those in the middle ranks of society, should be fast falling into a state of wretchedness and slavery; and become the mere creatures and property of the rich; will not ambition have obtained its object one way, if force could not obtain it the other? Or, to put the matter in another point of view, if the circulating capital, or the money in the country, whether it be gold, silver, or copper, or all of them, be only just a sufficiency for its intended purpose, and this contention or warfare should require a large proportion of it to be expended in other nations; then the prices of the produce of the country would be reduced in proportion to the quantity of money in circulation. Money being an article in trade for barter, the same as every other production of the earth, it would always produce a larger quantity of the necessaries or luxuries of life, in proportion to its scarcity; and then, the consequence would be that if the rich created and persevered in such contentions and wars, it would in proportion to the expence, or in proportion to the quantity of money drawn out of the country, lower the value of their lands and riches, which would be a sure check to their ambition. But when we see the contrary is the fact, that instead of war being any way oppressive on the rich, by reducing the value of their lands or property in proportion to the expence it incurs, it increases the value, it heaps wealth upon wealth on the rich, and want upon want on the poor; that the rich have a great interest in promoting it, and the poor have none; that the one it enriches, the other it enslaves; while we see this to be the effect of war, can we wonder that we should have seen and heard of the long continuance of it, and of the desire which ambitious rulers and rich men have always had to create contention and warfare? War must necessarily cause the nation to expend a sum of money to defray its expences. The sum required for the purpose would be in proportion to the power it has to contend with, and the duration of the war. And if all persons were compelled to subscribe to the expences in proportion to their property or riches, all would then equally bear the burthen, and all would be anxious to prevent war and restore peace. But if war creates a market for money, or a system of trafficking in money, and rich men having money in their coffers to lend, there being no other constant market for hire, their interest would then be to promote war, that they may lend on interest their unemployed money. Although money may at all times be kept in circulation in a nation by bartering for houses, lands, articles of .consumption, or manufactured goods, yet, if the markets were glutted with these things of barter, the value of them would be lowered, and instead of a certainty of gaining an interest for the money so laid out or employed, it would be a speculation whether they would gain or not. Therefore, if monied men are the rulers of a nation, they will be very desirous of creating a money market, where some profit is always certain. To establish a market for trading in money, or a market for lending of it, there must first be a scarcity of the article; the quantity must be reduced before people will go to market to hire it on interest. Various are the ways of doing this. Suppose, for instance, the metal currency of a country were twenty millions, and only sixteen millions of it were wanted to be in circulation, the remaining four millions, being a superabundance or a surplus which is not required for immediate use, would be kept in store in case of necessity. It would rest in the coffers of those who were rich or who had more than their use required. Now, if the monied men are the rulers of a nation, is it not very probable that they will have a wish that some national expences might be incurred which would require the use of these four millions? And would not they be glad to lend to the nation at an interest? For, whether the expences are occasioned by war or any thing else, is of no matter to those whose only object is their own gain. If the will of a nation were its power, would it ever be so absurd as to borrow four millions of money when it had four millions in store? for by collecting, in the name of taxes, four millions from the sixteen which is in circulation, money would become scarce, and the four millions laid up in store would become valuable and in request, and then it would be brought into circulation. But by creating a great national expenditure, one that will require twelve millions of money, and that to be suddenly drawn out of its regular circulation, the depression it would leave on trade would be so quick and sudden, that at first sight it would seem better to borrow that sum for the nation; because, the nation could better afford to pay the interest than to realize the capital. Yet, when we consider that although the money which is |