the first hearing of this question, knows very well which fide of it he ought to close with. But however right we are in theory, it is plain, that in practice we adhere to the wrong fide of the queftion. We make provifions for this life as though it were never to have an end, and for the other life as though it were never to have a beginning.

Should a spirit of superior rank, who is a stranger to human nature, accidentally alight upon the earth, and take a furvey of its inhabitants; what would his notions of us be? Would not he think that we are a species of beings made for quite different ends and purposes than what we really are? Must not he imagine that we were placed in this world to get riches and honors? Would not he

think that it was our duty to toil after wealth, and station, and title? Nay, would not he believe we were forbidden poverty by threats of eternal punishment, and enjoined to pursue our pleasures under pain of damnation? He would certainly imagine that we were influenced by a scheme of duties quite oppofite to thofe which are indeed prescribed to us. And truly, according to fuch an imagination, he muft conclude that we are a fpecies of the most obedient creatures in the universe; that we are conftant to our duty; and that we keep a steady eye on the end for which we were fent hither.

But how great would be his aftonishment, when he learned that we were beings not defigned to exist in this world above threescore and ten years? and that the greatest part of this busy species fall fhort

even of that age? How would he be loft in horror and admiration, when he fhould know that this fet of creatures, who lay out all their endeavours for this life, which fcarce deferves the name of existence; when, I fay, he fhould know that this fet of creatures are to exift to all eternity in another life, for which they make no preparations? Nothing can be a greater disgrace to reason, than that men, who are perfuaded of these two different ftates of being, fhould be perpetually employed in providing for a life of threescore and ten years, and neglecting to make provision for that, which after many myriads of years will be ftill new, and ftill beginning; especially when we confider that our endeavours for making ourselves great, or rich, or honorable, or whatever elfe we place our happiness in, may after all prove unsuccessful; whereas, if we conftantly and fincerely endeavour to make ourselves happy in the other life, we are sure that our endeavours will fucceed, and that we fhall not be disappointed of our hope.

The following question is started by one of the schoolmen. Suppofing the whole body of the earth were a great ball or mass of the fineft fand, and that a fingle grain or particle of this fand should be annihilated every thousand years. Suppofing then that you had it in your choice to be happy all the while this prodigious mafs of fand was confuming by this flow method till there was not a grain of it left, on condition you were to be miferable for ever after; or supposing that you might be happy for ever after, on condition you would be miferable

till

till the whole mafs of fand were thus annihilated at the rate of one fand in a thousand years: Which of these two cafes would you make your choice?

It must be confeffed in this cafe, fo many thoufands of years are to the imagination as a kind of eternity, though in reality they do not bear fo great a proportion to that duration which is to follow them, as an unit does to the greatest number which you can put together in figures, or as one of those fands to the supposed heap. Reafon therefore tells us, without any manner of hefitation, which would be the better part in this choice. However, as I have before intimated our reason might in fuch case be so overfet by the imagination, as to difpofe fome perfons to fink under the confideration of the great length of the firft part of this duration, and of the great distance

of that fecond duration which is to fucceed it. The mind, I fay, might give itself up to that happiness which is at hand, confidering that it is fo very near, and that it would laft fo very long. But when the choice we actually have before us, is this, Whether we will chufe to be happy for the space only of threescore and ten, nay, perhaps of only twenty or ten years, I might say of only a day or an hour, and miserable to all eternity: or, on the contrary, miferable for this fhort term of years, and happy for a whole eternity: What words are fufficient to express that folly and want of confideration, which in fuch a cafe makes a wrong choice? I here put the cafe even at the worst, by suppofing, what seldom happens, that a courfe of vir

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tue makes us miserable in this life: But if we suppose, as it generally happens, that virtue would make us more happy even in this life, than a contrary course of vice; how can we fufficiently admire the stupidity or madness of those persons who are capable of making fo abfurd a choice?

Every wife man therefore will confider this life only as it may conduce to the happiness of the other, and cheerfully facrifice the pleasures of a few years to those of an eternity.

IF the universe be the creature of an intelligent mind, this mind could have no immediate regard to himself in producing it. He needed not to make trial of his omnipotence, to be informed what effects were within its reach: The world, as exifting in his eternal idea, was then as beautiful as now it is drawn forth into being; and in the immense abyss of his effence are contained far brighter scenes than will be ever fet forth to view; it being impoffible that the great author of nature should bound his own power by giving existence to a system of creatures fo perfect, that he cannot improve upon it by any other exertions of his almighty will. Between finite and infinite there is an unmeasured interval, not to be filled up in endless ages; for which reason the most excellent of all God's works must. be equally fhort of what his power is able to produce as the moft imperfect, and may be exceeded

with the fame ease.

This thought hath made fome imagine, (what, it must be confeffed, is not impoffible,) that the unfathomed space is ever teeming with new births,

the younger ftill inheriting a greater perfection than the elder. But as this doth not fall within my prefent view, I fhall content myself with taking notice, that the confideration now mentioned proves undeniably, that the ideal worlds in the divine understanding yield a profpect incomparably more ample, various and delightful than any created world can do: And that therefore, as it is not to be supposed that God fhould make a world merely of inanimate matter, however diverfified; or inhabited only by creatures of no higher an order than brutes; fo the end for which he defigned his reasonable offspring, is the contemplation of his works, the enjoyment of himself, and in both to be happy, having, to this purpose, endued them with correspondent faculties and defires. He can have no greater pleasure from a bare review of his works, than from the furvey of his own ideas; but we may be affured that he is well pleafed in the fatisfaction derived to beings capable of it, and for whofe entertainment he hath erected this immenfe theatre. Is not this more than an intimation of our immortality? Man, who when confidered as on his probation for a happy existence hereafter, is the most remarkable inftance of divine wisdom; if we cut him off from all relation to eternity, is the most wonderful and unaccountable compofition in the whole creation. He hath capacities to lodge a much greater variety of knowledge than he will be ever mafter of, and an unfatisfied curiofity to tread the fecret paths of nature and providence; but, with this, his organs, in their prefent ftruc