NUMB. 29. TUESDAY, June 26, 1750. Prudens futuri temporis exitum Ridetque fi mortalis ultra Fas trepidet- But God has wifely hid from human fight The dark decrees of future fate, And fown their feeds in depth of night; He laughs at all the giddy turns of ftate, Honi When mortals fearch too foon, and fear too late. DRYDEN. HERE is nothing recommended with greater frequency among the gayer poets of antiquity, than the fecure poffeffion of the present hour, and the difmiffion of all the cares which intrude upon our quiet, or hinder, by importunate perturbations, the enjoyment of thofe delights which our condition happens to set before us. The ancient poets are, indeed, by no means unexceptionable teachers of morality; their precepts are to be always confidered as the fallies of a genius, intent rather upon giving pleasure than instruction, eager to take every advantage of infinuation, and provided the paffions can be engaged on its fide, very little folicitous about the fuffrage of reason. The darknefs and uncertainty through which the heathens were compelled to wander in the purfuit of happiness, may, indeed, be alleged as an excufe for many of their feducing invitations to immediate enjoyment, which the moderns, by whom they have been imitated, have not to plead. It is no wonder that such as had no promise of another state should eagerly turn their thoughts upon the improvement of that which was before I. 4 them; them; but surely those who are acquainted with the hopes and fears of eternity, might think it neceffary to put fome restraint upon their imagination, and reflect that by echoing the fongs of the ancient bacchanals, and tranfmitting the maxims of paft debauchery, they not only prove that they want invention, but virtue, and submit to the fervility of imitation only to copy that of which the writer, if he was to live now, would often be ashamed. Yet as the errors and follies of a great genius are feldom without fome radiations of understanding, by which meaner minds may be enlightened, the incitements to pleasure are, in those authors, generally mingled with fuch reflections upon life, as well deserve to be confidered distinctly from the purposes for which they are produced, and to be treasured up as the settled conclufions of extensive obfervation, acute fagacity, and mature experience. It is not without true judgment that on these occafions they often warn their readers against enquiries into futurity, and folicitude about events which lie hid in caufes yet unactive, and which time has not brought forward into the view of reafon. An idle and thoughtless refignation to chance, without any struggle against calamity, or endeavour after advantage, is indeed below the dignity of a reasonable being, in whofe power providence has put a great part even of his present happiness; but it shews an equal ignorance of our proper fphere, to harrass our thoughts with conjectures about things not yet in being. How can we regulate events, of which we yet know not whether they will ever happen? And why should we think, with painful anxiety, about that on which our thoughts can have no influence? It is a maxim commonly received, that a wise man is never surprised; and, perhaps, this exemption from aftonishment may be imagined to proceed from fuch a prospect into futurity, as gave previous intimation of thofe evils which often fall unexpected upon others that have less forefight. But the truth is, that things to come, except when they approach very nearly, are equally hidden from men of all degrees of understanding; and if a wife man is not amazed at fudden occurrences, it is not that he has thought more, but lefs upon futurity. He never confidered things not yet exifting as the proper objects of his attention; he never indulged dreams till he was deceived by their phantoms, nor ever realized non-entities to this mind. He is not furprised because he is not disappointed, and he efcapes difappointment be-caufe he never forms any expectations.. The concern about things to come, that is fo juftly cenfured, is not the refult of those general reflections on the variableness of fortune, the uncertainty of life, and the univerfal infecurity of all human acquifitions, which must always be fuggested by the view of the world; but fuch a desponding anticipation of misfortune, as fixes the mind G upon scenes of gloom and melancholy, and makesfear predominate in every imagination.. Anxiety of this kind is nearly of the fame nature with jealoufy in love, and fufpicion in the general commerce of life; a temper which keeps the man always in alarms, difpofes him to judge of every thing in a manner that least favours his own quiet, fills him with perpetual ftratagems of counteraction, wears him out in schemes to ob→ viate evils which never threatened him, and at length I s length, perhaps, contributes to the production of those mischiefs of which it had raised fuch dreadful apprehenfions. It has been usual in all ages for moralists to reprefs the fwellings of vain hope by representations of the innumerable cafualties to which life is fubject, and by instances of the unexpected defeat of the wifeft schemes of policy, and fudden fubverfions of the highest eminences of greatness. It has, perhaps, not been equally observed, that all these examples afford the proper antidote to fear as well as to hope, and may be applied with no less efficacy as confolations to the timorous, than as restraints to the proud. Evil is uncertain in the fame degree as good, and for the reason that we ought not to hope too - fecurely, we ought not to fear with too much dejection. The ftate of the world is continually changing, and none can tell the result of the next viciffitude. Whatever is afloat in the ftream of time, may, when it is very near us, be driven away by an accidental blaft, which shall happen to crofs the general courfe of the current. The fudden accidents by which the powerful are depreffed, may fall upon those whofe malice we fear; and the greatness by, which we expect to be overborn, may become another proof of the falfe flatteries of fortune. Our enemies may become weak, or we grow ftrong before our encounter, or we may advance against each other without ever meeting. There are, indeed, natural evils which we can flatter ourselves with no hopes of efcaping, and with little of delaying; but of the ills which are apprehended from human malignity, or the oppoftion of rival interefts, we may always alleviate the the terror by confidering that our perfecutors are weak and ignorant, and mortal like ourselves. The misfortunes which arife from the concurrence of unhappy incidents should never be fuffered to disturb us before they happen; because, if the breast be once laid open to the dread of mere poffibilities of mifery, life must be given a prey to difmal folicitude, and quiet must be loft for ever. It is remarked by old Cornaro, that it is absurd to be afraid of the natural diffolution of the body; because it must certainly happen, and can, by no caution or artifice, be avoided. Whether this fentiment be entirely juft, I fhall not examine; but certainly, if it be improper to fear events which must happen, it is yet more evidently contrary to right reason to fear thofe which may never happen, and which, if they should come upon us, we cannot resist. As we ought not to give way to fear any more than indulgence to hope, because the objects both of fear and hope are yet uncertain, fo we ought not to trust the representations of one more than of the other, because they are both equally fallacious; as hope enlarges happiness, fear aggravates calamity. It is generally allowed, that no man ever found the happiness of poffeffion proportionate to that expectation which incited his defire, and invigorated his purfuit; nor has any man found. the evils of life fo formidable in reality, as they were described to him by his own imagination; every fpecies of diftrefs brings with it fome peculiar fupports, fome unforeseen means of refifting, or power of enduring. Taylor juftly blames fome pious perfons, who indulge their fancies too much, fet themselves, by the force of imagination, in the |