description (898), was held to be a Compact by which each citizen covenants with the whole people, and the whole people with each citizen; and those who had adhered to their Covenants were still entitled to all the benefit of the Compact.

903. This view of the Constitution of each Country, as a Compact among the citizens, by no means tends to diminish the reverence and affection towards it, which we have stated to be one of the Duties of a citizen (329). Even a common Contract is, to a moral man, an object of most careful fidelity and respect; and to a religious man, an object of religious reverence; it is sacred. But the Social Contract is not a common Contract. It is a Fundamental Contract, by which all the Rights of men are defined and secured, all the most important and dearest social relations protected. It is a Contract with the whole body of our Community, dictated by the universal voice, devised or assented to by all the wisest and best of our Countrymen. Whether it be the result of the wisdom of man, or of the wisdom of ages, that is, of the good guidance of Providence, it has made our Country, and all that we value in it, what they are. Whatever were its origin therefore, the Constitution of our Country is a worthy object of our fidelity, reverence, and affection.

904. This also is recognized in the States of North America. Thus the Constitution of Rhode Island says: "In the words of the Father of his Country (Washington), we declare that the basis of our political Systems is the Right of the People to make and alter their Constitutions of Government : but that the Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole People, is sacredly obligatory upon all." And in accordance with this feeling, the Members of the General Legislatures, and of the respective State

Legislatures, and all Executive and Judicial Officers, swear to support the Constitution of the United States, and also the Constitution of their respective States. With what reverence and love the Consti tution of England has been looked upon by Englishmen, in general, it is not necessary to say.

905. Thus, the description of the Constitution of the Country as its Social Contract, serves to express the Doctrine that all Members of the State have mutual obligations which they may incur heavy pe nalties by violating. It expresses this in such a manner as to conciliate the good-will and assent, both of the Lovers of Order and of the Lovers of Freedom; and without any tendency to diminish the reverence and affection with which the Constitution is regarded.

Before we quit this subject, it may be proper to notice some of the objections which are sometimes urged against the Doctrine of the Social Contract.

CHAPTER VI.

OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED.

906. It is proper to consider the arguments which Paley has urged against the Doctrine of the Social Contract in his Moral and Political Philosophy, both on account of the currency and authority which that work possesses; and also, in order that we may thereby further explain the effect of the Doctrine : and may compare it with the Doctrine which he propounds as fit to supersede it, namely, the Doctrine that the foundation of Government, and of the Duty of Obedience to it, is Expediency.

907. Paley's principal arguments against the

Doctrine of an original Compact are: that such a Compact is not a Fact; and that if not a Fact, it is nothing: that if it were a Fact, yet that the Compact, as it affects the generations after the origin, can be of no force, because the subjects of States in our generation are not conscious of such a Compact, and have had no liberty of assent or refusal with regard to it.

908. To the first objection, we reply, that even if the Original Compact of Society be not a Fact, it by no means follows that the conception of such a Compact, as the Result of Facts, and the Source of Duties, is of no value. There are several such conceptions which, though not historical facts, are appealed to by moral and political writers, as valuable moral realities. When we say that the Governors are Trustees for the benefit of the Governed, or that all Property is a Trust for the benefit of the Community, it might in like manner be objected, that no Deed of Trust was ever executed in such cases, and that Kings reigned, and Proprietors held their possessions, before any such views were taken of their tenure. But still, the doctrine that Sovereignty and Property are Trusts, is held by Moralists to be highly important; and is the source of Moral Maxims which cannot be so distinctly conceived, or so clearly expressed, in any other way. And in like manner, the Doctrine that men are held together in Society by a Compact, even if we cannot point to any event, recorded or conjectural, as the Original Transaction by which the Compact was made, may be a very important and necessary moral and political Reality. And it is so; since it expresses, in one phrase, the mutual relations of the Governors and the Governed, and of all classes one with another; the reciprocal Character of their Rights; the possibility of the obligations of one party ceasing, in consequence of some act done by another party; the Duty of fidelity

VOL. II.

and respect to the Constitution; and the condemnation of those who violate or disregard such Duties.

909. But we reply further: that the Original Compact is a Fact, if we accept, as the terms of the Compact, those Principles of Polity, those fundamental Political Laws and Maxims, which have been generally accepted and approved in all ages of the history of the Country; and which, though occasionally forgotten or transgressed, have constantly resumed their authority, when the influence of force or party interest was removed. The aggregate of such Laws and Maxims, in other words, the Constitution of the Country, is a Fact; and has always been so regarded; not by theoretical writers only, but by men accustomed to deal with Facts; by lawyers, statesmen, and Englishmen of all classes. Whatever doubts may exist, with regard to some of the Rules and Maxims so asserted, it is plain that such a set of Principles have, as a Fact, existed in the Collective Mind of the Country; as appears by the Constitution having grown out of them. And if it be urged, as an objection, that the Maxims which make up the Constitution have been adopted in succession, as the result of struggles between conflicting parties, and different Classes in the State; we reply, that this is so far from showing that there is no Social Contract, that it gives to the result still more the character of a Contract; for in other Contracts, also, it constantly happens, that each party to the Contract recedes from its original claims; and the conditions of the Contract are different from the pretensions put forward on either side, in the course of the negotiations.

The Social Contract therefore, which we assert as a moral Doctrine, is not to be rejected because it is not a Fact in the sense in which the objector requires it to be so, namely, a single Historical Fact; and it

is a Fact, so far as is requisite for the purpose of its being a true Moral Doctrine.

910. But it is further objected by Paley, that the Doctrine of a Contract is false and useless, because men in general have not actually given their consent to the fundamental Rules of the Government under which they live, and have had no opportunity of giving or refusing such consent.

911. In order to determine how far this objection is valid, we must consider what the analogy of Contracts in general teaches us, with regard to consent which may be supposed or implied, though not actually given. Now on this subject, we have not the smallest need to follow any other teaching than that of Paley himself, in order to assert an Original Contract. In speaking of the Administration of Justice, he says, "The law of nature, founded in the very constitution of human society, which is formed to endure through a series of perishing generations, requires that the just engagements a man enters into should continue in force beyond his own life; it follows that the private Rights of persons frequently depend upon what has been transacted in times remote from the present, by their ancestors or predecessors, or by those under whom they claim, or to whose obligations they have succeeded." But this,

which he here asserts of private Rights, may, with exactly the same reason, be asserted of public Rights. Public Rights and Obligations, no less than private, may depend upon what was done by our predecessors, and upon their Rights and Obligations. And the examples which he offers, further show this. They are such as these the questions which arise between Lords of the Manor and their Tenants; between the King and those who claim Royal Franchises; questions of Tithes; and the like; which, as he says, depend upon ancient Grants and Agreements. "The appeal," he adds, " to those grants