quent under former princes both of the Tudor and of the Stuart families, fell with the odious tribunal, the Star Chamber, by which they had been enforced.

983. It is true, that some persons still held that the Royal Power was absolute, and could not be limited by opposite acts or length of usage. But these doctrines were not those of the Parliament; the attempts to exclude James II. from the throne, showed how large a portion of the sovereign power was held to reside in other branches of the government. And the Revolution, which placed William the Third on the throne, involved a complete repudiation, on the part of the nation, of the doctrines of the Absolute Power, and the indefeasible and imprescriptible Rights, of the King of England. Yet the asserters of the liberty of England, even in this extreme case, attempted to divest their act, as much as possible, of the aspect of violence. The great. vote of Jan. 28, 1689, was to the effect that King James II. had "abdicated the government, and that the throne was vacant." In this, it was not pretended that the word "abdicated " was used in its ordinary sense, to denote a voluntary`resignation of the crown. It was a somewhat gentler term than "forfeited," which was the notion really intended. But the national act, in this case, went beyond even the meaning of forfeiture; for it disregarded the rights of James's Heirs, and appointed another Sovereign. The modern constitutional writer whom we have mainly followed in our historical survey, says, on this occasion,* “ It was only by recurring to a kind of paramount, and what I may call hyper-constitutional law; a mixture of force, and regard to the national good, which is the best sanction of what is done in revolutions; that the vote of the Commons could be defended. They proceeded, not by the stated rules of the English

VOL. II.

* Hallam, Eng. Const., ., 134.

Y

Government, but the general rights of mankind. They looked not so much to Magna Charta, as the original compact of society, and rejected Coke and Hall for Hooker and Grotius." As we have said (895), Revolutions cannot be justified by stated Rules of Government, but must be defended as Cases of Necessity. The defence of the Revolution of 1688 was, that the constitutional liberty and rational independence in matters of religion, which by the historical education of Englishmen were become necessary to their moral agency and moral progress, could not subsist under princes whose views of the national constitution and national religion were those of the Stuarts: and the proof of this incompatibility, which had been gaining strength ever since the accession of James I., was completed by the last acts of James II. A Revolution of which this is the ⚫ true defence, conducted calmly, resolutely, and peaceably to its object, may very fitly be called Glorious.

984. This great occasion of the assertion of the liberty of England was signalized by the Declaration of Rights, which gave judgment on the past, and maxims for the future acts of the crown. It contains a recital of the arbitrary acts which James had committed, and a condemnation of them as illegal. In this important act, it is declared: "That the pretended power of suspending laws, and the execution of laws, by royal authority without consent of parlia ment, is illegal: That the pretended power of dispensing with laws by royal authority, without consent of parliament is illegal: That the Commission for creating the late Court of Commissioners for ecclesiastical causes, and all other commissions and courts of the like kind, are illegal and pernicious: That levying of money for or to the use of the crown by pretence of prerogative without grant of parliament, or for longer time, or in other manner than the same

:

is granted, is illegal: That it is the right of the Subjects to petition the King, and that all commitments or persecutions for such petitions are illegal : That the raising or keeping a standing army within. the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is illegal: That the subjects which are protestants, may have arms for their defence suitable to their condition, and as allowed by law That elections of members of parliament ought to be free: That the freedom of speech, or debates in parliament, ought not to be impeached, or questioned in any court out of parliament: That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted: That juries ought to be duly empanneled and returned, and that jurors which pass upon men in trials of high treason ought to be freeholders: and That for the redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening, and preserving the laws, parliaments ought to be held frequently." This Declaration was by the Bill of Rights.

985. After the Revolution, the Constitutional Liberty of England seemed to be sufficiently secured; and was so yet the care of parliament was still employed in devising and enacting further Securities. The appropriation of the revenue by Parliament was carried into further detail, by the separation of the Civil List, and of the Navy, Army, and Ordnance Department, from each other. "This measure has given the House of Commons so effectual a control over the executive power, or more truly speaking, has rendered it so much a participator in that power, that no administration can possibly subsist without its concurrence; nor can the session of parliament be intermitted for an entire year, without leaving both the naval and military force of the kingdom unprovided for."* The Mutiny Bill also, by which alone *Hallam, Eng. Const., 11., 159.

martial law can be administered in the army, was from this time passed only from year to year.

986. The Act of Settlement, by which the Electress Sophia, after the death of Queen Anne, was declared to be the stock of the Royal line, contained further provisions, intended to secure the nation against arbitrary acts of the Court: especially the exclusion of pensioners, and many of the officers of the Crown, from parliament; and the protection of the independence of the Judges, by making their commissions continue quamdiu se bene gesserint, during life or good behaviour, instead of durante bene placito, as long as the crown chose, which had been the practice.

987. Thus, so far as Parliament was the guardian of the National Liberty, the cause of liberty was fully vindicated; and the doubt might occur, whether, according to the Constitution so modified, Parliament might not sometimes be led, by some special object, to interpose its power so as to obstruct the acts of the crown, and to make government impossible. Order seemed to have been sacrificed to Liberty. But this was not the case. The balance between Order and Liberty was preserved by the struggle which took place within the boundary of Parliament itself. The Influence of the Crown and of the Aristocracy was in that field exerted in favour of Order; and with more steadiness and care, than can be expected, on that side, from the Democracy. The efforts of the Democracy soon began to be directed to diminish or extinguish this Influence. One of the points, which thus came into conflict, was the mode of electing the Members of the House of Commons. By the theory of the Constitution, as it had been commonly stated, these Members were the Representatives of the Common People ; but the Advocates of popular Rights asserted that in fact, they were not so; and that the House of

Commons ought to be reformed, so as to bring the fact into nearer accordance with the theory of Representation.

988. By the ancient Constitution, the House of Commons was supposed to contain representatives of all the parts of the Empire which were subject to English laws and parliamentary burthens. Henry VIII. extended the right of election to the whole of Wales, the counties of Chester and Monmouth, and even the towns of Berwick and Calais ; and thus added thirtythree members to the Commons.* Edward VI. created fourteen boroughs, and restored ten, that had disused their privilege. Mary added twenty-one, Elizabeth sixty, and James twenty-seven members. But the design of the great influx of new members from petty boroughs, in these latter reigns, seems to have been to secure the authority of government, which such members were likely to support, rather than to follow out a democratic principle of the Constitution.

989. Four different kind of Electors of the Representatives of Boroughs appear in our Constitutional History. (1) Members of Corporations: the municipal magistracy or governing body of the incorporated place; (2) Freemen of Corporations, to whom the elective franchise was given by charters of incorporation; (3) Electors by Burgage Tenure ; where the right was annexed to certain freehold lands or burgages, and did not belong to any persons but such tenants; (4) The inhabitant householders paying scot and lot, which include local and general taxes. This was the original form of the right as enjoyed by Boroughs in the time of Edward I., and was applied to all of a later date, where a franchise of a different nature was not expressed in the charter.