of any one, which a life spent in tranquil society commonly produces, may lead men to think with dislike of the punishment of death, and of other severe bodily punishments. But if this dislike operate so as to make citizens neglect, or violate, their duty of cooperating to enforce the Law, the result will be the growth of crime, and the recurrence of a disordered and violent condition of society. Judge, Jury, Prosecutor, Witnesses, are alike bound by this Duty; and alike chargeable with the consequences of its neglect.

1055. The degree of co-operation which the State has required of its citizens in the enforcement of criminal Law, has been different in different times. Among the ancient Jews, capital punishment, death by stoning, was inflicted by the hands of the assembled people themselves. In modern Europe, and in the world in general, the infliction of death, or mutilation for great crimes, has usually taken place in public; and has been regarded with sympathy, or at least with acquiescing awe, as a natural act of justice, necessary to the safety of good citizens. The freedom and diversity of opinions which have prevailed on political matters in England, have rendered men less generally ready to sympathize with acts of the State against individuals; and thus, the sympathy for necessary justice has been dull, while a sympathy for the individual is lively. But this disproportionate progress of sympathy, for the good and the bad members of society, is a defect in our national moral culture. The humanity is of a partial and perverted kind, which is attracted most by the necessary consequence of criminality.

1056. The prevalent detestation of criminals has been, in most states, one of the holding points of the general avoidance of crime; and consequently, one of the means of a general moral culture. Some

punishments so far take this prevalent feeling for granted, as to make it the instrument of punishment; as when the criminal is declared infamous; or when he is put in the Pillory, which is infamy added to bodily pain. These punishments are, undoubtedly, very unequal in the weight with which they fall upon different persons, according to the public opinion respecting them; and this is a defect in such punishments. But it does not appear that orderly society can subsist without assuming, in a great measure, that agreement between public opinion and judicial proceedings which such punishments assume. acts, which are great crimes by the law, cease to be infamous, or to shock men's minds, the law ought to be altered if for no other reason, yet for this; that the evils attending the frequency of such acts, being really felt, may excite general anger against such crimes and such criminals, and thus bring men's feelings into harmony with the law which condemns them. If the law, as a means of moral discipline, lose its hold upon men, from being too rigorous, it may regain its hold by being relaxed: but it is to be recollected that the hold thus gained consists in the suffering, alarm, and indignation which crime produces.

1057. Many attempts have been made to render punishment a moral Discipline, not only for society in general, but also for the criminal himself; to reform him, while we punish. And so far as this is compatible with the reality of punishment, it is a Duty to aim at such an object: not only as a matter of humanity towards the individual, but also as a step in the moral improvement of the community: for the persons who are punished by imprisonment, or otherwise, are, after a longer or shorter time, liberated; and these form a part, and in populous States, not a small or unimportant part, of those whose collective moral character is the moral character of the com

munity. How the reformation of criminals is to be aimed at, whether by solitary confinement, by making the prisoner's subsistence or comfort depend upon his industry, or in what other way, is a question, rather of Prison Discipline than of morality.

1058. The punishments besides death and bodily suffering, as Fine, Imprisonment, Exile, Deportation to a convict colony, and the like, differ much in the severity with which they fall upon different persons, according to their previous circumstances, and the circumstances of the community. Through the feeling of the repugnance which the infliction of death excites in bystanders, many persons have been led to think that capital punishments ought to be abolished altogether. If other punishments could come to assume such a character as to give to men's Rights their reality, capital punishments might cease. But such an increase in the efficacy of lower punishments, such as exile, imprisonment, and the like, must depend, in a great measure, upon the value of those benefits of social life from which the exile and the prisoner are excluded. If the general lot of man in society could be made so delightful, that it would be comparative misery to lose it, Banishment or Imprisonment for offenders might suffice to keep up such a condition. But then, it is to be recollected, that one requisite for our advancing towards a state of society so generally satisfactory, is the establishment of Moral Rules as realities: and to this, at present, there appears to be no way, except by making Ignominious Death the climax of our scale of Punishments.

1059. We have said that there are two kinds of Laws, Laws against Wrongs and Laws against Vice. What we have hitherto said respecting Punishments, applies mainly to the former kind. The general Principle which we have laid down respecting Punishment in such cases, namely, that it is to

be regarded as an Instrument of Moral Education, is still more evident with regard to Punishments appointed for acts, which, though vicious, violate no man's Right. Such are Laws against cruelty to animals; as we have said (1026); Laws against Indecency and Profligacy; against Profaneness and Blasphemy; and the like. Punishments assigned to such Offences, evidently have it for their purpose to mark the judgment of the State as to what is right, and what is wrong; and to call upon the citizens to agree in this judgment. Such Laws are intended, not to protect the Rights, but to mould the Manners of the citizens; not so much to prevent the acts which they forbid, as to foster in the community a disposition the opposite of that which such acts betray. The State forbids cruelty to animals, because it approves, and would cherish, the feeling of humanity. It puts down indecency and profligacy, as far as a regard for freedom will allow it to do so, because it respects, and would diffuse, chastity and purity. It condemns profaneness and blasphemy, because it reverences God, and would lead all its members to share in this reverence. Such Laws are manifestly Moral Lessons. The State, in promulgating such ordinances, plainly comes forward in the character of a Teacher of the Citizens.

1060. But yet, this office of teaching must needs be very imperfectly discharged, if the means which the State can employ for this purpose are only those which we have mentioned. Punishments, when viewed as Instruments of the Moral Education of the citizens, may have a significance which they cannot have under any other point of view; but still, they are Instruments which can carry the work but a little way. We must have something different from the Axe, the Scourge, the Chain, the Branding Iron, in order to raise the minds of men to any elevated standard of morals. The use that is made of them,

may show that Moral Education is a Duty which the State acknowledges, and must needs acknowledge; but we must look in another quarter for the only effectual means by which this Duty can be performed.

CHAPTER XV.

HOW CAN THE STATE EDUCATE THE PEOPLE?

1061. As we have seen, the State is necessarily driven to aim at the Moral Education of its members, and yet has no prospect of effectually promoting this object by its ordinary means of action, Law and Punishment. For Law (460) deals with external acts; Morality, and therefore Moral Education, with internal motives and intentions; and how is the State to penetrate to and to mould these? Education unfolds the Faculties and imparts Belief (561). How can the State impart Belief? The foundation of Morality is a Knowledge of Truth, and especially of Religious Truth (565). How can the State give such a Knowledge? Religious Truth is kept present to men's minds, and effective in their lives, by means of Religious Sympathies and Religious Ordinances. How can the State reach such Sympathes or direct such Ordinances?

1062. It is plain that the State cannot do these things of itself; and cannot do them at all, except it can for that purpose obtain the aid of the Religious Teachers of its people. If it can induce them to act in conjunction with it, the State may, by means of Religious Education, impart a Moral Education. Using the term Church in a general sense, as implying the Teaching Body in every Religion, the State