powers in some Mohammedan Countries, exercise both civil and criminal jurisdiction over their Countrymen; though this jurisdiction is of a limited kind. To these cases of exceptions to the territorial jurisdiction of a State, are added a foreign army, marching through the country, or stationed in it; and foreign ships of war in its ports, the two States being in amity. But the private vessels of one State entering the ports of another, are not exempt from the local jurisdiction, except so far as compact exempts them.

1187. With the exceptions just stated, the two leading Maxims of International Law, as it regards Jurisdiction, are generally admitted: First, that the Laws of a State have force within the limits of its own government, and bind all the subjects thereof, but have no force beyond those limits: Second, that all persons who are found within the limits of a gov. ernment, whether their residence is permanent or temporary, are to be deemed subjects thereof.*

1188. Thus the inhabitants of each State are ruled by their own Laws. But this does not suffice for all the occasions of human action. Men of dif ferent countries have intercourse of various kinds with each other. Men travel from one country to another. As they move, they carry with them characters and attributes which have been assigned to them by the laws of their own country; as rank, wealth, wife, legitimate children, contracts. cannot avoid inquiring how far these characters and attributes are modified by the transition from one country to another, in which the Laws respecting them are different. And here, we find that States in general have agreed to a Maxim which gives, in all common cases, stability and permanence to the conditions and relations of men. This Maxim (the

Story's Conflict of Laws, p. 30.

We

Third in addition to the First and Second which we have mentioned) is as follows. The Laws which are of force within the limits of a State are allowed to have the same force in other States also, so far as they do not interfere with the powers or rights of those States or of their citizens. This extra-territorial efficacy is granted to the Laws of States, by a general disposition to further each other's ends, which is called the Comity of Nations.

1189. It has been thought by some jurists* that the term "Comity is not sufficiently expressive of the Obligation of a Nation to give effect to the Laws of foreign nations when they do not interfere with its own. It has been said that it is not a matter of Comity, or Courtesy, but of Duty. And undoubtedly it is a Duty of every State to give effect to the Laws of other States, so far as they are means of promoting Justice, Humanity, Truth, Purity, Order. But this Duty cannot be said to amount to an Obligation (of the kind often called a perfect Obligation); for if withheld, it cannot be enforced. One Nation cannot assert a Right to have its Laws made effective within the territory of another State, and without the State's Consent. The practice of giving to Laws this extra-territorial effect prevails, not in virtue of the Rights of Nations, but of their Moral Claims on each other, and of their Mutual Duty. And this Duty is called Comity, rather than by any name implying a higher Morality, because a State, in carrying into effect the Laws of a foreign nation, does not pretend that they are necessarily good and moral Laws; which, with regard to its own Laws, it does pretend. The great ends of Law, the security of person and property, the observance of good faith, the stability of family ties, these are the common objects of all States in their Laws and

Story's Conf., 33.

Administration. The Laws of foreign States, with regard to Protection, and Property, and Contracts, and Marriages, may be different from our own. We (the State) cannot pretend to say that they are good in the same manner that our own are; but we will not dwell upon this doubt; we will take for granted that they answer the ends of Law; we will recognize and assist their operation on that assumption. This is the spirit in which nations adopt the Maxim which we have stated; and this spirit of action ap. pears to be better described by calling it the Comity or Courtesy of Nations, than if we were to say that such a practice is followed in virtue of the Mutual Rights of Nations; for these Rights are not acknowledged to this extent; or in virtue of their Mutual Duties for this would imply that it would be wrong not to accept the foreign Law; a doctrine which would too much infringe the special respect with which the State looks upon its own Law. Courtesy is a Duty, but a Duty which must give way, when it comes into conflict with higher Duties, in which the distinction of right and wrong is concerned and such a Duty is the Comity of Nations.

1190. Since there are thus many Cases to which foreign as well as domestic Laws apply, it must often happen that doubts and apparent contradictions occur, as to which Law is to be followed in a particular Case; there will be a Conflict of Laws. Examples of such difficulties occur in the following Questions May a Contract which is valid by the Laws of the country when it is made, be enforced in a country where such Contracts are invalid, or illegal? May a Marriage between persons of full age, according to the laws of one country, be dissolved by their removing into another country by whose laws they are still minors? If a person has Property in one country and Debts in another, according to what laws are his creditors to be paid? Such ques

tions arise in endless number. They cannot be decided without the establishment of some general maxims on the subject of the Conflict of Laws. To lay down, however, and to apply such Maxims, is the office of works written expressly on this subject, and to them we must refer. I may notice, as a work of great value on the subject, Judge Story's Conflict of Laws; and in this, the reader will find the other standard works on the subject, quoted and discussed.

1191. I may however very briefly state some of the Maxims which have been generally accepted on this subject.

With regard to immovable property (land and the like) the law of the place where it is situate, governs in everything relating to the tenure, the title, and the forms of conveyance. Hence, a deed or will of real property, executed in a foreign country, must be executed with the formalities required by the local laws of the State where the land lies. This Rule is

termed Lex loci rei sita.*

1192. With regard to movable property (money and goods), the modes of conveyance and the like are principally governed by the home or domicile of the party. This Rule is the Lex domicilii.

1193. It becomes necessary to lay down some Rule for the determination of the National Domicile of a person; for there may be instances in which, from change of residence, or from having several places of abode, a person's domicile may be doubtful. The definition given by jurists† is, that the Domicile is a person's principal residence, to which, when absent from it, he always retains an intention of returning (animus revertendi). To this general Rule, others, applicable to particular cases, are subordinate, but we need not dwell upon such details.

Wheaton, Vol. 1., 136.

† Story, § 41.

1194. With regard to Contracts, the general Rule is, that a Contract valid by the Law of the place where it is made, is valid everywhere else. This Rule, established by the general comity and mutual convenience of nations, is termed Lex loci contractus.

1195. But again,* every sovereign State has the exclusive right of regulating the proceedings in its own courts of justice. This Rule is Lex fori. And the Lex loci contractus of another country cannot apply to such cases as are properly determined by the Lex fori of that State where the contract is brought in question. Thus, if a Contract made in one Country is attempted to be enforced, or comes incidentally in question in the judicial tribunals of another, everything relating to the forms of proceeding, the rules of evidence, and of limitation or prescription, is to be determined by the law of the State where the suit is pending, and not of that where the Contract was made.

1196. The municipal laws † of most countries prohibit foreigners from holding Land within the territory of the State, because in most countries the Rights of Government are connected with the tenure of land, as was the case in Europe under the feudal system. In that case, the acquisition of land involved the notion of allegiance to the Sovereign within whose dominions it lay, which might be inconsistent with the allegiance which the proprietor owed to his native sovereign.

1197. The right of Succession, like the right of real property, was conceived to depend on the State, and to be a creature of the State. Hence, this right was denied to foreigners dying in the Country; and the Sovereign of the Country took their property. This Right of the Sovereign, as it existed in France, † Wheaton, p. 138.

* Wheaton, I., 149