doos, with refpect to the nature of matter.

Of that creed he gives the following abstract from Sir William Jones.

"The difficulties attending the vulgar notion [we should have faid the common philofophic notion] of material fubstances, induced many of the wifeft among the antients, and some of the most enlightened among the moderns, as well as the Hindoo philofophers, to believe that the whole creation was rather an energy than a work, by which the infinite mind, who is present at all times, and in all places, exhibits to his creatures a fet of perceptions like a wonderful picture, or piece of mufic, always varied, yet always uniform."

In another paffage, the fame author (adds Mr. Stewart) obferves,

"that the Vedantis, unable to form a distinct idea of bruté matter independent of mind, or to conceive that the work of fupreme goodness was left a moment to itself, imagine that the Deity is ever prefent to his work, and conftantly fupports a series of perceptions, which in one fenfe they call illufory, though they cannot but admit, the reality of all created forms, as far as the happiness of creatures can be affected by them." P. 82.

We appeal to our readers if this be not the very idealifm of Berkeley, though extremely different indeed from that of Hume. Mr. Stewart fays, it is involved in the phyfical theory of Bofcovich; and if fo, it furnishes a new proof that the theory of Bofcovich differs not effentially from that of the Bishop of Cloyne, who fays exprefsly-" I fee this cherry, I feel it, I tafte it; and I am fure nothing cannot be feen, or felt, or tafted; it is therefore real. Take away the fenfations of foftnefs, moisture, rednefs, tartnefs," (i. e. the forms of the Hindoos)" and you take away the cherry*."

In the second section of this chapter, Mr. Stewart cenfures Dr. Reid for confounding with the primary qualities of matter, what he calls its mathematical affections; and declares it to be his opinion, that the Doctor thus left fome advantage, which he might otherwife have had in his controverfy with the adherents of Berkeley. We confefs ourselves to be of a very different opinion. The mathematical affections of matter could not, as Mr. S. admits, have been employed in that controverfy, but on the fuppofition that pace is a real thing, diftinct alike from mind and matter, but of neceffary exiftence, and equally incapable of being created or annihilated! But Berkeley and his adherents did not admit the

*Third Dialogue, &c.

reality

reality of this modern idol of Englishmen, as Leibnitz fomewhere calls it; and therefore Dr. Reid could have gained nothing by introducing it into a controverfy with fuch men. We are perfectly aware of the opinions of Newton and Clarke about the nature of pace, and we are ready to pay all reasonable deference to their high authority; but even Newton and Clarke were not infallible; and their mistakes on this fubject, as well as on fome others, may have been de tected by meaner men. It is by no means peculiar to Berkeley and his adherents to deny the existence of space as a pofitive thing. Dr. Law, afterwards bishop of Carlifle, whom no man ever suspected of being a Berkeleyan Idealift, attacked this notion, both in his notes on King's Elay on the Origin of Evil, and afterwards in his own Inquiry into the idea of Space, time, immenfity, and eternity; and proved, we think, with the force of demonftration, that Space has no better claim to a neceffary and uncreated existence than a vacuum; that we have as pofitive an idea of the one as of the other; and that we might with as much truth talk of an infinite and eternal vacuum, as an exiftence diftinct both from mind and matter, as of an infinite and eternal Space. This opinion we have very decidedly adopted, though it would require more room than we can afford, to enter into a defence of it here, against the advocates for the pofitive existence of Space. It would indeed be impoffible, within the limits prefcribed to us, fo much as to enumerate diftinctly the different notions which these men have profeffed to entertain of this fingular existence ;-fome calling it a fubftance; others, a property; fome, a middle thing, between fubftance and property; and others, a mode of existence, a relation, a mere poffibility; while fome have confidered it as one of the attributes of the Deity, or an attribute of his attributes; and a very few have dared to call it even his fenforium. It is very true that we have a diftin&t idea or notion of Space ; and Dr. Reid has fhown, in a fatisfactory manner, as Dr. Law had done before him, by what process that idea or notion is required; but we have as diftinct ideas of darkness and a vacuum as of Space. Are darkness and a vacuum real things, of which any pofitive properties may be predicated? If it be faid, and we think we have met with fuch a faying fomewhere, that Space must be fomething real, because it admits, within certain portions of it, the existence of folid bodies; we reply, that a vacuum likewife a lmits within fome portions of it the existence of matter; darkness, the exiftense of light; and nothing, the existence of many things. Are a vacuum, darkness, and nothing, realities? But it is faid, that

002

after

after we have got the idea of space, we cannot by any effort banifh it from our minds, or fet limits to its extenfion. In a certain fenfe, this is true; but is it not likewife true, that, if we were placed on the utmost verge of creation, we could not banish the idea of vacuity from our minds, nor fet any limits to its imaginary extenfion beyond us?

In the third Effay we have found nothing to arrest our attention. It is extremely well written, as every part of the volume is; and the author has clearly proved, that on moft queftions connected with the philofophy of the human mind, the French are, at least, half a century behind the writers of this Island. He likewife tells us, once more, what he fhall himself achieve, fhould he live to execute a plan which be has long meditated, of analyzing the logical proceffes, by which we are conducted to the different claffes of truths; i. e. if he should live to complete his great work on the Human Mind, with which he has so often promised to favour the public.

There is not any thing in this work, which has pleased us more than the fourth Effay. Mr. Stewart does not reafon gravely with Hartley, Prieftley, and Darwin; but fairly ftates the peculiarities of their fyftem in their own words, fhowing how readily the fame writer employed thefe peculiarities at different times to ferve purposes not only different, but directly oppofite and contrary to each other. He has thus expofed them to the contempt and ridicule of all thinking men, much more effectually than if he had attempted to treat them as Hume and Berkeley were treated by Dr. Beattie; while by making them contradict themselves and confute each other, he has fatisfied the reader that he had no occafion to reafon on the fubject. The juftice too that he has rendered to the character of Dr. Hartley, which had begun to fuffer from the company into which he has been dragged, gave us great pleasure; for Hartley feems to have been a confcientious and virtuous man.

"It must net," fays Mr. Stewart, "be concluded from thefe extracts, that Hartley was a decided materialift. On the contrary, after obferving, that his theory must be allowed to over. turn all the arguments which are ufually brought for the immateriality of the foul, from the fubtilty of the internal fenfes, and of the rational faculty,' he acknowledges candidly his own conviction, that matter and motion, however fubtilly divided, or reafoned upon, yield nothing but matter and motion ftill;' and therefore requests, that he may not be, in any way, inter. preted fo as to oppofe the immateriality of the foul.' I mention this (continues our author) in justice to Hartley, as most of his

later

later followers have pretended, that, by rejecting a fuppofition of a principle diftinct from the body, they have fimplified and perfected his theory." P. 130.

The philological fpeculations, of which Mr. Stewart confiders the tendency in his fifth Effay, are chiefly thofe of Horne Tooke, of which we have given our own opinion elsewhere. Mr. Stewart admits, as we do, the greatnefs of that author's merit as an Etymologift; but he doubts, as we do likewife, whether he be entitled to the character of great, either as a philofopher or as a philofophical Grammarian. Mr. Stewart objects particularly to Mr. Tooke's inode of interpreting the words of the English language, its tendency to imprefs upon mankind the belief that fenfation is the only fource of ideas or notions; and that it has this tendency, is indifputable. It has accordingly been adopted and applauded beyond measure by Dr. Darwin and other materialifls, who labour fo ftrenuously to degrade man from his elevated rank in the fcale of beings.

"When I ftudy the intellectual powers of men," fays Mr. Stewart," in the writings of Hartley, of Priestley, of Darwin, or of Tooke, I feel as if I were examining the forry mechanism that gives motion to a puppet. If, for a moment, I am carried along by their theories of human knowledge, and of human life, I feem to myself to be admitted behind the curtain of what I had once conceived to be a magnificent theatre; and while I furvey the tinfel frippery of the wardrobe, and the paltry decorations of the fcenery, am mortified to difcover the trick which had cheated my eye at a distance. This furely is not the characteristic of truth or of nature; the beauties of which invite our clofest inspection; deriving new luftre from thofe miferofcopical researches which deform the moft finished productions of art." P. 187.

We have now taken as comprehenfive a view of the first part of this volume as the limits prefcribed to us would admit; a view certainly fufficient to convince our readers, that in every refpect it is worthy of its author. The ftyle is elegant, perfpicuous, and precife, rivalling in these respects the ftyle of Reid and of Berkeley-the two greatest masters of the ftyle proper for metaphyfical difcuffion, that our country had hitherto produced. In the happiness of his illuftrations, Mr. Stewart perhaps furpaffes them both. There is however one peculiarity in the ftructure of some of his fentences, which, as we think it improper, we will take the liberty to point out. He speaks of the SYSTEMS OF Berkeley and of Bofcovich, and calls M. Prevoft, to

* See Brit. Crit. vol. 29. pp. 461 and 631.

whom

It

whom his book is dedicated, Fellow of the Royal SOCIETIES OF London and OF Edinburgh; but this is furely improper; for it indicates, that Berkeley and Bofcovich had each more than one fyftem, and that there are more than one royal fociety both in London and in Edinburgh. fhould have been, we think, the SYSTEMS of Berkeley and Bofcovich; or the SYSTEM OF Berkeley and of Bofcovich; and M. Prevoft should have been called Fellow of the royal focieties of London and Edinburgh, without the interpofition of the fecond or. Elsewhere he speaks of certain conclufions, which are equally compatible with the metaphyfical CREEDS OF the materialist and of the Berkeleyan. This fhould furely have been-" equally compatible with the metaphyfical CREED OF the materialift and of the Berkeleyan" or rather-" which are compatible with the metaphyfical creed as well of the materialift, as of the Berke leyan." These however are very trifling improprieties.

[To be concluded in another Number.]

ART. II. Obfervations on the Natural Hiftory, Climate, and Difeafes of Madeira, during a Period of Eighteen Years, By William Gourlay, M. D. Fellow of the Royal College af Phyficians, Edinburgh; and Physician to the British Factory at Madeira. 8vo. pp. 158. 6s. Callow. 1811. WE have long been familiar with the name of Madeira,

but although we can atteft the excellence of its wine, and have heard the falubrity of its climate often celebrated, we know little of its actual ftate; we have therefore great pleasure in introducing Dr. Gourlay's work to our readers. He has refided on the inland twenty-five years, and enjoyed the advantages of extensive medical practice.

The first part of the volume treats of the natural hiftory of the island. The account given of its firft discovery by an English nobleman of the name of Machim, in the reign of Edward the Third, is fomewhat romantic; he derives his information from Cordeyro, and states, that he is confirmed in it by the unanimous teftimony of other authors. Puffen. dorff, however, mentions that the island was difcovered by the Portuguese in 1420. Moreri alfo dates it in the fame year, and Raynal, ftill by the Portuguese in 1420, Moreri alfo dates it in the fame year, and Raynal, ftill by the Portuguefe,

Or Machin. Mr. Bowles has made poetical use of it. See his Spirit of Difcovery, Book 4, and the note,