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SERMON I

Moral Agency explain'd, and in what
Sense it is to be attributed to God.

Rev. xv. 4.

Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy Name? for thou only art Holy.

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F all our inquiries concerning the fu- SERM. preme Being, none are more impor- I. tant than those which relate to his

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moral Character; for that is the immediate foundation of our duty to him, and our hopes from him. An intelligent Agent, poffeffed of an eternal immutable existence, almighty Power, and infinite Knowledge, might be an object of fpeculation which would naturally end in diftruft and horror: But perfect rectitude, equity, and goodness, are confidered as practical principles, which fo determine his views, and direct the meafures of his conduct towards other beings, as to be the object of affections, which we know are in the human mind, and of the utmoft

VOL. II,

A

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I.

SERM.confequence to its happiness; the objects of reverence, esteem, love, truft and a defire of imitation. This fhews of how great moment, and how worthy of our attention the fubject is, which we are now entering upon, namely, the confideration of God's moral attributes. In this difcourfe I will endeavour, firft, to fhew what clear and rational evidence we have of his moral agency in general. 2dly, In what fense, and with what limitations, it is attributed to him. 3dly, To what useful purposes it may be applied for the forming our tempers, and governing our practices.

First, to fhew what clear and rational evidence we have of God's moral

agency in general. Our idea of moral agency arises from an attention to what paffes in our own minds. We find in ourselves confcious perception with a felf-determining power, and affections to certain objects variously exerting themfelves; all which in fome degree, and within a limited fphere, feem to be common with us to other animals. But there is in the mind of man, which the brutal nature appears to be incapable of, a power of reflecting upon affections, its own, or thofe of other agents, together with the actions proceeding from them, which are neceffarily approved or difapproved, in other words, judged to be

good

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