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intuition, the intimate effences of all things; SER M. and whofe condition is infinitely above every kind and every degree of weakness or indigence. But on the contrary, a sense of moral rectitude, especially pure benevolence into which it may be ultimately refolved, cannot but appear to have an abfolute excellence in it, worthy of the most perfect nature: Nay, we cannot look upon any Agent as truly amiable without it. It does not suppose the least degree of imperfection; nor is to be conceiv'd as ordain'd to a higher end, but constitutes its own chief end; is the immediate foundation of the highest enjoyment we can apprehend any intelligent nature capable of; and esteem'd by all rational beings merely for its own fake: Or as fome learned men fpeak, (tho' I think not very clearly,) it feems to have a neceffary foundation in the eternal reafon of things. And upon the whole, fo much of this fenfe as is engraven upon our hearts, may well be accounted the finishing part of the divine image in our nature.

What has been faid may be fufficient to answer the objection; but that which was last mention'd concerning the external fenses, will lead us to a diftinct proof of the moral-agency and rectitude of the Deity. Tho' we cannot fay, in general, that whatever sense there is

in

SERM. in us,
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the fame must be in God; on the contrary, whatever imperfection there is in any of our fenfes, it must not be attributed to him; for there is and neceffarily must be an imperfection in the effect which is not in the voluntary, defigning, caufe; yet this must be allow'd as a true principle, that whatever real perfection, (i. e. capacity either of communicating or enjoying happiness,) there is in man, or any creature, the fame is in God, or a fuperior perfection analogous to it. And therefore it is justly infer'd even from our external fenses, that fince We perceive by them, which is a perfection above the state of inanimate nature, He also perceives, tho' in a manner altogether free from the weakness which belongs to our manner of perceiving. He that planted the ear shall be not hear? he that formed the eye fhall he not fee? he that teacheth man knowledge shall be not know? * that is, fince God is the author of that knowledge which we have by our fenfes, or otherwise, whatever we can difcern in our imperfect way, he knows more perfectly. In like manner the judgment of moral differences which is in the mind of man, being derived from God the fame is in him more perfectly; and moral rectitude being the highest excellence which

Pfal. xciv. 9, 10.

the

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the human nature is capable of, (raising it not SER M. only above the inanimate, but all the other animal kinds,) it must be in the original fountain of all excellence, without any of the infirmities which cleave to it in us.

It is true, a great part of this reasoning only proves directly and immediately, that God knows and approves moral good, and difapproves moral evil. But as it is that which effentially constitutes moral-agency in general, it is fufficient to establish the rectitude or moral perfections of the Deity; especially, so far as is neceffary to fettle in our minds a fenfe of indispensable moral obligations from a regard to him. Indeed in imperfect beings, mere approbation of virtue is not enough to make a virtuous character; because we know by experience, that the difpofitions and practice are not always agreeable to it. Men are often hurried by irregular propenfities and paffions into those pursuits which are contrary to the calm dictates of their understandings; and rafhly do, nay fometimes thro' the prevalence of vicious habits continue in doing, what upon reflection their own judgments difapprove. But this can never be the cafe of a perfectly wife Being, infinitely above all intellectual and moral infirmities, above the poffibility of being furpris'd or misled, or of

any

SERM.any difcord between his understanding and I. affections. And therefore if God approves

moral good and difapproves evil, it follows that moral rectitude is his true character, and the invariable principle by which his actions are directed. I proceed,

2dly, To confider in what sense, and with what limitations, moral agency is attributed to God. It is evident that the practice of virtue, and the obligation to it, differs according to the diverfity of conditions wherein agents are placed. That may be the indifpenfable duty of one, which is not required from, nor is indeed practicable by, another more perfectly righteous and good Being, in circumstances intirely different. Gratitude is unquestionably due to a benefactor; so that we can scarcely believe there is any goodness at all in a mind which is not disposed to make affectionate acknowledgments, or suitable returns, for favours received. Patience and equanimity is an important part of a virtuous character in distress. Abfolute refignation to the will of a perfectly wife and good fuperior, is undoubtedly required from those, who being imperfect in wisdom and goodness, are in a ftate of intire fubjection to him, and neceffarily depend upon him. But tho' all these, and others which might be mentioned, are eminent

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eminent virtues in men, and abfolutely necef- SER M. necef-SER fary to a good moral character, yet the obligation of them evidently arises from the imperfection and indigence of our ftate, to which there is nothing parallel in the infinitely perfect and independent condition of the fupreme Being; and therefore they can be no part of his moral rectitude. Who hath given to him that he should recompenfe it? None of his creatures, (and all things in the world are his creatures,) can be fuppofed to lay him under any previous obligations by beneficence, or to have independent rights. There is no wifdom or goodness above his own to truft in; no fuperior authority to which he owes fubmiffion: He is far out of the reach of fufferings, or the least degree of unhappiness. And therefore, the virtues which have a large share in a good human character, and indeed the greatest part of the moral system, as accommodated to our dependent and imperfect state, can have no place in the perfections of the Deity, or be any otherwise attributed to him, than as by his authority he enjoyns, and by his perfect rectitude, wisdom, and goodness, approves them. Of righteousness, as practifed by him, we must form an idea, abstracting from all kinds of fubjection or indigence as much as poffible; but remembring, on the VOL. II.

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con