SER M. contrary, the absolute supremacy of his doI. minion, the glorious immutable excellence of

his nature, and felicity of his condition. Still however, it ought to be received and inviolably maintain'd, as a moral certain principle and of the utmost importance, that he is a moral agent, a God of truth and without iniquity, juft and right is he; acting towards his creatures, not in the way of abfolute fovereignty and arbitrary dominion; difpofing of them as he pleases without any regard to what is fit and reasonable, equitable and good; difpenfing natural good and evil, or happiness and misery, merely as he will; not always willing, and therefore not always doing, what is in itself best, and determining by his fole defpopower the measures of what is called right and wrong, independently on the nature and reason of things, or moral fitness and unfitness; not acting thus, I fay, but always and uniformly from an inward principle, according to the methods of moral rectitude and goodness apparent to his own most perfect understanding. Upon no other foundation can he appear amiable to the human mind. For a sense of moral rectitude with high approbation is indelibly impreffed upon it; and it is not poffible for us to esteem any intelligent being fuppofed to be deftitute of that Perfec

tick

tion. Religion therefore, or the practice ofS E R M. virtue from a regard to the Deity effentially I. founded in good affections to him, must rise or fall; nay it must be or not be, according to the notions we have of his moral character: And 'tis certain that nothing has fo much tended to corrupt it, as men's enormous opinions concerning that article.

To form as complete a notion of this fubject as the narrowness of our capacity will allow, we may reflect on the order and connection of moral qualities in the human mind; and from thence take our rife to the confideration of the fame attributes in other agents endued with them, and even the supreme Being himself. We know that in ourselves there are various particular affections of the virtuous kind accompanied with approbation; fuch as gratitude, compaffion, natural affection, &c. which are principles of felf-approved action, without a defign'd reference to any other principal or higher end. But there is also another principle, namely, benevolence, to which the virtuous instincts before mentioned, and others like them, are fubordinated; and the mind is justified to itself in reftraining and regulating their exercife by its direction. It will appear at first fight to any confiderate perfon, that gratitude, natural affection, and

SER M. compaffion, muft give place to the greatest I. public good, or moft general happiness, which

is the immediate object of benevolence. This, therefore is the principal, the most comprehenfive, and the controuling moral affection in our minds; which will be further confirm'd, if we inquire into the reafons and ends of all the virtuous affections. If the question be, why are compaffion and gratitude planted in the human nature? The answer is, because they tend to the good of the whole. But if it be, Why have we univerfal benevolence, or a difpofition to promote the good of the whole? No anfwer can be given, but that so our nature is conftituted, and fo is the will of its author. From this idea of our own moral frame, if our thoughts afcend to fuperior agents, and even to the eternal absolutely perfect Being, as we cannot avoid apprehending an order and connection in his moral attributes, we shall find ourselves led to conceive of them in the fame manner. It is no prefumption to inquire into the reasons and ends of the divine actions, fince in many inftances he has laid them open to our inquiry; and this is a part of what he bath fhewed us, which may be known of him. If therefore we ask, Why has be planted kind affections in the human nature? Why has be given us excellent moral laws? Why does he

often

often interpofe to relieve the diftreffed? Why SERM. does he bear long with many of his offending I. creatures? Why does he reward virtue and punish vice?-all which belong to his moral administration, and are, in our way of thinking, refer'd to distinct moral principles or perfections in him, as beneficence, pity, longfuffering, juftice. The answer to all is, that fuch is his conduct, because thereby he promotes in the wifeft and moft effectual manner, the greatest absolute good of the whole rational creation. If it be afk'd farther, What is the reafon of his acting from benevolence, and what fuperior end is the greatest abfolute good, or the most univerfal happiness fubordinated to? No answer can be given. Here then we must reft; and there feems to be no error in conceiving that the greatest good, or moft univerfal happiness, is the ultimate end of the Deity, and pure benevolence the ultimate determination (if it may be fo called) of the divine mind.

From what has been faid, I think we may infer that benevolence, the nobleft and moft excellent moral affection, is to be attributed to God in the ftrictest and most proper fense. Other moral principles, as justice, mercy, faithfulness, which we cannot help thinking inferior, because they ultimately

SERM.refer to benevolence, and its immediate obI. ject is their laft end, These we also afcribe to God, but in a more improper fenfe. They are fo many diftinct qualities or principles of action in the human mind; accompanied each of them severally with a sense of excellence and approbation, which is wifely ordered by the author of nature to animate us to that diligence in the good works they tend to produce, which the more general calm virtuous principle would not be fufficient for without them; and because our weak understandings could not always difcern the connection between them, and the ultimate end of virtuous action. But thefe reafons do not affect the fupreme Being; and therefore there is no need of fuppofing distinct moral affections in him, tho' we apprehend his moral attributes in that manner, being led to it by the analogy it bears to the constitution of our own nature. Nor does there appear any inconvenience in this way of thinking, provided we preserve always in our minds a just sense of the divine abfolute perfection, infinitely above the infirmity which accompanies particular affections in us. But however we diftinguish, or do not distinguish, the perfections comprehended in the moral rectitude, or holiness of the divine nature, 'tis plain that it is

not,